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Abstract 
 
Despite wide agreement in the systemic field that therapists should take a 
non-blaming stance, historically there has been lit t le explorat ion of how this 
stance is achieved in practice. The difficulty in knowing how to put ‘non-
blaming’ into practice is further heightened by competing models of 
intervention with families affected by psychosis. This study contributes to a 
body of literature that is concerned with how complex issues of morality 
are achieved dialogically by considering how family therapists manage 
the tension of intervening to promote change whilst  maintaining a mult i-
part ial, non-blaming stance. 
 
Two therapies carried out with families affected by psychosis are analysed 
using the methods of Conversat ion Analysis (CA) and Membership 
Categorizat ion Analysis (MCA). In both therapies the sequences examined 
are drawn from the second session of therapy where explicit  blaming 
events occur. By examining blaming events chronologically through the 
course of a session the study shows how the rules about t he way blame is 
talked about are achieved interactionally.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that systemic theory’s emphasis on the 
importance of being non-blaming is grounded in a sophist icated 
understanding of the threat blame poses to co-operation and agreement. 
In both therapies, the delicacy and ambiguity with which blame is t reated 
serves to enable the conversat ion to continue without withdrawal. 
However the cost of ambiguity is a possible misunderstanding of the intent 
of the speaker. The result ing misalignment, where it  continues over several 
turns and sequences, leads to explicit  blame becoming relevant as a 
solut ion to a redundant pattern of interaction.  
 
The findings indicate that the management of blame requires both the 
explorat ion of blame and its interruption when emotions and conflict run 
ii 
 
high. The former enables understanding and movement towards 
therapeutic goals while the latter is necessary to promote therapeutic and 
family alliances. An unintended consequence of the injunction to be non- 
blaming might be the premature closing down of topics, militat ing against 
problem resolut ion.  
 
The study concludes that CA and MCA offer a wealth of knowledge about 
mundane conversat ional practices that can be applied fruit fully to 
systemic therapy process research, teaching and supervision.  
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Chapter 1 
Background to the study 
My motivation for this research is rooted in a clinical conundrum which 
sparked my interest at the beginning of my training as a systemic therapist .  
As a trainee I learned that we should try to diffuse blame in families and 
offer a non-blaming therapy. The very first  family in my training group was 
highly crit ical and blaming. I  used all the systemic techniques available to 
me. I used circular quest ions, I  reframed, looked for unique outcomes, the 
team reflected, we drew geno-grams, we sculpted, yet all my techniques 
seemed to fail. I  (secret ly) blamed family members for persistent ly blaming 
or (overt ly) blamed myself for not being good enough. Sometimes I felt  
blamed by my colleagues for either not taking a stand (colluding) or for 
taking a stand (blaming).  
 
As so often in my work a paper came along to help. John Stancombe and 
Sue White (2005) published their explorat ion of how therapists and families 
manage blame. Their findings resonated with my experiences and I 
stopped thinking of these types of impasse as my failure of technique and 
became interested in the dilemma. How do we, as members of a wider 
culture where blame permeates every sector of life manage the discourses 
of ‘no blame’ in our part icular sub-culture of systemic psychotherapy?  
 
Having qualified I returned to work in the NHS as a family therapist  in an 
adult  mental health context.  Much of my work involves families where a 
member has experienced psychosis.   An underlying quest ion in much of 
the work with such families is ‘is this person mad or bad’? Different theories 
about the cause of psychosis have different repercussions for family 
members. If we correlate childhood trauma with psychosis what might we 
be thinking about t his father here in front of us, is he to blame? And if this 
person has a diagnosis of schizophrenia does it  mean she is not to blame 
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when she shouts at her mum? Might it  also mean that no-one listens to 
what  she is shouting?  So when we start to talk about different ideas about 
what the problem is and what caused it  the stakes are high. People’s 
identit ies are at stake. This thesis documents my explorat ion of blame in 
therapy with families affected by psychosis and shows how blame is an 
important tool in the construct ion and maintenance of morality and 
identity.  
 
Although there is a strong theoret ical basis to systemic therapy’s adoption 
of a non-blaming stance there is lit t le research into how systemic therapists 
deal with blame. Most of the research into blame is within the field of 
cognit ive psychology and attribut ion t heory. This research examines blame 
as an interactive achievement, how speakers infer blame and respond to 
blaming inferences and what they are trying to achieve by such actions. 
By examining the micro-processes of talk in a family therapy sett ing I show 
how systemic theory is put into practice. My chosen research 
methodology, the application of Conversat ion Analysis and Membership 
Categorisat ion Analysis to therapy process, does not have a strong 
tradit ion within the systemic field. I  demonstrate how these methodologies, 
st rongly established in the discipline of sociology, have much to offer 
systemic therapists within the domains of clinical work, research and 
teaching. 
 
The study you see here was not the one I originally intended but evolved 
over t ime in response to the material gathered and my increasing interest 
in what CA and MCA could achieve.  The original design included follow 
up interviews with families involved, and one of these interviews was 
conducted prior to the change of design. Despite the interview not being 
used as originally intended, the family’s report of their subjective 
experience had an important influence on the research. I  have therefore 
included a coda to the thesis which offers another perspective through 
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which to reflect on the findings. A brief history of the project has also been 
provided in Appendix A  
The research questions 
How do family therapists do ‘non-blaming’ in their routine practice?  
Families often come to therapy with contested explanations for the 
difficult ies they are experiencing. They often hope for an expert opinion on 
whom or what is to blame for their difficult ies (Stratton, 2003a; Stancombe 
and White, 1997). Despite wide agreement in the systemic field that blame 
is unhelpful (Watzlawick et  al., 1974; Hoffman, 1995; Selvini Palazzoli et  al., 
1980) historically blame has not been an area of debate in the literature. 
Apart from some notable exceptions (cf. Bowen et  al., 2002, 2005; Stratton 
2003a, 2003b; Stancombe and White, 2005; Furlong and Young, 1996; 
Friedlander et  al., 2000; Wolpert, 2000) there is lit t le discussion about what 
const itutes blame, how to define it , what blame does and how to engage 
with it . Blame poses a dilemma for systemic therapists. It  is a linear 
explanation that fits in a posit ivist  epist emological frame, one eschewed by 
cybernetic, construct ivist  and social construct ionist  explanations. As 
Stratton says: 
 
The systemic movement developed in opposit ion to approaches to 
therapy that were founded in physical science, and which 
conceptualise illness and cure primarily in terms of linear causal 
sequences. In rejecting such simplicit ies, systemic family therapy has 
often not so much said ‘it  is more complex than that ’ as ‘lets not go 
there’. (Stratton 2003a, p.136)  
 
Stancombe and White (2005) demonstrate how blame is a feature that 
permeates Family Therapy and that therapists have to actively work to 
manage their own and family members blaming. This study extends the 
work of Stancombe and White and others to examine t he procedures 
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systemic therapists use to manage blame in an adult  mental health 
context. 
How do systemic therapists manage blame in the context of families 
affected by psychosis? 
In an adult  mental health sett ing the injunction for a ‘no blame’ culture is 
further heightened by competing models regarding work with families 
affected by psychosis. In the field of family interventions in psychosis two 
key theoret ical approaches dominate, Family Therapy (FT) and Family 
Management (FM). Where FM holds a biological model of causation FT 
maintains an interactional understanding. An illness model is one way to 
claim a non-blaming orientat ion towards individuals and families and 
notions of circular causality another, but each have their costs. To be 
mentally ill liberates one from all sorts of common social responsibilit ies. 
However it  confers responsibility to co-operate with expert opinion on what 
to do to get better and can have the unintended consequence of 
marginalisat ion from the social world. Theories that privilege social 
construct ions of mental illness generally remain agnost ic to diagnost ic 
categories and will be more interested in meaning and interaction. 
However families may experience interest in family interaction as blaming 
the family for the psychosis. This study examines how families and therapists 
negotiate different causal explanations for difficult ies and their implications 
for speakers’ identit ies. 
How do therapists manage the competing institutional tasks of decreasing 
blame and increasing agency in their routine practice?  
A key tenet of all therapy, albeit  through diverse means, is to increase 
understanding of our thoughts, feelings and behaviours and the impact of 
these on others with a view to change. Through this increased 
understanding our choices are emphasised and therefore our agency (or 
responsibility) for our actions. Any therapy within the context of mental 
health services then runs the gauntlet between these two competing tasks, 
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decreasing blame and increasing agency. These are essentially moral 
issues. This study demonstrates how therapists manage the tensions 
between emphasising moral agency and personal choice while at the 
same t ime avoiding blame for actions that transgress social norms. 
How do family therapists manage the tensions of negotiating conflicting 
versions of events without allocating blame? 
 In family therapy further tensions arise in managing different and often 
conflict ing versions of events.  Family members presenting with difficult ies 
often produce different descript ions of events in such a way as to 
persuade the hearer that their behaviour is reasonable and the other’s not. 
Thus accepting one person’s version often implies that the other is at fault  
and vice versa. In an individual psychotherapy, a therapist  working with a 
woman who lays the blame for her depression at the door of her husband 
can take t ime to explore the client ’s version of events unt il she feels the 
therapeutic relat ionship is robust enough for the client ’s responsibility for 
the state of affairs to be challenged. However, if the client ’s husband is in 
the room with her, the therapist  must find a way of aligning with bot h the 
wife’s and the husband’s conflict ing versions of events if the therapist  
wants the husband to ever come back. This study examines how therapists 
manage the task of developing a therapeutic alliance with family 
members presenting different versions of events while also maintaining a 
non-blaming stance. 
 
The study contributes to a body of literature that is concerned with how 
complex issues of morality are achieved dialogically. The conclusions of 
the research are that the tasks of negotiat ing what the problem is and who 
or what is responsible for it  are replete with inferences of blame. By 
examining blaming events chronologically through the course of a session I 
have been able to show how the rules about the way blame is talked 
about are achieved interactionally. The systemic therapists and families in 
the study are highly attuned to moral issues which the therapists generally 
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approach through cautious and indirect means. When a prevailing 
misalignment occurs between the tasks different speakers are trying to 
achieve, less caution is shown and explicit  blame is made relevant. I  show 
how both therapists and families draw on identity categories of illness and 
wellness to imply or contest inferences of blame at different t imes to 
achieve different things. I  demonstrate how the therapists and families may 
ignore, mit igate, exonerate or imply blame as part of the process of 
negotiat ing what kind of talking const itutes family therapy. I  describe how 
blame can be both a cause and a solut ion to an interactional problem 
and what is at stake is not the eradication of blame but the quest ion of 
what is deemed reasonable blame and reasonable agency wit hin this 
local context. Through this means I show how the inst itut ion of systemic 
family therapy both const itutes and is const ituted by the local moral order. 
I  argue that the concepts of misalignment and repair within CA mirror the 
broader concepts of rupture and repair in the therapeutic alliance 
literature. I  suggest that CA can illuminate the complex dialogical 
processes by which the therapeutic alliance in mult i-party therapy is 
negotiated. I  also argue that CA and MCA offer a wealth of knowledge 
about mundane conversat ional practices that can be applied fruit fully to 
systemic therapy process research. Finally, I  recommend CA and MCA as 
useful tools in teaching and supervision to enable clinicians to heighten 
their awareness of the micro-processes of communication and their 
inescapable role in the creation of the moral order.    
Organisation of Chapters 
Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
Chapter 2 sets out the rat ionale for the study in the context of the relevant 
theory and exist ing research. Part 1 introduces how blame has been 
theorised in the field of family work, both in the family management and 
systemic literature. The discussion traces the key theoret ical models 
influencing contemporary family therapy in the UK today and their 
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conceptualisat ion of the therapist ’s stance in relat ion to neutrality. This 
forms an introduction to the inst itut ional backdrop of the therapy sessions 
analysed. The aim is to illuminate the theories that inform therapists 
practice in the context of systemic work with psychosis. Part 2 reviews the 
relevant research literature, briefly sketching findings from attribut ion and 
expressed emotion studies before narrowing focus onto therapy process 
research.   
Chapter 3 - Methodology 
Chapter 3 is concerned with methodological issues and is divided into 
three parts. Part 1 introduces the epistemological and methodological 
terrain. Part 2 introduces the methods of CA and MCA in some detail. My 
aim is to explain the methods sufficient ly for those unfamiliar with them to 
follow the analysis and evaluate its claims. In Part 3 the design and 
execution of the study is detailed.  
Chapters 4 and 5 - Data analysis  
Chapters 4 and 5 present the findings from the analysis of two therapies 
carried out with two families affected by psychosis. In both therapies the 
sequences are drawn from the second session of therapy where explicit  
blaming events occurred. My approach to this analysis has been akin to 
the archaeology of a blaming event. Rather than examining many 
blaming events to identify general features, I  have painstakingly dug down 
to uncover the specific structures of these two events. The analysis shows 
the practices by which part icipants in family therapy co-construct the way 
in which a blaming event unfolds. 
Chapter 6 - Discussion 
Chapter 6 concerns the clinical implications of the findings and draws out 
the conclusions and recommendations for clinical practice, teaching and 
further research. I  suggest that CA complement s systemic theory by 
detailing how therapists are influenced both by theory and by feedback. 
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The analysis demonstrates that systemic theory’s emphasis on the 
importance of being non-blaming is grounded in a sophist icated 
understanding of the threat blame poses to co-operation and agreement. 
The therapists in this study demonstrate that blame is seen as a prompt to 
action. In both therapies, the delicacy and ambiguity with which blame is 
t reated serves to enable the conversat ion to continue without withdrawal. 
However the cost of ambiguity is a possible misunderstanding of the intent  
of the speaker. The result ing misalignment, where it  continues over several 
turns and sequences, leads to explicit  blame becoming relevant as a 
solut ion to a redundant pattern of interaction.  
 
I  suggest that the management of blame requires both the explorat ion of 
blame and its interruption when emotions and conflict run high. The former 
enables understanding and movement towards therapeutic goals while 
the latter is necessary to promote therapeutic and family alliances. An 
unintended consequence of the injunction to be non-blaming might be 
the premature closing down of topics, militat ing against problem 
resolut ion. If we think of blame as having an important social function then 
it  opens up the quest ion of what kinds of blame are deemed reasonable 
or not in any therapeutic encounter. CA and MCA are shown to be 
powerful tools with which to illuminate the complexity of how this is 
achieved in practice. 
Coda 
Finally, the coda provides a commentary from one of the families who 
part icipated in the research. It  serves as a warning against becoming too 
wedded to our hypotheses, as a clinician or as a researcher. 
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Chapter 2 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the rat ionale for the study in the context of the 
relevant theory and exist ing research. Part 1 sets out a discussion of how 
blame has been theorised in the field of family work, both in the family 
management and systemic literature. I  go on to discuss the link between 
blame and personal agency within the frame of dialogical and narrat ive 
theory and practice.  Part 2 reviews the relevant research literature, briefly 
sketching findings from attribut ion and expressed emotion studies before 
narrowing focus onto therapy process research.  The aim of this chapter is 
to provide an argument for the relevance of the study of blame to 
contemporary systemic practice and to show that a small scale and 
intensely detailed study such as this is an effective way to capture the 
subtlety of the blaming and mit igating practices with which part icipants 
negotiate the therapy encounter.  
 
Part 1 - Theoretical Literature  
Blame 
blame: n & v ● v t r. 1 assign fault  or responsibility to 2 (foll by on) assign 
the responsibility for (an error or a wrong) to a person etc. ● n  1 
responsibility for a bad result : culpability  2 the act of blaming or 
attribut ing  responsibility… (Thompson, 1995, p.134) 
 
The first  problem in theorising blame is defining it . The ubiquitous use of 
blaming terminology in common discourse confuses the picture. It  might 
be understood as a feeling, an action or a belief1. For blame to be given 
                                                 
1  This is reflected in the research where difficulties in operationalising blame lead to a wide 
range of definitions. (cf. Wolpert, 2000; Stratton et al., 2003a; Bowen, 2005)   
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there must be both an attribut ion of responsibility and moral censure. 
Different iat ing between responsibility and blame can be tricky. If a mother 
says “I’m exhausted because my son kept me up all night crying” she 
attributes responsibility to the son for the sleepless night. Only if she crit icises 
him for doing so, perhaps due to weakness of character or deliberate 
intent will she be blaming him. Family therapists are well aware that 
blaming is not always explicit . The context of the conversat ion, body 
posture or tone of voice might subtly imply blame where none is explicit ly 
spoken (Bowen et  al., 2005; Wolpert, 2000).   
What is the function of blame? 
Blame can be seen to have different functions from different perspectives. 
At an interpersonal level the functions of blame have been identified 
variously as evasion of responsibility, managing feelings of helplessness, 
dealing with feelings of anxiety, avoiding emotional pain, communicating 
needs or sense of helplessness, keeping a conversat ion moving or bringing 
about closure (Furlong and Young, 1996). The culture of psychotherapy is 
broadly predicated upon beliefs that people must take responsibility for 
making changes in their beliefs or behaviour, or accept what they can’t  
change, so that they can live more easily in the world. In the cont ext of 
psychotherapy, blame is often seen as a way of pushing responsibility 
away, of denying personal agency, and as such unhelpful (Shapiro, 2006). 
Concepts of blame and personal agency then are inextricably linked. 
 
At a cultural level Douglas (1992), an anthropologist , argues that types of 
blaming and associated systems of just ice are symptoms of the way that 
society is organised. Every society has a set of possible causes for a 
negative event from which plausible explanations are chosen. From these 
follow a fixed repertoire of obligatory actions. An example might be if a 
child steals from a neighbour.  The community will look for who is to blame 
for the theft. Different moral codes will lead to different attribut ions. The 
injunction not to steal implicates the child.  Beliefs about appropriate 
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parental control may place the blame at the parents’ door. Alternatively 
moral codes about humility and prudence may lead people to blame the 
neighbour for bragging about the amount of cash he has. Each crit icism 
would lead to different types of reparative action. From this perspective 
blame can be seen to be a necessary part of the definit ion of the limits of 
acceptable conduct within a system. Blame indicates that the limits are 
being contested and either they or the contest ing behaviour need to be 
modified. 
The negative impact of blame 
Furlong and Young different iate between crit icism and blame in an 
interpersonal context by defining blame as that which is concerned with 
damning the person not just the behaviour:  
 
I t  is this depersonalising, dehumanising quality that dist inguishes blame 
from construct ive crit icism. The fact that the quality of denigrat ion 
may not be intended by the blamer, or even be objectively 
observable to a third party, is irrelevant. If the effect of an exchange is 
that the personhood of the “blamee” is effectively disputed, this can 
be understood as an episode of blaming. (Furlong and Young 1996, 
p.194) 
 
This definit ion points to the complications involved in researching blame. If 
it  is neither intent ional, nor even observable to a third party, yet is 
experienced as blame by the recipient, then how can we recognise it  at 
all? One clue to the nature of the blame is marked by the emotions that 
accompany it , the manner in which blame is delivered or received if you 
like. For instance the subjects of blame, either by self or others, often 
experience feelings of shame and guilt  (McNab and Kavner, 2001). In the 
field of cognit ive psychology Obuchi et  al. (2004) suggest that blame is the 
cognit ive component of anger. Blame is the judgment that the person 
deserves punishment and anger is the negative affect that accompanies 
 12 
this attribut ion. Feelings of hopelessness are also common. By placing 
responsibility for the fault  firmly outside oneself a sense of powerlessness 
often ensues (Gotlib and Abramson, 1999).  
Blame in the context of families experiencing psychosis. 
Family interventions in psychosis can be broadly separated into systemic 
family therapy (FT) and family management approaches based on 
psycho-education (FM), each of which conceptualise causality different ly. 
While FT is founded on theories of mutual influence and applicable to any 
context, FM models explicit ly adopt a biological understanding of 
psychosis and draw on behavioural and systemic ideas in order to 
influence family interaction. Historically, both FT and FM models are 
associated with concepts that have been interpreted as blaming of 
parents, especially mothers, respectively, the Double Bind and High 
Expressed Emotion. 
The double bind 
Arguably, the very foundations of systemic therapy are located in the 
seminal paper "Towards a theory of Schizophrenia" (Bateson et  al., 1956) 
where the authors first  introduced the double bind theory. The paper was 
an early attempt by the authors to art iculate an explanatory model of 
psychopathology and human interaction based on cybernetic 
epistemology. Despite the authors’ caveat that the concept of the double 
bind was a part ial and somewhat simplist ic account of just one part of the 
extraordinary complexity of family interaction, it  was interpreted by others 
as describing a series of unidirectional and intentional acts that caused 
schizophrenia.  The paper was part  of an on-going research project that 
spanned ten years or so. Those familiar with the concepts the team were 
grappling with would find it  difficult  to see the concept of the double bind 
as a linear and causal relat ionship (Cullin, 2009). Nevertheless, by locating 
the double bind principally in the mother’s communicative behaviour and 
describing the recipient as the "vict im" the authors do seem to invite such 
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an interpretat ion.  The influence of this paper led to a view of systemic 
family therapy for psychosis as blaming of families, especially parents and 
in part icular mothers. For instance MacFarlane and his colleagues in their 
review of the literature on family interventions say:  
 
Family psycho-education originated from several sources in the late 
1970s. Perhaps the leading influence was the growing realizat ion that 
conventional family therapy, in which family dysfunction is assumed 
and becomes the target of intervention for the alleviat ion of 
symptoms, proved to be at least ineffective and perhaps damaging 
to patient and family well-being. (MacFarlane et  al., 2002, p. 255) 
 
This view of systemic family therapy hardly fits with contemporary theory 
and practice, yet it  persists, and in my experience continues to be a barrier 
to the provision of systemic family therapy in adult  mental health services in 
the UK today.  
High expressed emotion 
FM models evolved out of studies of the effect of the family context on the 
course of schizophrenia and specifically out of research that connects the 
emotional climate of a family with relapse (Kuipers et  al., 2002). The 
concept of Expressed Emotion (EE) (Brown et  al., 1962; Brown and Rutter, 
1966) refers to a measure that shows a correlat ion between crit ical, host ile 
or over involved family interactions with relapse rates in family members 
diagnosed with schizophrenia (Bebbington and Kuipers, 1994). ‘Crit ical’ 
and ‘host ile’ families are those where blaming is prominent. EE is not a 
causal explanation, rather a snapshot of the emotional climate of the 
family. Like the double bind theory, the authors never claimed that high EE 
caused schizophrenia, yet popular interpretat ions of this literature have led 
to parents being blamed, if not for causing the original illness then at least 
for relapse. Studies have shown that the relat ionship of EE to family 
functioning is more complex. For example Mcfarlane and Cook (2007) 
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argue that EE tends to develop over t ime and emerges as a consequence 
of the psychotic experience rather than having a causal relat ionship to it . 
Studies of EE in professional care groups support this argument, showing 
that similar patterns of EE develop in the relat ionships of staff working with 
psychotic patients (Barrowclough et  al., 2001; Tattan and Tarrier, 2000).  
Family Management solutions to blame. 
The most common FM models in use are based on a combination of 
biological, behavioural and systemic ideas with a strong emphasis on 
psycho-education. FM approaches emphasise that psychosis is an illness 
like any other and therefore not the fault  of patient or their parents. The 
most common explanation offered is the stress vulnerability model (Zubin 
and Spring, 1977). Families are reassured that EE does not cause psychosis 
but does have an influence on relapse rates. Various skills such as 
communication and problem solving are then taught with the explicit  aim 
of reducing EE and relapse. There has been a gradual shift  of emphasis 
over t ime from more behavioural approaches to an emphasis on cognit ive 
appraisals (NICE 2009). Most models consider the effect of blame on the 
family. For example one of the leading models in the UK emphasises the 
importance of taking an explicit  non-blaming stance from the outset to 
enable families’ engagement, implying that unless this is explicit ly stated, 
then families are likely to feel blamed (Falloon et  al., 2006).  
   
However an unintended consequence of the ‘illness like any other’ 
explanation seems to be greater st igma for both patients and families. 
Cross cultural studies show that where the biomedical view of mental illness 
predominates so does st igma and social exclusion. It  seems that where 
mental illness is seen as connected to trauma, emotion or spiritual matters, 
then those suffering are seen as less different from the rest of the 
populat ion and as a result  less frightening (Bentall, 2003; Read et  al., 2006; 
Watters, 2010).  
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Despite the emphasis on not  blaming the family, anyone working in an 
adult  mental health sett ing will be familiar with discussions about 
‘enmeshed’ or ‘overprotective’ mothers or ‘distant ’ fathers with an implicit  
and sometimes explicit  view that the professionals need to rescue the 
patient from a toxic family environment. Carers continue to report feeling 
responsible for both onset and relapse of psychosis (Corrigan and Miller, 
2004) and sometimes blamed by mental health workers (Gonzalez-Torres et  
al., 2006). 
Critique of the ‘cause or effect’ debate  
The debate about whether HEE causes psychosis or psychosis causes HEE 
serves to obscure a more complex picture. For instance a growing body of 
literature demonstrates a strong correlat ion between child abuse and 
psychosis and between the content of delusions and the actual 
experience of abuse (Dillon, 2010; Read, 2007). These findings challenge 
the disease model of psychosis by reframing delusions as a meaningful 
response to trauma. The potential negative implications of these findings 
for families are summed up by a representative of Rethink in the press: 
 
The mental health field has been here before. The anti-psychiatry 
movement of R D Laing rejected the concept  of schizophrenia as an 
illness and set out to blame the parents…[Lets not] resurrect a sterile 40 
year old debate” (Pinfold, 2005, quoted in Johnstone, 2009, p. 185)  
 
Johnstone argues that the use of the word trauma to summarise a whole 
range of damaging experiences that children and adults can experience 
shifts focus away from other, more mundane damaging experiences, such 
as long term, serious communication difficult ies. In addit ion, it  tends to 
obscure wider social issues also correlated with the incidence of psychosis, 
such as poverty and racism. This posit ion allows for the experience and 
meaning of t rauma to be context dependent and the conceptualisat ion 
of cause and effect as mult i-faceted and interdependent. Some families 
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may have a style of relat ing which is physically and/or emotionally abusive, 
and this will have an effect on the child’s developing brain, the way they 
make meaning, express distress and communicate with others. Other, non-
abusive families may be affected by traumatic circumstances. The 
consequent distress may be expressed through psychosis which then 
impacts negatively on the families’ communication style and emotional 
climate.  
Summary 
So far I  have argued that blame is a concept that is part of day to day life 
and yet sometimes hard to pin down as an observer.  In a social context it  
delimits the bounds of acceptable behaviour. In an interpersonal context 
we are beginning to tease out the complexity of different iat ing between 
construct ive crit icism and destruct ive crit icism (blame). In individual 
therapy, blame of others is often seen as a block to the inst itut ional task of 
increasing personal agency. In family therapy Furlong and Young (1996) 
different iate blame from construct ive crit icism by means of the effect on 
the personhood (identity) of the recipient. Crit icism that is heard to be 
demeaning or unfair leads to emotions such as anger and shame which 
may reduce peoples’ ability to engage in useful therapeutic work. We can 
link these ideas to the research into High Expressed Emotion where we 
have robust evidence that crit ical and host ile expressions of emotion 
negatively affect relapse rates in people with schizophrenia. One key 
aspect of the FM approach to reducing blame is to locate the cause of 
the problem firmly outside the family, in something beyond their control. 
Although the intervention implicit ly suggests that family communication 
style and problem solving capacit ies are lacking, the rat ionale offered is 
that this is due to the effect of the illness. Thus the illness model implicit ly 
absolves all family members from blame. The potentially negative 
consequence of this conceptualisat ion is that the patients lived 
experience may be obscured. Abusive relat ionships in the family, chronic 
communication problems or other t raumat ic circumstances that give 
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meaning to psychotic experience is less relevant than the treatment of the 
illness. In this way both the impact of social factors and the concept of the 
patient ’s personal agency is undermined. In addit ion the ‘illness as any 
other’ argument seems to have the further consequence of social 
exclusion.  
Neutrality, Curiosity and Multi-Partiality – Systemic solutions for 
blame. 
Introduction. 
I t  is not possible to do just ice to the full range of theoret ical influences on 
the systemic therapist ’s stance towards blame within the constraints of this 
thesis. The main thrust of this review of theory is an examination of the 
notion of neutrality and its evolut ion through the history of systemic 
theorising. My rat ionale for this is that arguably, the paradox of blame in 
the systemic field became fore-grounded as the stance of the therapist  
shifted from that of expert to that of non-expert , from technician to 
collaborative conversat ionalist . For this reason I have chosen to focus on 
the concept of neutrality and its evolut ion into curiosity and then mult i-
part iality. These concepts reflect the key theoret ical influences on 
contemporary systemic therapy in the UK, the Milan Systemic, Dialogical 
and Narrat ive frameworks. 
 
I  argue that the notion of neutrality as both an ethical principle and 
pragmatic posit ion continues to influence systemic practit ioners approach 
to blame, part ly due to the continued importance of Milan Systemic ideas 
in the UK context. I  will also turn to a concept that is entwined with that of 
blame, the quest ion of personal agency, and consider how this is 
accounted for in contemporary systemic thinking. I  argue that as the 
dominant metaphor has shifted from system to narrat ive so personal 
agency has been fore-grounded. I therefore frame my discussion of 
agency within the narrat ive framework. 
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First order theories - Neutrality 
I t  is widely agreed that the beginnings of family therapy emerged out of a 
dissat isfaction with psychoanalyt ic models that dominated the field at the 
t ime where the cause of psychological distress was seen as hidden deep 
within the individual psyche. In the 1960’s two groups of therapists focussed 
their attent ion on the centrality of relat ionships in understanding 
symptomatic behaviour. The strategic school took a part icular interest in 
how faulty problem solving became embedded in relat ionship 
(Watzlawick et  al., 1974) Meanwhile the structural approach developed 
ideas about dysfunctional family structures which militated against 
‘normal’ individuation and communication (Minuchin, 1974). What each of 
these had in common was the notion of the therapist  as expert who could 
accurately diagnose the problem and deliver the correct treatment.  Thus, 
although ‘joining’ the family was emphasised as essential in order to invite 
their co-operation, theoret ically, family members’ emotional responses 
were largely overlooked. Whether they felt  blamed or not by the therapist  
was of less interest than changing their faulty logic or structure.  
 
The Milan group combined both these perspectives suggest ing that 
symptoms were the result  of individuals maintaining behaviour designed to 
manage other family relat ionships, but which had escalated beyond the 
behaviour’s original usefulness (Campbell, 2003). Hoffman (1998, p.145) 
explains the adoption of the cybernetic metaphor as an attempt to get 
away from the “blame and change” mind set:  
 
Mental illnesses are indeed mental, in that they are at least 90% made 
up of blame, or causal attribut ions felt  as blame. (Hoffman 1995, p. 
391)  
  
Much of the work of family therapy then has been directed at shift ing 
ideas about where the responsibility for problems lies. The cybernetic 
metaphor brought with it  a dilemma. The concept of circularity negates 
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the assumption of blame in that we cannot isolate a single cause for a 
problem except as an artefact of our own observation. However, neither 
can we fail to create a punctuation at the point of observation. Any 
suggest ion for change implies that that part icular punctuation has been 
isolated as the cause. It  is therefore next to impossible not to experience a 
request for change as a statement of blame. The Milan group placed 
therapist  neutrality (Selvini Palazzoli et  al., 1980) as one of the three 
foundational concepts of the systemic approach. The st ance of neutrality 
was an attempt to counter the negative effects of blame by invit ing 
therapists to give equal weight to the views of every member of a system. 
Cecchin’s definit ion of neutrality for instance was that every family 
member should feel that the therapist  was on his or her side by the end of 
a session (Campbell, 2003). The assumption was that everyone was doing 
the best that they could, given their posit ion within mutually reinforcing 
feedback patterns. Hoffman suggests that the whole technology of 
paradox in the early years was an attempt to remove the attribut ion of 
fault  buried in attempts to elicit  change and escape the blame game. 
When families’ causal explanations were sought the aim was less to 
understand them than to shake them up and introduce new ones. Again 
the emphasis was on the system, feelings such as anger and motivations 
such as right ing wrongs were seen as unimportant to the systemic project 
(Krause, 1993).    
 
However, family therapists work in an arena where evaluation of behaviour 
is of great interest both to the family and to social inst itut ions. Glaser’s 
resolut ion to the issue of therapist  neutrality in the context of child abuse 
was to argue for a separation between the contexts of legislat ion and 
therapy. Therapists then could be shielded from their personal judgments 
by statutory child protection legislat ion for, “These are the arenas….for 
apport ioning judgment and blame” (Glaser, 1991, p.152-3). By separating 
out the context of legislat ion from the context of therapy, therapists could 
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be free to be curious about the family’s subjective experience and beliefs.  
Hypothesising behind the screen allowed: 
 
the therapist  and team to become aware of and art iculate feelings, 
prejudices and judgments […] unless these are art iculated, the 
therapist  will not be free to attend to the family’s perceptions. (Glaser, 
1991, p. 156) 
 
The separation of what Stancombe (2002) refers to as therapists’ front 
stage and backstage work takes on an almost cathart ic air, implying that 
therapists can somehow shake off judgments and enter the therapy room 
with a carefully crafted intervention that can incorporate everyone’s 
posit ion in a blame free way. However Glaser fails to account for the 
production of values within the inst itut ionalised practices of therapy itself 
(Hare-Must in, 1994).  She also implies that if therapists free themselves of 
their own judgements they will not be perceived by the family as judging 
them. Stancombe and White (2005) show that while family therapists work 
hard to create a blame free intervention for public consumption, families 
are highly attuned to any verbal or non-verbal cues that may imply 
concealed blame.  
Second order theories - Irreverence and curiosity 
Influenced by Bateson’s later ecosystemic ideas, construct ivism, feminism 
and post-modern theories second order cybernetics quest ioned the very 
possibility of therapist  neutrality (Campbell, 2003; Dallos and Draper, 2005; 
Flaskas, 2011).  Feminists argued that neutrality led to the implication that 
perpetrators and vict ims of violence were equally responsible (Goldner, 
1985a, 1985b; Mackinnon and Miller, 1987). The central dichotomy 
between the feminist  and cybernetic posit ions is pert inent to the issue of 
blame. A pure systemic therapy would focus on finding ecological 
balance, even at the expense of individuals and as such would be amoral. 
The feminists argued that to take a neutral posit ion was essentially to 
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uphold the status quo. To claim neutrality obscures an essentially polit ical 
posit ion which upholds patriarchal values that are immoral (McConaghy 
and Cottone, 1998). Thus the posit ive cultural function of blame is 
demonstrated as that which defines the type of society we wish to live in. 
 
The influence of construct ivist  ideas focussed attent ion on how meaning 
was created both within the family and within the family/therapist  system. 
Maturana (1988) posited that instruct ive interaction is not possible. An 
actor can never predict how the receiver of the action will understand 
and respond to the act. The therapist  t hen cannot claim to be a neutral 
observer or design interventions to achieve a specific end. The concept of 
the observed system was replaced by that of the observing system. Thus 
the focus of therapy was redefined as the int erplay between the beliefs 
and prejudices of therapist  and family. The combination of these ideas led 
to Cecchin et  al. (1992) replacing the concept of neutrality with that of 
curiosity combined with irreverence. Irreverence denotes the stance of 
consistent ly interrogating every theory, assumption and belief that we hold 
in a spirit  of curiosity. There is an acknowledgement that some beliefs are 
more useful than others and we have the right as therapists to hold our 
beliefs st rongly as long as they are open to scrut iny and reconsiderat ion.  
 
They give an example where a therapist  who believes talking and co-
operation is better than violence reaches an impasse in therapy with a 
violent couple. Although the violence stops the woman is furious because 
the perpetrator has not been punished. The therapist  owns his uncertainty 
and admits his belief, suggest ing the couple not see him for six months so 
he can “cure myself of my prejudice” (Cecchin et  al., 1992, p. 29). Rather 
than enter into dialogue about their different construct ions of the therapy 
encounter then the therapist   
 
constantly undermines the patterns and stories constraining the family, 
promoting uncertainty and thus allowing the clients system an 
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opportunity to evolve new beliefs and meanings….” (Cecchin et  al., 
1992, p.9) 
 
While the posit ion of irreverence moves us closer to an explorat ion of the 
values underpinning blame the emphasis is st ill on the therapist  acting on 
the family to undermine their beliefs. The inference is that although 
therapists cannot not  take a posit ion, they should somehow move to an 
alternative as soon they notice. However, where we might conceivably 
imagine curing ourselves of a prejudice against punishment, could we 
conceive of curing ourselves of the prejudice against sexual intercourse 
between adults and babies except in the most abstract and theoret ical 
manner? Thus the contribut ion of personal and social values to the 
production of values in the therapy room is st ill not fully accounted for. 
Third wave theories - Not knowing and multi-partiality 
Second order cybernetics marked the beginning of what has come to be 
known as the ‘Post Milan’ school. Contemporary Milan systemic theory 
continues to evolve, drawing on a range of theories (cf. Bertrando, 2007) 
and remains highly influential in contemporary practice in the UK.  From the 
1990s onwards the other dominant theoret ical influences on practice stem 
from dialogical, social construct ionist , and narrat ive ideas. Although there 
are differences between the theories, there are many commonalit ies, of 
which the greatest is the prominence of language and meaning making in 
conceptualisat ions of how human problems are both constructed and 
resolved. There is a great deal of cross fert ilisat ion between the theories 
which makes strict dist inct ions difficult . For the purposes of this paper I will 
subsume the influence of social construct ionism within the dialogical and 
narrat ive schools. My just ificat ion for this is that the key social construct ionist  
scholars influencing the systemic field, Kenneth Gergen and John Shotter, 
are drawn on extensively by both dialogical and narrat ive theoret icians 
and perhaps more importantly, my argument would not be enhanced 
part icularly by further dist inct ions. So, I  will begin by tracing the influence of 
 23 
dialogical theories on the concept on neutrality and then, within the 
narrat ive frame, continue the discussion by shift ing focus to the concept of 
personal agency, a concept that becomes more prominent as the 
metaphor of system is replaced by that of language.  
From Curiosity to Not knowing  
Anderson and Goolishian (1988) introduced dialogical theory to the field 
with their concept of human systems as linguist ic systems. They eschewed 
any attempt at hypothesising on the therapist ’s part, be it  neutral or 
curious, due to its potential for hidden moral evaluation. Dialogical theories 
emphasise that nothing we say has meaning in itself except in response to 
other utterances, both in the moment and in the history of dialogues in 
part icular types of conversat ions (Maybin, 2001). With every utterance we 
posit ion ourselves within a discourse and offer a limited choice of posit ions 
from which to respond. In monological conversat ion the speaker refers to 
inner thoughts to give meaning to things and the other becomes fixed in a 
pre-conceived posit ion. To avoid this, therapists should avoid any 
hypothesis, but instead take a collaborative stance in the spirit  of 
conversat ional partners (Anderson and Goolishian, 1988; Anderson, 2001).  
 
Not knowing requires that our understandings, explanations and 
interpretat ions in therapy not be limited by prior experiences or 
theoret ically formed truths, and knowledge. (Anderson & Goolishian, 
1992, p. 28)  
 
Thus ‘not knowing’ becomes a way of maintaining a non-hierarchical and 
non-blaming stance. Crit icisms of the approach follow a now familiar 
refrain. That a) it  is impossible not to be influenced by preconceived ideas 
b) in the attempt to shed power (and blame) therapists again fall into the 
trap of t reating all posit ions as ethically equivalent and c) power is not 
something that can be shed but remains present in the inst itut ionalised 
structures of therapy. In an attempt to address such quest ions dialogical 
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therapists have moved towards the concept of bringing their thoughts and 
feelings into the therapy more explicit ly (cf. Rober, 2002, 2005a, 2005b). Not 
knowing has been replaced by the concept of ‘mult i-part iality’. For 
instance Rober separates out the listening and speaking acts of the 
therapist , locating ‘not knowing’ as oriented to the act of listening while 
advocating a reflect ive stance to consider the posit ion from which we are 
responding. At about the same t ime as Anderson and Goolishian were 
disseminating their model and Tom Andersen (1987) was developing his 
highly influential reflect ing team practices, Seikkula and his colleagues 
were developing another approach drawing on dialogical principles, the 
Open Dialogues approach in Finnish Western Lapland (Seikkula and Arnkil 
2006). Open Dialogues is possibly as close to the ideal of mult i-part iality 
that practice can achieve. Open Dialogues brings the entire mult i-
disciplinary team together to discuss their ideas, prejudices, theories and 
concerns with the families and social networks of a person in psychiatric 
crisis. The therapist ’s task is not to rid himself of his own feelings and values 
but to bring them into dialogue. The aim is not to privilege any story over 
another and in this way to bring alive the possibility of different 
understandings within the encounter.  The dialogical approach 
emphasises the inevitability of misunderstanding in any situation. Tolerat ing 
uncertainty is a central theme. However, some authors suggest uncertainty 
is not helpful to families. That uncertainty about the cause and outcome of 
psychosis can lead to families feeling blamed (Smith et  al., 2007). In an 
encounter following dialogical principals the therapist ’s task is to listen to 
how utterances are taken up. If someone appears to have inferred some 
blame then it  is the therapist ’s job to bring it  into the conversat ion, but not 
to move to diagnosis or other practices that move to certainty too quickly. 
 
Like Andersen, both Rober and Seikkulla are more concerned with t he 
pract ice of therapy rather than construct ing another theoret ical model:  
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…I  see dialogue as simply something that belongs to life, not as a 
special therapeutic method. And this means all psychotherapies have 
to be dialogic if they are to be successful in bringing about the 
posit ive changes that psychotherapists seek. (Seikkulla, 2001, p. 179) 
  
The Open Dialogue approach to psychosis is immensely important , 
research shows a remarkable reduction in the incidence of schizophrenia 
in Finnish Western Lapland (Seikkula, 2006). However, although the 
dialogical stance of the therapist  is important, the defining characterist ic 
of Open Dialogues is the organisat ion of the mental health system itself.  
 
The dialogical movement then is gett ing close to the practical dilemmas of 
therapists regarding both the recognit ion and response to the effects of 
utterances in the moment. It  also acknowledges the inevitability of taking a 
posit ion in relat ion to any utterance made. However by eschewing any 
theory of change beyond dialogue itself and claiming dialogue not as a 
form of therapy but as ‘a way of life’ Seikulla (2011) sidesteps how 
therapists decide which voices in the ‘polyphony of voices’ they will take 
up and why. Dialogue itself is seen as the healing element within any 
therapy. Yet different therapeutic models will guide the therapist  towards 
those voices they will prefer over others. Yet again we return to the familiar 
dilemma, do we enter into dialogue with the paedophile or do we enter 
the monological domain of ascribing blame for actions we find untenable.  
 
In summary, the concept of neutrality has evolved over t ime and been 
shaped by different theoret ical models. Despite the theoret ical challenges 
addressed in the literature, in practice some version of neutrality, as a 
means of avoiding blame, has endured as a canonical professional ethic 
to which systemic therapists should aspire (Stancombe and White, 2005).  
Part of this ethic is the ability to tolerate uncertainty and avoid fixed 
meanings. However this is difficult , if not impossible, to achieve as a single 
therapist  and the best we can do is remain alert  to our prejudices. Rober 
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expands on this, drawing attent ion to our stance as a therapist  during the 
acts of both listening and speaking. Seikkulla’s addit ional solut ion is to work 
with the whole team and whole social network, thus bringing mult i-
part iality live into the room and beyond.  However, some families 
experience uncertainty itself as unhelpful. In the final part of this section I 
will continue to address the contribut ion of the third wave theories by 
shift ing the focus a lit t le and looking at the other side to the coin of blame, 
the concept of personal agency.   
The construction of personal agency 
Inextricably entwined with notions of blame and responsibility are 
concepts of personal agency. The level of culpability for an action will be 
contingent upon evaluations of the person’s perceived intention, 
motivat ion and awareness of possible consequences. Without agency 
there is no blame and like blame, and for the same reasons, the concept 
of personal agency creates problems for systemic theorists. I  will not 
examine the history of systemic theorising about agency here as it  reflects 
the tensions already discussed. Suffice to say that by concentrat ing on 
organisat ion and structure rather than meaning, individual motivat ion was 
deemed unworthy of considerat ion (Krause 1993). Where causality is 
circular, individual agency, whether praise or blameworthy, becomes 
inconceivable. With some notable voices of caution (cf. Speed, 1996; 
Frosh, 1997; Kraemer, 1997), family therapy largely signed up to narrat ive, 
dialogical and social construct ionist  theories. The focus of attent ion shifted 
from patterns of behaviour to patterns of language and meaning. The shift  
in focus on the storied self shifted the individual to the foreground 
(Minuchin, 1998) and an interest in conceptualising personal agency within 
a narrat ive frame (White, 2004, 2007).  
 
Despite an emerging movement away from the central metaphor of 
language and towards embodied experience (Shotter, 1993), linguist ic 
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systems, narrat ive and dialogue remain the dominant conceptual 
frameworks in contemporary systemic practice. 
The narrative self 
Narrat ive therapy covers a range of different ideas and practices that hold 
in common the centrality of narrat ive in the const ruct ion of meaning. 
Indeed, the idea of the narrat ive self, and personal agency, is central to 
dialogical, social construct ionist  and narrat ive inspired forms of therapy. As 
the metaphor of the narrat ive has risen in popularity and rivalled the 
metaphor of the system, so the individual story has moved into the 
foreground. Personal agency, as in t radit ional individual psychotherapies, 
has become an area of therapeutic interest. However, the conception of 
personal agency is located in a socially or dialogically constructed domain 
rather than the individual mind or psyche. For instance Anderson and 
Goolishian (1990) suggest that problems gain their meaning when they 
diminish our sense of agency and personal liberat ion. Seikkulla (2011, 
p.185) argues that  “our clients have regained agency in their lives by 
having the capability of dialogue”. 
 
Let’s turn now to the form of narrat ive therapy developed by one of its 
most influential architects, Michael White. White explicit ly adopts a 
Foucauldian notion of power to crit ique tradit ional psychology and 
psychotherapy. After Foucault , he suggests that the “internal state 
psychologies” (White, 2004, p. 85) are significant systems in the 
maintenance of social norms through modern power. In contrast to 
tradit ional forms of power which operate through familiar st ructures of 
coercion and restrict ion, modern systems of power are conceptualised as 
operating through people’s active part icipation in judging themselves and 
others through social norms. White takes issue with the humanist ic 
assumptions of the self that lie at the heart of the majority of contemporary 
psychological practices. These models essentially aim t o free the core self 
from pathologies or disorders in the form of unconscious defences, 
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cognit ive distort ions, emotional dysregulat ions or deviant behaviours. Once 
freed from these constraints by the proper treatment, the individual can 
experience and interpret the world correctly and make active, rat ional, 
responsible choices.  Personal agency then can be evaluated in relat ion to 
how well the person’s internal representation of the world fits with reality.  
White argues that this deficit  model of what it  means to be human 
diminishes the power of ordinary people to express and practice their 
personal agency. It  limits the range of identity posit ions open to people. 
 
People are induced to actively part icipate in the judgement of their 
own and each others lives according to these ideals. These ideals for 
personhood are represented by all those contemporary norms about 
what it  means to be a ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ person. (White, 2002, p. 43)  
 
Personal agency then is an important aspect of narrat ive practice, wit h 
the embedded assumption that the person can escape the oppressive 
posit ioning of certain discourses by actively choosing another. For 
instance, Freedman and Coombes (1996, p. 97) describe the construct ion 
of an “agentive self” where the person can inhabit a const itut ive as well as 
const ituted subject posit ion. The therapist ’s role is to enable 
“conversat ional practices that are richly describing of peoples’ lives that 
open more options for action in the world rather than fewer”, (White, 2002, 
p. 900) 
 
Inspired by White, Jenkins (1990) applies narrat ive theories to the sphere of 
domest ic violence. Male violence is seen to be constructed through 
gendered discourses that limit  the possible identity posit ions couples can 
inhabit. Perpetrators of violence are enabled to take responsibility for their 
actions through bringing to awareness alternative story lines and identity 
posit ions. Blame becomes relegated to the sphere of normalising 
discourses which trap both men and women in certain ways of living and 
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responsibility (or agency) is enacted through choosing alternative, non-
violent identit ies.   
 
Guilfoyle suggests that a common posit ion in Narrat ive texts is the 
assumption that agency means the capacity to choose or reject different 
discourses in different contexts. However, this is problematic. If a person 
can choose the discourses that form them then that person must exist  
separately from those discourses. He traces this tension to the work of 
Foucault  himself: 
 
Foucault did not leave us with an explicit , well developed account of 
the active subject who a) exists simultaneously within the context of 
power/knowledge dynamics and b) is dist inguishable from the 
sovereign subject he had already rejected. (Guilfoyle, 2012, p. 633) 
 
So the metaphor of social discourse brings with it  a similar dilemma to that 
of the metaphor of system. The problem of the discursive, deconstructed 
self leads us to the problem of a discursive determinism where people 
become subject to pre-exist ing discourses. If there is no agency, there is no 
blame, but without agency there is no power to effect change.  
 
Guilfoyle’s solut ion is to dist inguish between negative and posit ive aspects 
of resistance to dominant discourses.  
 
…negative resistance can be seen as resistance that precedes 
discourse but lacks its own posit ive discursive contents, while posit ive 
resistance is the meaning-making activity that follows acts of negative 
resistance. (Guilfoyle, 2012, p. 635)  
 
So, the init ial act of resistance is not the stepping into an alternative 
discourse, but the refusal of an exist ing one. A purely discursive view of the 
subject fails to account for our corporeality. Resistance can be located in 
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the embodied self and offer a momentary escape from discourse. The 
init ial act of refusal does not require an alternative narrat ive, but without 
an alternative narrat ive there would be an absence of meaning and 
social connectedness. This absence produces movement towards 
discourse once more. This might be towards the original opposed discourse 
or it  might be towards an alternative narrat ive. To remain a part icipant 
within “the human social-communicative space, the person who resists 
must be re-storied; become a subject once more.” (Guilfoyle, 2012, p. 636).  
Thus Guilfoyle sees the posit ive aspect of resistance as the act of 
reconst itut ing the subject within socially meaningful alternative stories.  
Therapy as a site of moral negotiation 
The part icular challenge the post -modern epistemologies pose to therapy 
is this. If therapy is a site for the production of social values then it  becomes 
less science and more rhetoric, the art of persuading to a part icular point 
of view (Klaushofer, 2007). Therapy becomes about finding forms of 
thinking and acting in ways that are morally acceptable to all, including 
the therapist  (Rikonen and Smith, 1997). Family therapy’s answer has been 
to strive towards the ethic of mult i-part iality. However, how this stance is 
achieved in practice is problematic. How do families recognise ‘not 
knowing’ and ‘mult i-part iality’ and what if they draw on a different ethic? 
Stancombe (2002) argues that the ‘not knowing’ posit ion as practiced in 
contemporary therapy merely obfuscates the inevitable moral judgements 
we make as therapists in our day to day practice. He suggests that 
contemporary practice tends to show an essentialist  and cognit ive notion 
of narrat ive that eschews its performative nature. The focus is on 
uncovering marginalised stories as if they exist  outside the therapy room, as 
if we have a free choice over those stories we wish to inhabit or proffer. The 
therapist ’s part in const itut ing this story remains on the whole unexamined.  
If as a discipline we have incorporated narrat ive ideas into our practice, 
with their accounts of language as being inseparable from polit ics and 
ideology, then every utterance we make can be seen as imbued with 
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moral implication. Stancombe persuasively demonstrates that neutrality is 
an interactional achievement rather than a personal stance. Therapists t ry 
to conceal their judgements by working up neutral versions behind the 
screen to present to the family, yet the family is highly attuned to any sign 
of evaluation, verbal or non-verbal, through omission or commission.  
Summary 
The aim of this section has been to sketch the key theoret ical debates 
available to contemporary systemic therapists regarding the management 
of blame and to highlight the areas where theory fails to fully address the 
practical moral decisions therapists make on a day to day basis. As a 
student I was introduced to, and encouraged to practice, concepts and 
techniques from all the theoret ical models mentioned above and more. 
This thesis t races my attempt to find my own path through these 
overlapping but often conflict ing territories. I  have described how the 
tension between theories of mutual influence and ideas about personal 
responsibility has been an area of debate throughout the development of 
family therapy. The ethic of impart iality, be it  termed neutrality, curiosity, 
not knowing, or mult i-part iality, has been a consistent theme, part icularly of 
second and third wave practices, yet how to achieve it  remains a quest ion 
of debate.  
 
To add yet more complexity to the mix, the therapists represented in this 
research explicit ly adopt an integrated FT and FM model. Indeed some 
authors suggest integrat ing the two models (Lobban et  al., 2005). Burbach 
and Stanbridge (1998, 2006) suggest that integrat ing a circular view of 
causality with FM approaches enables an explorat ion of family dynamics 
which may contribute to the maintenance of the problem. Although the 
theoret ical explanations, and indeed conflict between the two camps, 
would suggest that FM and FT models are radically different, practice is 
often less clear cut. In day to day practice the line between models is 
muddier than between manualised versions of therapy designed for 
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research trials (Bertrando, 2007). In my experience of working with and 
supervising both FT and FM practit ioners, biological and interactional 
understandings are woven into conversat ions in both sett ings. Family 
therapists sometimes set tasks which look very similar to FM tasks. Despite 
FM approaches being designed to be delivered in specific ways, in 
practice practit ioners often go off piste to fit  the model to the family. 
However, it  remains the case that the epistemological foundations of the 
two approaches are in direct contradict ion and just how integrat ion of 
diverse models gets done in practice is unclear.  
 
I  suggest that any theoret ical model has its gaps and contradict ions. 
Therapists are not only influenced by professional theories but also 
personal, polit ical and cultural beliefs which will inform their practice. 
Families too will bring a range of beliefs which will influence the negotiat ion 
of what the problem is, who is responsible and what can be done about it . 
However, there is often a gap between therapists and families 
expectations of the ‘unwritten rules’ of the therapeutic encounter. Where 
therapists are trained to be impart ial and uncertain, family members may 
want an expert to tell them what or who is to blame. This study illuminates 
how therapists and families co-operate in making sense of therapy, filling in 
the gaps in the unwritten rules together, and in that process, negotiat ing 
what is judged as reasonable and unreasonable behaviour. 
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Part Two - The Research Literature 
Introduction 
Part 2 concerns the relevant research literature, briefly sketching findings 
from attribut ion and expressed emotion studies before narrowing the focus 
onto therapy process research.  I  introduce relevant studies in family 
therapy using similar sorts of research methodologies, such as discourse 
analysis and discursive psychology. By the end of this chapter I  hope to 
have sketched the terrain sufficient ly for the reader to understand the 
context and rat ionale of the study before turning to Chapter Three where 
the method and design will be described in detail. 
Attribution research 
Research into blaming in interpersonal communication has its st rongest 
t radit ion within the field of attribut ion theory (Gotlib and Abramson, 1999). 
Attribut ion research shows a correlat ion between families with problems 
and blame. For instance, in a review of the literature Corcaran and Ivery 
(2004) suggest that parents who maltreat children tend to explain 
childrens’ behaviours as due to disposit ional and stable causes. Because 
these parents tend to see their children (and not themselves) as 
responsible for their problems they often drop out of therapy (Morrissey-
Kane and Prinz, 1999). Attribut ion theory is located predominantly within 
the discipline of cognit ive psychology and causal attribut ions are often 
interpreted in isolat ion. However, as I  have described above, blame is a 
difficult  concept to pin down outside the context of a relat ionship.   
Expressed emotion research 
FM approaches have been designed specifically to reduce HEE in families 
based on robust evidence that HEE is correlated with relapse. However, 
exactly what elements of family intervention make a difference is unclear 
Kuipers (2006). The NICE guidelines reflect this uncertainty. 
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With regards to the training and competencies required by the 
therapist  to deliver family intervention to people with schizophrenia 
and their carers, there was a paucity of information reported 
throughout the trials. Consequently, the GDG were unable to form any 
conclusions or make any recommendations relat ing to practice. 
However, the GDG acknowledge that the training and competencies 
of the therapist  is an important area, and one that warrants further 
research. (NICE, 2009, p. 242) 
 
Research into expressed emotion has moved beyond the diagnost ic 
category of schizophrenia and has been shown to be relevant to a range 
of psychological difficult ies, including bi-polar disorder (Kim and Malkowitz 
,2004) and depression (Hooley and Teasdale, 1989). Calam et  al., (2002) 
have shown parental EE on the crit ical and host ile dimensions to predict 
failure to engage in child mental health services. A number of studies have 
shown that families’ appraisals of their problems have an impact on EE. 
Families in similar situations can experience the burden of care as greater 
or lesser, and their expressed emotion be higher or lower, depending on 
their explanations for their problems. Lobban et  al., (2005) show a 
correlat ion between relat ives who are highly crit ical and those who 
perceive symptoms to be under the control of the patient.  They propose 
that EE measures might most usefully be defined as an indirect measure of 
coping mediated by relat ives’ beliefs about the factors influencing the 
patients’ behaviours. Thus attribut ions of responsibility and blame are linked 
with EE. 
EE and systemic family therapy 
Bertrando et  al., (2006) researched the effects of systemic family therapy 
on Expressed Emotion in families affected by psychosis. Their study of a 
manualised systemic therapy achieved outcomes comparable to those 
reported by FM models. The authors highlight the quest ion of what it  is that 
makes FI’s effective: 
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… psychoeducational intervention stresses the biological 
determinants of illness and the need for the patient to ‘be a patient ’, 
whereas systemic intervention attempts to relocate symptoms in a 
network of relat ionships and to reinstate them in the family’s story and 
development. In both cases, however, family members’ emotions can 
be given a name and a meaning, and so be modified or reduced. 
(Bertrando et  al., 2006, p. 98)  
The effects of blame in family therapy 
Research into family therapists’ perception of blaming events shows blame 
is seen to reduce engagement in therapy both when parents feel blamed 
(Furlong and Young, 1996; Wolpert, 2000) and when parents blame the 
child for difficult ies (Wolpert 2000). It  is also seen to interfere wit h problem 
solving capacit ies (Friedlander et  al., 1994). Families that persistent ly blame 
pose challenges to the stance of therapist  neutrality and to their ideals 
about how therapy can help (Bowen et  al., 2005; Newman et  al., 2013). 
The part icipants in Newman’s study adhere to an integrated FM/FT model 
in their work with families affected by psychosis. The findings are therefore 
part icularly relevant to this analysis, evidencing the theories that guide 
therapists’ practice in this part icular work context .  Blame was identified as 
the most challenging aspect of the work, with therapists report ing that 
family members blame each other, themselves and professionals. 
Clinicians felt  that blame was a major factor for families dropping out of 
therapy. Therapists believed that the main tools they used to avoid blame 
were, 
 exploratory conversat ions that encouraged mult iple points of view  
 circular rather than linear explanations 
 the stress vulnerability model (Zubin and Spring, 1977) 
Blame as an interactional phenomenon 
Two main types of therapy process research are represented in the 
literature. Although some form of categorizat ion is always necessary, the 
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two strands are different iated by those that attempt to identify and code 
blaming attribut ions according to decontextualised observational coding 
schemes (cf. Friedlander et  al., 2000; Besharat et  al., 2001; Stratton et  al., 
2003; Wolpert, 2000) and those that adopt an interactional approach 
where the focus is on the performance of blame cont ingent  upon context 
(Stancombe and White, 2005). 
 
Bridging attribution and interaction theories, Stratton et  al., (2003a, 2003b) 
developed a measure, the Leeds Attribut ional Coding System that 
encompasses an interactional component. They identified those 
attribut ions (global, stable, internal, personal and controllable) that 
const itute characteralogical blaming as part icularly negative in its impact 
and difficult  to diffuse. Where the identity of the person as a whole seems 
to be crit icised rather than their behaviour or indeed one aspect of their 
perceived personality, then the negative impact of blame is increased. So, 
where the ident it y of the person is at stake, the impact increases. Their 
research is interest ing in its potential practical application in therapy. It  
indicates that by shift ing the attribut ion in just one domain, for instance 
from intentional to unintentional action, the impact of blame can be 
softened. 
 
The limited therapy process research into therapists responses to blame in 
Family Therapy show that therapists demonstrably view blame as a prompt 
for action (Friedlander et  al., 2000, Stancombe and White, 2005). The 
research therefore shows that systemic therapists not only take blame 
seriously in theory but also in practice. Friedlander found that the most 
frequent response of therapists to blame was ignoring or divert ing. This did 
not mean that therapists did nothing when a blaming event happened. 
Indeed in every instance some form of diversionary tactic was employed, 
the most frequent of which was focusing on the posit ive. Other tactics 
included interruption, highlight ing neutral information, and redirecting the 
topic of conversat ion. Reframing was another common response. Other 
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less frequent categories of response were acknowledging the blame (while 
not agreeing with it) or challenging it  direct ly. 
 
They found no difference in families’ responses to different therapist  
st rategies, including direct challenges, although they did find that blaming 
statements were reduced within four out of seven sessions the more 
frequently the therapist  responded to them. Melidonis and Bry (1995) found 
that the effect of ignoring negative attribut ions and focusing on 
exceptions was to decrease blaming in solut ion focused therapy sessions.  
Stancombe and White (2005) however found that by responding in a way 
that displayed neutrality towards blaming statements, st rategies such as 
those described in both studies above, systemic therapists paradoxically 
invited more.  The effect of therapist  responses on the family then is open 
to debate. One reason for these different findings may be the difficult ies in 
operationalizing the concepts of blame and neutrality. For example, in the 
studies cited above Friedlander et  al., depend on a strict coding of explicit  
attribut ion of fault  that includes causal factors of a disposit ional or 
intent ional element while Stancombe and White lean on a more context 
dependent co-constructed notion of blame. Freidlander et  al. also 
acknowledge that although they note the effects of therapist  responses on 
families, the focus of their study was on therapist  responses. However it  may 
also be that the effects of different therapist  st rategies will be different 
according to the local context, the meaning created between t his 
therapist  and t his family at t his t ime.   
 
Those adopting an interactional approach to psychotherapy research are 
interested in how such concepts such as change (Frosh et  al., 1996; 
Couture and Strong, 2004), alliance (Sutherland and Couture, 2007), 
personal agency (Kurri and Whalstrom, 2005; Guilfoyle, 2002), pathological 
identit ies (Avdi, 2005) and neutrality (Stancombe 2002, Stancombe and 
White, 2005) are interactionally achieved. In her review of Conversat ion 
Analysis (CA) and Discourse Analysis (DA) studies of Family Therapy 
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specifically, Tsielou (2013) identifies a mere 24 studies in all, most of which 
use a hybrid DA approach drawing on Discursive Psychology (DP) and CA. 
Many of these studies analyse a single case, sometimes just one or two 
therapy sessions, in order to elucidate the complex practices involved in 
the development of a piece of social action.  It  is in this t radit ion that this 
study resides. The following studies are part icularly relevant to my analysis. 
 
Stancombe and White (2005) have demonstrated how family therapists 
take care to work up “non-blaming” interventions in response to blaming 
events in the family and in the therapy team. They demonstrate how 
neutrality is interactionally achieved. In other words, the therapist  cannot 
achieve neutrality unless the part icipants co-operate by showing that t hey 
agree his or her actions are neutral. Thus neutrality will be constructed 
between therapist  and family in context. If this is the case then it  makes 
sense that different therapist  responses will have different effects at 
different t imes with different families. Similarly, different families will have 
different effects at different t imes on the therapist . Like Stratton (2003a) 
Stancombe and White urge systemic therapists to talk with families more 
explicit ly about moral judgments because a) families are highly at tuned to 
any tacit  evaluation and b)tacit  evaluations are inevitable.  
 
In a study of a single couple therapy session Kurri and Whalstrom show how 
therapist ’s moral reasoning is woven around two intersecting ethics, those 
of individual autonomy and relat ional responsibility. They demonstrate that 
therapists responded to blaming accounts by shift ing the focus on to the 
blaming spouse to “give accounts of their deeds or thoughts wit hin t he 
conversat ion” (Kurri and Whalstrom, 2005, p. 363). Therapists showed a 
negative moral evaluation of blaming talk by topicalising it .  In other words, 
therapists do not remain neutral to blaming talk and imply fault  by asking 
the blamer to account for their actions. This brings us to the considerat ion 
of agency in the literature.  
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Agency research 
I  have argued that personal agency is an important theme in 
psychotherapy in general and in family therapy has taken centre stage 
within the narrat ive and construct ionist  models. Thus the effects of 
hegemonic discourses on notions of subjectivity and agency have been 
an area of research interest (Avdi, 2005; Guilfoyle, 2002; Kogan and Gale 
1997).  In a domest ic violence counselling context, Kurri and Whalstrom 
(2005) have shown that ‘agentless talk’ is a prompt to action for therapists. 
They argue that counsellor’s have to manage a tension between the 
normative moral rule ‘domest ic violence is wrong’ and the professional 
ethic of respect for the client ’s autonomy. This study of a single counselling 
session shows the function of delicacy in the therapist ’s management of 
the tension between pursuing a moral posit ion condemning domest ic 
violence whilst  simultaneously avoiding blaming the client for choosing to 
remain in the relat ionship.     
 
Madill and Doherty (1994) in a study of a single session of an individual 
psychodynamic therapy note the therapists reframing of a client ’s choice 
from one determined by obligation into one of personal desire (you did 
what you wanted then). Thus the therapist  implies it  is not only possible but 
desirable to act autonomously and constructs a problem suitable for his 
therapeutic aims. In the family therapy literature two studies are of 
part icular relevance. Guilfoyle’s (2002) analysis of two therapy sessions 
highlights the dilemmas faced by a construct ionist  therapist ’s preference 
for stories of personal agency. Guilfoyle, both therapist  and researcher in 
this case, challenges parents exonerating explanations of their child’s 
behaviour as 'unconscious', and thus beyond his control by re-formulat ing it  
as intent ional. Thus, the costs of the behaviour being seen as blameworthy 
are weighed up against the gains of it  being open to the possibility of 
change.  He highlights the part icular problem this poses to narrat ive 
therapists who in t heory crit ique those notions of self-contained 
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individualism which are a dominant feature of contemporary Western 
culture, while in pract ice privilege stories of self-containment and personal 
agency. Parker (1992) suggests that this problem may be compounded by 
the difficulty of communicating different models of subjectivity in a 
language structured by dualist  conceptions. Avdi focuses on the effects of 
diagnosis in the construct ion of identity. In his study of a twelve session 
therapy with a family whose child has a diagnosis of aut ism he argues that 
the therapy is successful on the grounds that his analysis has: 
 
t raced shifts in the way that the child's difficult ies are talked about, 
from a disposit ional to a relat ional understanding and from a non-
agentic to agentic formulat ions regarding the child's behaviours. (Avdi 
2005, p. 506) 
 
By deconstruct ing a medicalised, pathological identity the therapist  both 
normalises behaviour but also runs the risk that behaviour previously seen 
as 'not his fault ' is redefined as intent ional, wit h all its connotations of 
responsibility and blame. Thus both the above studies demonstrate that at 
t imes therapists’ interventions could be read as more blaming when in 
pursuit  of a part icular therapeutic goal.  
Summary 
I  have sketched the rich history of systemic theory and practice knowledge 
available to systemic therapists regarding the management of blame. I 
have then reviewed the relevant research regarding the impact and 
management of blame in family therapy. I  have shown how the research 
into EE clearly demonstrates a correlat ion between blame and 
psychological distress. The combination of EE measures and attribut ion 
research show evidence that beliefs about the cause of the difficult ies, 
and especially discrepancies in beliefs are pert inent. Thus research into the 
effects of causal explanations that are blaming, both on families and on 
families’ engagement in therapy, supports the notion that blame is 
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unhelpful. The limited research into blame in family therapy confirms that 
therapists experience blame both as a challenge to their ideals and 
practice and as a prompt to action. However the effects of those actions 
remain unclear. Comparison of studies that attempt to code blame 
externally is hampered by lack of consensus regarding the 
operationalisat ion of the concept. This is because blame cannot be fully 
understood when abstracted from its interactional context.  
 
Within the tradit ion of micro-analyt ic studies of therapy process, there are a 
handful of studies examining blame in family therapy. These studies, using 
methods that foreground the interactional construct ion of social 
phenomena, enable a detailed examination of the subtlety with which 
blame may be implied or inferred. Studies of the construct ion of agency in 
therapy are also relevant to the discussion of blame. The limited research 
available indicates that therapists prefer ‘agency talk’, where clients claim 
responsibility for their actions. One cannot have agency without 
responsibility, and responsibility for negative events potentially implies 
blame. Focusing on increasing agency then may increase blame, while 
decreasing blame may diminish agency. The interactional studies 
described above give a rich descript ion of the discursive practices ut ilized 
by therapists to manage the tensions of decreasing blame and increasing 
agency in rout ine practice across a range of therapeutic modalit ies. They 
offer a glimpse of some interest ing phenomena that deserve further 
examination. For example, how non-blaming is achieved interactionally (or 
not) in systemic family therapy, how family therapists display their moral 
evaluation of blaming accounts and accounts of personal agency and 
how these evaluations are taken up by family members. This study sets out 
to illuminate how therapists and families make sense of family therapy 
together, part icularly how they negotiate what is judged to be reasonable 
blame, and reasonable agency, within the context of family therapy for 
families affected by psychosis. 
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In the next chapter I  will describe my chosen method to explore these 
ideas further. 
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Chapter 3 
Introduction 
Chapter Two concerned the context and rat ionale for the quest ions the 
study sets out to answer. Despite a clear consensus across disciplines that 
blame is unhelpful, and evidence that therapists are prompted to action 
by blame, research into blame in therapy has been hampered by 
difficult ies in operationalising blame as a concept. What interests me is 
how therapists and families recognise this phenomenon of blame that is so 
hard to operationalise and what  they do to display that recognit ion to one 
another. This chapter details the method used to address those quest ions. 
Following a brief summary of the aims of the study Part 1 scopes the 
relevant epistemological and methodological issues. The methods of CA 
and MCA are then described in some detail. The aim is to familiarise a 
reader new to these methods sufficient ly to enable a crit ical examination 
of the analysis that follows.  In Part 2, the practical design of the study is 
described, including a discussion of ethical considerat ions. In short, the 
study comprises an analysis of selections from the transcripts of two therapy 
sessions, using Conversat ion Analysis (CA) and Membership Categorisat ion 
Analysis (MCA).    
The aims of the study - What kind of talking is acceptable here? 
I f blame is seen as a social action then the relevant quest ion becomes 
how do people perform blame? Also, how do others recognise the 
performance of blame and understand what social action it  is intended to 
achieve? I have described how some researchers have studied blame 
from this bottom up approach, examining the sequential construct ion of 
blaming events in situ. This study adds to this body of work and approaches 
it  from a part icular angle. How does blame get performed within the 
context of family therapy for psychosis and how do bot h families and 
therapists show their evaluation of blame as either being socially 
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acceptable or unacceptable under the circumstances?  This 
encompasses the quest ion of how part icipants negotiate the unwritten 
rules about what kind of conversat ions are relevant. The focus of the 
analysis has been on what interactional practices are deployed to imply 
blame, how those implications get taken up, resisted or t ransformed and 
what the interactional consequences are of such practices. This illuminates 
how part icipants in therapy collect ively agree what actions are 
understood to be blaming and whether those actions are deemed 
acceptable or not.  The analysis of blame has led to a further, linked 
considerat ion.  How personal agency is constructed in relat ion to practices 
of blaming and mit igation. My main theme of enquiry then is how family 
therapists, in the context of family work with families affected by psychosis, 
manage the inst itut ional tasks of decreasing blame and increasing agency 
within family talk. 
Part 1- Epistemological and Methodological Issues 
Introduction 
This section describes the rat ionale for the method of analysis. I  will begin 
by locating this study in the context of psychotherapy research in general. I  
will go on to out line the epistemological foundations of CA and MCA, their 
key concepts, their st rengths and their weaknesses. I  make the case that 
CA and MCA together offer an analyt ic tool well suited to my research 
interest.  
Psychotherapy outcome and process research in a modernist frame. 
Psychotherapy research largely falls into two strands, outcome research 
and process research. Psychotherapy outcome research has 
predominantly been concerned with answering quest ions such as which 
therapy works best for whom. The randomised, controlled trial exemplifies 
this posit ion, requiring large sample sizes, control groups and therapy 
manuals in order to eliminate variables and isolate cause and effect.  
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Psychotherapy process research is more concerned with examining how 
therapy works. Much of t radit ional therapy process research is located 
within an empiricist  t radit ion, using a variety of quantifiable measures to 
claim objectivity and reliability. St iles and Shapiro (1989) liken these types of 
studies to psychopharmacological research. They try to identify t he ‘active 
ingredients’ of therapy, such as advice giving, which are seen to be 
delivered to the client within ‘fillers’ which are inert. Both process and 
outcome research in this t radit ion view values and subjectivity as 
potentially clouding our view of reality and therefore as problems to be 
eradicated in the pursuit  of t ruth (Guba and Lincoln, 1985). The difficult ies 
encountered in eliminating the subjective are met by honing the tools of 
research. So a researcher in this t radit ion would work hard to operationalise 
the concept of blame so that it  could be identified objectively by 
observers and be replicable across studies regardless of other variables.  In 
these types of studies context is something to be controlled. 
Psychotherapy process research in a post-modern frame 
Some authors argue that it  is impossible to different iate the ‘ingredients’ of 
therapy as if they were objects that can be delivered by therapists 
irrespective of context and relat ionship (Elliot et  al., 1999). Instead they 
advocate a focus on the micro-processes of therapy, building 
understanding of how therapy gets done in context. In these studies then 
context is something to be analysed as indist inguishable from the active 
ingredients of therapy. This study sits within this latter t radit ion. The aim is to 
show how t hese part icipants manage blame in t his context, in order to 
build a picture of practices which illuminate micro-theories in use.  
Discourse research 
As systemic theory has developed over t ime, so too the field of qualitat ive 
research has increasingly focused on how everyday realit ies are brought 
into being in and through social interaction. It  is difficult  to imagine the 
study of social interaction without paying attent ion to how we use 
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language to achieve things. The common ground for all discourse research 
then is an interest in language in use, or “the study of human meaning” 
(Wetherell, 2001, p. 3). This fits the movement in therapy process research 
towards a post modern frame, the study of the contingent and 
interactional nature of therapy (Burck, 2005).  This common interest in 
language and context has meant that Discourse Analysis (DA) has been 
taken up by systemic practit ioners to examine both the macro and the 
micro-processes of the therapy encounter (Roy- Chowdhury, 2006; Frosh et  
al., 1996; Burck et  al., 1998; Stancombe and White, 1997; Guilfoyle, 2002).  
Discourse analysis 
The field of DA contains numerous, often competing methods, based on a 
bewildering array of ontological, epistemological and methodological 
assumptions. The most dist inct division within discourse research is between 
ethnomethodologically inspired methods such as Conversat ion Analysis 
(CA) and Post Structuralist  methodologies such as Crit ical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) and Foucaldian Analysis (Wetherell, 1998). The tension 
between the different approaches is well documented (cf. Billig, 1999; 
Schegloff, 1997, 1998, 1999; Wetherell, 1998). Proponents of CDA stress the 
reproduction of power and social inequality through discourse as well as 
the historical processes through which such practices have emerged.  In 
contrast, CA researchers interest lies in describing the “conversat ional 
‘machinery’ through which social action emerges” (Holstein and Gubrium, 
2011, p. 343). A key difference, hotly debated by members of each camp, 
is the extent to which analysts are just ified in using information from outside 
the text to analyse the text (Antaki et  al., 2003; Wetherell 2001). Holstein 
and Gubrium (2011) neatly describe Foucauldian inspired researchers as 
privileging ‘the what ’ or ‘discourses-in-practice’ while 
ethnomethodologically inspired practit ioners privilege ‘the how’ or 
‘discursive practice’. Some forms of discourse research attempt to bridge 
the two by combining the fine grained analysis of CA with more macro 
discourse work (cf. Wetherell and Potter, 1992; Parker, 1992; Billig, 2001). 
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Derek Edwards and Jonathan Potter (1992) introduced the term Discursive 
Psychology (DP) to different iate their approach from the broad spectrum 
of DA studies. Edwards and Potter are most interested in re-examining 
tradit ional psychological explanations from a discursive action 
perspective. While the term DP has been used to encompass a variety of 
methods (Edwards, 2005a), this study is most closely aligned with the work 
of Edwards and Potter. For example Edward’s (2005b) analysis of 
complaints shows that the attribut ion of fault  is not simply a matter of 
cognit ion, but that the production of a complaint is highly sensit ive to the 
context in which it  is produced. Rather than treat ing language as 
representative of cognit ive processes DP, 
 
applies the basic principles of conversat ion analysis, with a view to 
discursive psychology’s central concern with how psychological 
characterist ics […] are handled as part of talk’s performance of social 
actions. (Edwards, 2005, p.8) 
 
In other words we anticipate and signal how we wish the complaint to be 
received as complaints have implications for how the characterist ics of the 
complainer will be judged as well as those complained about.  
 
In the next section I will describe the theoret ical foundations of CA and 
MCA. I will then go on to describe each method and their key analyt ical 
concepts, start ing with CA. 
Conversation Analysis 
The origins of CA  
The origins of CA and MCA lie within the discipline of sociology, specifically 
in ethnomethodology. The focus of ethnomethodology lies in the social 
analysis of the situated, practical reasons for social actions (Garfinkel, 
1967).  In any interactional sett ing, all part icipants have ways of making 
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sense of and organising their everyday life. For Garfinkel, language and 
social interaction were the practices by which both social inst itut ions and 
the moral order were const ituted. People act, and account for their 
actions on the basis of their tacit  knowledge of shared understandings of 
how people should act, the local moral order.  Thus the management of 
everyday, mundane affairs is essentially a process of moral posit ioning and 
reposit ioning. Conversat ion Analysts study the systematics of social 
interaction through language, which they term ‘talk-in-interaction’2. 
 
Antaki (1994) also traces the influence of pragmatics on the development 
of CA. Grice (1975) argued that in order to understand one another’s 
intent ions, speakers are guided by an underlying principle of co-operation. 
We assume that the maxims of relevancy (each turn will relate to that 
which has gone before), clarity (we will attempt to be concise and to the 
point), t ruthfulness (we will say as much as necessary to not misdirect) and 
quantity (say no more and no less than is necessary) are the common 
ground by which we construct and infer meaning.  These tacit  assumptions 
are not prescript ive but normative, and through their deployment a 
mult iplicity of meanings can be achieved with great economy. So for 
instance the phrase “The dog looks happy” can be understood to infer 
more than a wagging tail if said immediately after “Where has my dinner 
gone?” Similarly irony depends for its meaning on the assumption of t ruth 
when the same utterance is made of a trembling dog following the vet ’s 
receptionist ’s “Next”.  
The foundation of CA as a discipline 
Harvey Sacks and his collaborators Emmanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson 
drew these strands together in the 1960’s and 1970’s to develop a method 
of analysing language as a form of social action. Sacks died in 1975, and 
                                                 
2   
Talk-in-interaction includes language and language like symbols, gestures, postures, facial and 
verbal expressions, anything which may ascribe meaning to ongoing interaction.  
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much of his original work, which laid the foundations of CA, exist  only in the 
form of his lectures which were later collected together and published 
(Sacks, 1995). Schegloff, Jefferson and other CA researchers have 
continued to develop and extend the approach. 
 
Schegloff argues that the very roots of human sociality lie in: 
  
…those features of the organizat ion of human interaction that allow 
the flexibility and robustness that allows it  to supply the infrastructure 
that supports the overall or macrostructure of societ ies in the same 
sense that roads or railways serve as the infrastructure for the 
economy… (Schegloff, 2006, p. 70) 
He argues that “talk-in-interaction” provides this infrastructure and:  
 
the organisat ion of interaction needs to be -and is- robust enough, 
flexible enough, and sufficient ly self-maintaining to sustain social order 
at family dinners and in coal mining pits, around the surgical operating 
table and on skid row … in every nook and cranny where human life is 
to be found. (Schegloff, 2006, p. 71) 
 
The CA project then is the analysis of naturally occurring conversat ion in 
order to describe how the organisat ion of talk-in-interaction, is both 
manifested in and reproduces social st ructure. Levinson (2006, p. 39) 
describes conversat ion analysis as one discipline among many, all 
researching aspects of what he calls “the human interaction engine”, 
universal propert ies that underpin human interaction. 
What is CA? 
Following Grice, CA posits that in order to understand one another people 
have to have some shared assumptions about the underlying rules of 
interaction. Although language dominates social interaction, the crucial 
act ions being performed are nearly always indirectly conveyed. To do this 
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the signals have to be recognisable, to have some order. CA ’s aim is to 
elucidate those rules, or generic practices, by which we signal to one 
another our intent ions.  It  does this by observing recurring patterns of 
interaction and then working out what these patterns achieve, 
 
to take what people are doing, that is saying, not -saying, saying 
something in a part icular manner, at a part icular moment., etc., and 
t ry t o find out  t he kind of problem for which t his doing might  be a 
solut ion. (ten Have 2007, p.16, my italics)  
Two domains of CA 
Ten Have different iates between two domains of CA. 
1) The empirical analysis of large quantit ies of data to establish regular 
patterns of interaction and uncover tacit  procedures or technologies in 
use. Over the years CA has developed a large body of work describing 
these organisat ional practices.  
 
2) The elucidation of, “the endogenous logic that provides for the 
sense of the (inter) actions, as part of a lived moral-practical order”, (ten 
Have 2007, p. 38) 
 
I t  is important to stress here that CA ’s project is not to develop a 
generalised theory of interaction but by elucidating the technologies of 
talk CA tries to show:  
 
the inherent theories-in-use of members practices as lived orders, 
rather than trying to order the world ext ernally by applying a set of 
t radit ionally available concepts … (ten Have, 2007, p. 34) 
 
The tension in CA is managing to uncover the orderliness of talk while 
eschewing generalised theories of communication and maintaining the 
stance that order is co-operatively produced at the local level. CA 
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concepts should not be understood as causal rules but rather as normative 
orientat ions of part icipants that can be used as flexible resources for social 
action. This tension, to both look for pattern and avoid a formal external 
coding system explains CAs close attent ion to detail. It  is in the orientat ion 
of the interlocutors that the local order is both produced and displayed. 
The researcher, as a member of the same language system as the objects 
of study, will bring their own ‘membership competencies’ to the analysis 
but it  is the interactants own understandings, as displayed in their 
utterances, that are both the object of study and the key resource for 
validation of the analysis.   
The building blocks of CA  
Four fundamental, interlocking organising activit ies have been identified 
within the CA literature. These comprise turn taking practices, sequence 
organisat ion, repair practices and the organisat ion of turn design.  
Turn taking 
Sacks et  al. (1974) observed that overwhelmingly in conversat ion only one 
person speaks at a t ime with minimal gap or overlap between different 
speakers. Schegloff claims the ubiquity of turn taking to be fundamental to 
social interaction. 
 
 What is at stake in “turn taking” is not politeness or civility, but the very 
possibility of coordinated courses of action between part icipants 
(e.g., allowing for init iat ive and response)- very high stakes indeed. 
(Schegloff, 2006, p. 72) 
 
A number of organising practices allow for speakers turns to be changed 
smoothly. For example, speakers orient to a possible change of speaker at 
the end of a Turn Construct ion Unit  (TCU).  A TCU is marked by its 
adequacy to achieve an action. It  might be a sentence, a single word or 
a nod of the head.  The end of any TCU is termed a Transit ion Relevance 
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Place (TRP). At each TRP there are three main ways that the next turn is 
allocated. The present speaker can select the next, a speaker can self- 
select or the present speaker can continue. These options are 
hierarchically organised where other selection is preferred over self 
selection and speaker continuation least preferred. CA has elucidated 
numerous patterns of sequence structures that are designed to check if 
condit ions are favourable for a suspension of turn taking procedures. For 
instance, different ‘pre-sequences’ that serve to check if condit ions are 
favourable to permit the speaker to continue through a series of TRPs 
without interruption, perhaps to tell a joke or a story.  Other structures 
contain repeated sequences (chaining rules) such as quest ion and answer 
sequences where the norm prevails that a quest ioner has “a reserved right 
to talk again… And, in using the reserved right he can ask a quest ion”,  
(Sacks, 1972, p. 343).  
 
How the speakers co-operate will both create and depend upon how 
speaking rights are negotiated, how speakers display their orientat ion to 
who has the right to extended turns and who does not.  The normative 
procedures of turn taking can be oriented to by different speakers to 
achieve different ends in different contexts. For example, in this study 
therapists are shown to use the structural propert ies of quest ions to achieve 
certain inst itut ional ends. 
Sequence organisation 
This is one of the aspects which fits systemic therapy so well and offers such 
a powerful tool for the analysis of psychotherapy practice. CA views every 
utterance as produced in relat ion to what has gone before and as 
projecting (or limit ing) the possibilit ies of what can come after. Every 
utterance is seen as both context dependent and context renewing. 
Meaning is t ied inextricably to the posit ion of the utterance in unfolding 
talk, its ‘sequential implicit iveness’.  
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The adjacency pair  
The adjacency pair (AP) is the basic sequence unit  and analyt ical tool, the 
second pair part being heard as relevant to the first  pair part. Essent ially 
the first  speaker’s utterance is designed both to show the next speaker 
what they are doing and project certain sorts of possible responses. The 
next speaker can then respond either in the way the first  speaker implied, 
or not. The way the second speaker responds will then be open to 
interpretat ion. If the second pair part is not heard as both relevant and 
fitt ing then this is seen as an accountable matter. For example, social 
norms related to ‘saving face’ provide for an invitat ion to be accepted 
unless there are good reasons not to accept. For this reason, refusing an 
invitat ion is usually marked as ‘dispreferred’.  
Preference organisation 
Confusingly, preference organisat ion in CA has nothing to do with 
individual choice or desire. Even more confusingly preference is used to 
denote two linked but slight ly different meanings. The first  use is where 
preference refers to findings that project empirically which alternative is 
most frequent and therefore expectable. So by studying many instances of 
invitat ions, CA shows that the most frequent response is acceptance. 
Acceptance then is the preferred (expected) response to an invitat ion. 
The second use of preference refers to structural propert ies of responses 
that mark act ions as normatively posit ive (preferred) or negative 
(dispreferred). A preferred action is that which interactants display as the 
expect ed posit ive action by means of delivery that is fast, brief and 
requires no further explanation.  A dispreferred action is marked as such by 
pauses and hesitancy of speech, often accompanied by an account for 
the reasons of refusal as being outside ones control.  To refuse an invitat ion 
without  these markers will be open to (usually negative) interpretation. Thus 
interactants can choose not  to mark a refusal as dispreferred to achieve a 
social act, perhaps to show that the invitat ion breaks a social norm or that 
the invited is angry with the inviter.  
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Repair organisation 
 
I f the organizat ion of talk in interaction supplies the basic infrastructure 
through which the inst itut ions and social organizat ion of quotidian life 
are implemented, it  had better be pretty reliable, and have ways of 
gett ing righted if beset by trouble. (Schegloff, 2006, p. 77).  
 
Repair organisat ion refers to those practices which enable any kind of 
t rouble, (misunderstandings, mishearings, misalignments) to be dealt with. 
Practices of repair are found to occur immediately after a trouble source is 
identified. Repair is preferred in the next available turn and self repair is 
preferred over other repair with recipients of t rouble talk regularly holding 
off to allow the other to correct the trouble themselves. Schegloff suggests 
that this co-operative attunement to the immediate repair of any 
misunderstanding is the main guarantor of intersubjectivity and common 
ground in interaction. Thus recipient design (see below) organises the talk 
in such a way as to be understood by its recipients while repair practices 
“provide resources for spott ing, diagnosing and fixing trouble” (Schegloff 
2006, p.79). For this reason repair is omni-relevant, it  can occur at any point 
in talk and continuers such as ‘uh-huh’ are markers that display repair is not  
necessary at this point (Schegloff, 1982).  
 
I  have found the management of misalignment (see below) and repair of 
part icular interest in relat ion to sequences of blame.  
The organisation of turn design 
Turn design refers to practices that shape utterances in part icular ways to 
achieve certain actions. Recipient design for instance refers to the shaping 
of an utterance in such a way as to be understandable by t his recipient in 
t his context, given the pre-supposit ions of the speaker regarding the kind of 
knowledge the recipient might have. For instance reference to persons 
involves practices of minimisat ion (say the least necessary) and recipient 
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design (use of assumed knowledge such as a first  name), (Sacks and 
Schegloff, 1979). People can be referred to correctly in many different 
ways but these two practices combined lead to the most economical 
means of reference without recourse to repair. Preference organisat ion 
(discussed above) is another strand of turn design, where utterances are 
shaped to display normative assumptions.  
 
So there are many alternative ways to say something, and the choices 
made are made to perform a part icular action with part icular people in a 
part icular context. Each choice normatively offers certain available 
responses and constrains others. Hearers will be attuned to these choices, 
interpret them in part icular ways and make their choices in response, 
which offer certain possibilit ies and constrain others for the first  speaker. 
Misalignment may occur when one speaker designs a turn to, for example, 
imply a fault  (you shouldn’t  have bought me that), but the recipient may 
(deliberately or mistakenly) receive it  as grat itude (No really it  was 
nothing). Here practices of repair will become relevant if the conversat ion 
is to go on smoothly. So through this turn by turn shaping of talk in 
interaction the local moral order is created. 
Summary 
The aim of CA is to bring to awareness the ordinary everyday practices 
that form the infrastructure upon which social life is built . Over the last 50 
years or so, CA as a discipline has focused on uncovering these basic 
practices of talk-in-interaction and has developed a large corpus of 
established findings and robust analyt ical tools in the process. I  have briefly 
summarised the key organising activit ies that have been identified within 
the CA literature, turn taking practices, sequence organisat ion, repair 
practices and the organisat ion of turn design. Pure CA scholars across the 
world continue to examine ordinary conversat ion within and across 
different language groups and add to our understanding of these 
organising practices.  
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Critiques of CA 
Crit ics of CA suggest that by focusing on the ‘how’, the technicalit ies of 
conversat ion, the ‘what ’, the cultural resources that guide and limit  what 
can be talked about are left unaccounted for, and those cultural 
resources highlighted are frequently those ut ilised in the maintenance of 
inequality, injust ice and oppression. Crit ical psychologist  Michael Billig 
(1999, p. 550) suggests that CA assumes that conversat ion is a neutral 
place “in which equal rights of speakership are often assumed” and is thus 
incompatible with any type of crit ical analysis. He suggests for example 
that CA’s st ricture to stay t ied to part icipant orientat ions precludes analysis 
of gender issues unless specifically oriented to by part icipants themselves. 
Wetherell concurs, “The trouble with conversat ion analysts is that they 
rarely raise their eyes from the next turn in the conversat ion” (Wetherell, 
1998, p. 402). Thus the on-going divide between practit ioners of CDA and 
CA posit ions one as a pedantic, overly technical and sterile exercise, 
devoid of crit ical thinking and the other as imposing pre-exist ing polit ical 
theories on the data in a profligate manner. 
 
Feminist  scholars such as Elizabeth Stokoe and Celia Kitzinger argue that 
CA is highly compatible with feminisms concern for representing women’s 
own understandings of the world. Stokoe suggests that CA shares 
construct ionist  approaches interest in illuminating part icipant orientat ions 
to ‘doing’ gender.  CA helps to move away from essentialist  not ions of 
gender and “the ideological assumptions of the analyst and shift  towards a 
focus on members’ common sense knowledge about gender” (Stokoe, 
2000, p. 560). Kitzinger argues that CA can illuminate the unspoken as well 
as the spoken:  
 
…it  would be unbearably limit ing to use CA if it  meant that I could 
only describe as ‘sexist ’ or ‘heterosexist ’ or ‘racist ’ those forms of talk to 
which actors orient as such. Indeed it  is precisely t he fact  t hat  sexist , 
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het erosexist  and racist  assumpt ions are rout inely incorporat ed int o 
every-day conversat ions without anyone noticing or responding to 
them that way which is of interest to me. (Kitzinger, 2000, p. 171, italics 
in original) 
 
She argues that CAs concern with the small details of talk is valid because: 
 
these apparently t iny and insignificant details are relevant  t o t he 
part icipant s  in the conversat ion, and systematically affect what they 
do next, and how they do it . I f we want to understand what people 
are saying to one another […] we […] have t o at t end t o t heir t alk at  
t he same level of det ail as t hey do. (Kitzinger, 2000, p.173)   
 
Holstein and Gubrium (2011) urge a respect for and different iat ion 
between the two enterprises, while at the same t ime recognising the 
limitat ions of each. They suggest that both are necessary and run on 
parallel paths, with one elaborating the historical contingencies and the 
other the real t ime processes by which social actions are rendered visible. 
For one ‘context ’ means the historical social sett ing in which t alk takes 
place, for the other ‘context ’ is limited to the preceding turn or sequence. 
Neither are interested in generating explanatory theories, the ‘why’ if you 
like, but both are concerned with describing how explanatory theories in 
use (e.g. why does psychosis happen?) might come into being and 
“documenting the practiced stuff of such realit ies” (Holstein and Gubrium 
2011, p. 345). They suggest that the origins of CA contained this important 
balance between the ‘hows’ and the ‘whats’ of social interaction which 
has got lost as Conversat ion Analysts,  “…have increasingly restricted their 
invest igations to the relat ion between social practices and the immediate 
accounts of those practices”  (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011, p. 344).   
 
They suggest that: 
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Sacks in part icular understood culture to be a matter of practice, 
something that served as a resource for discerning the possible 
linkages of utterances and exchanges. (Holstein and Gubrium, 2011, 
p. 343) 
 
My solut ion to this problem is to follow Holstein and Gubrium’s lead and 
return to Sacks’ method of studying cultural resources through MCA. 
Summary 
The main crit icism of CA then is that it  has become so technical that it  
can’t  see the wood for the trees.  The key debate is in the definit ion of 
what const itutes ‘context ’ and how it  is accounted for, with some authors 
suggest ing that CA has defined context so narrowly that it  obscures vital 
resources relevant to its understanding. The problem is in how to analyse 
these discursive resources without imposing the researchers pre-conceived 
ideas. One solut ion is MCA. Before elaborating the discipline of MCA, in the 
following section the difference between CA and Applied CA is discussed.   
Applied CA  
In this study I do not claim to add to the body of knowledge that pure CA 
is amassing. Instead I ut ilise the exist ing knowledge produced by CA 
scholars and apply it  to my part icular field to see what knowledge can be 
produced which may be of use to the systemic discipline.   
 
There is now a growing field of Applied CA which is concerned with how 
day to day conversat ional practices are put to use to achieve inst itut ional 
aims. Heritage suggests three main features of inst itut ional talk: 
 
1) Inst itut ional interaction normally involves part icipants in specific 
goal orientat ions which are t ied to their inst itut ion relevant 
identit ies: … 
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2) Inst itutional interaction involves special constraints on what will be 
treated as allowable contribut ions to the business at hand. 
3) Inst itut ional talk is associated with inferential frameworks and 
procedures that are part icular to specific inst itut ional contexts. 
(Heritage, 1997, p. 163-4) 
 
 
Certain inst itut ional sett ings have been more widely researched, for 
example, medical sett ings (Maynard and Heritage, 2005; Heritage and 
Maynard, 2006; Heritage and Sefi, 1992; St ivers, 2005), news interviews 
(Clayman, 1988, 1992), and mediat ion sessions (Garcia, 1991; Greatbatch  
and Dingwall, 1997; Stokoe, 2013). However, unt il recently, psychotherapy 
has been largely overlooked in the CA literature (Peräkylä et  al., 2008). CA 
takes an agnost ic posit ion towards espoused theories of change in 
therapy, its focus being on ‘why that now?’ rather than ‘does this work?’  Its 
unique contribut ion to therapy process research lies in its attention to detail 
which shines a light on how therapists and clients deal with interactional 
dilemmas that the broader beam of theory fails to illuminate. CA ’s great 
strength is in describing how mundane conversat ional practices are 
harnessed in the pursuit  of inst itut ional ends and how t heory is 
accomplished in practice. For example, in his study of systemic 
approaches to HIV counselling Peräkylä showed not only that practit ioners 
did achieve the interactional consequences that their theory claimed, it  
also demonstrated that: 
 
…the counsellors’ own practice is even more sophist icated than their 
theory: in a most systematic way they prepare their clients for 
hypothetical quest ions concerning the future, through careful means 
of topic elicitat ion and topic development. (Peräkylä, 1995, p. 333).  
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He then suggests a useful application of these findings, “The importance of 
this preparatory work could possibly be given specific attent ion in the 
teaching of counselling skills”, (Peräkylä 1995, p. 333)  
 
Silverman in another study of HIV counselling perturbs the conventional 
understanding of empathy as the skill of the counsellor to attune to the 
patients feelings, but instead demonstrates empathy to be an interactional 
achievement: 
 
The skills of the counsellors we have examined in these ext racts are not 
primarily based on owning a special (professional) body of 
knowledge. Instead, such skills depend upon the apparatus of 
descript ion that is publicly available to everyone – including clients… 
(Silverman, 1997, p. 221) 
 
He goes on to say, “The dist inct ive character of counselling arises in the 
systematic deployment of this apparatus in encouraging the client to talk”, 
(Silverman 1997, p. 221).  
 
Silverman argues that it  is less useful to think about good and bad 
counselling practice and more useful to think about the funct ions of 
communication sequences in a part icular inst itut ional context, thus 
bringing to light both the unacknowledged skills of practit ioners as well as 
the unintended consequences of their actions. Antaki’s (2008) elaboration 
of the different practices therapists use to formulate clients talk is a good 
example of this. He shows how therapists use formulat ion in such a way as 
to ostensibly merely paraphrase the client ’s previous utterance but in fact 
subtly shift  the meaning towards their inst itut ional ends. This work elucidates 
how even the most collaborative of therapists will inevitably delete, select 
and transform clients’ accounts in the rout ine interactional management 
of the session, thus bringing to light the way therapists influence talk 
towards their own agenda. McMart in (2008) shows the other side of the 
 61 
coin in her work on clients’ resist ance to therapists’ aims, through the 
examination of the receipt of ‘optimist ic quest ions’ in narrat ive and solut ion 
focussed therapies. She shows how the day to day management of both 
troubles talk and praise pose interactional dilemmas for narrat ive and 
solut ion focussed therapists whose optimist ic quest ions can be oriented to 
by clients as either missing the point or an invitat ion for self-
aggrandisement.  
CA studies show that participants rout inely orient to a medical consultat ion 
in a systematic way. These insights have been useful in t raining in medical 
practice (Maynard and Heritage, 2005). Psychotherapy is a far more 
diverse field than medicine and thus less likely to show systematic patterns 
of orientat ion. However, the studies described above, and others, begin to 
add to our understanding of how practices central to different therapeutic 
models get done. Thus we can see how applied CA renders the 
inst itut ional context visible in situated talk in a way that pure CA does not . 
Furthermore, applied CA is highly relevant to the examination of how 
therapists and family members use mundane interactional practices to 
offer and resist  blaming accounts.  
Stocks of interactional knowledge 
Peräkylä and Vehviläinen (2003, p. 729) suggest that the knowledge base 
of many professions is made of “normative models and theories or quasi-
theories about interaction”. These norms and theories are disseminated in 
texts, through teaching and supervision. They term these theories and 
norms Stocks of Interactional Knowledge (SIKs).  In family therapy for 
instance we have SIKs such as circular quest ioning or externalising, which 
describe certain interactional practices and locate those practices within 
part icular theoret ical frameworks. SIKs are concerned with explaining, 
legit imising or opposing exist ing practices. In contrast CA is concerned with 
uncovering regularit ies in interaction. CA researchers have had lit t le 
interest in practit ioners’ own theories, while “practit ioners view their 
practice and their own actions through and in terms of them”, (Peräkylä 
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and Vehviläinen, 2003, p. 728). Thus CA findings tend not to resonate with 
the professional groups they study.  Peräkylä and Vehviläinen call for a 
dialogue between CA researchers and professionals.  They suggest that: 
 
CA has a crit ical t ask in point ing out the simplified or empirically 
unsustainable assumptions of the SIKs. However, it  also has a 
complement ary t ask in providing more detailed or concrete 
descript ions of known practices and in showing new practices or 
functions. Accomplishing these tasks does not compromise the strict ly 
empirical stance of CA studies, but it  may be vital for the wider social 
relevance of the CA enterprise. (Peräkylä and Vehviläinen, 2003, p. 
747) 
 
Thus Peräkylä neatly sums up the purpose of this study; to crit ically examine 
and provide a detailed descript ion of how we put one element of our 
systemic SIKs into practice, the practice of managing blame.  
Summary 
Applied CA is a linked but dist inct discipline which is concerned with 
showing how those generic practices uncovered by pure CA work in 
inst itut ional contexts. It  renders visible the way inst itut ional aims are 
accomplished in situated talk and, as Peräkylä suggests it  is part icularly 
relevant to the study of psychotherapy processes. In this study I use not 
only sequential analysis but also Membership Categorizat ion Analysis.  
Membership Categorisation Analysis 
Within the CA field there is a growing interest in reviving the discipline of 
MCA as a means of analysing how socio-cultural knowledge can be 
accounted for in talk in interaction (Stokoe, 2012). Sacks was interested in 
understanding the interactional rules through which culture is both 
generated and recognised.  He developed two interrelated methods of 
analysis, sequential analysis and membership categorizat ion analysis. The 
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former has been widely taken up and dominates contemporary CA, while 
MCA has been largely overlooked. Where sequential analysis is concerned 
with the structuring and organisat ion of talk in interaction into systems 
whereby part icipants manage such things as turn taking and repair, MCA 
focuses on taken for granted knowledge of the world, especially the 
practices by which people and their actions are evaluated.  Like 
sequential analysis MCA is concerned with the underlying rules which allow 
us to understand one another. Its concern is with uncovering the generic 
pract ices that are embedded in, and by which people mobilise, shared 
knowledge and the common sense workings of society.  
 
MCA gives researchers with a primary interest in topical [...], rather 
than sequential issues an empirically t ractable method for studying 
those issues, as members’, rather than analysts’ categories. (Stokoe, 
2012, p.278) 
 
In the following section, I  will briefly sketch the main analyt ic concepts that 
have informed this research in order to enable a crit ical reading of the 
analysis.  
Membership categorisation device 
A MCD is a “collect ion of categories for referring to persons, with some 
rules of application” (Sacks, 1995, Vol.1, p. 238). The MCD then is the 
apparatus by which categories are understood to belong to a collect ion. 
For instance ‘family’, includes the categories mother, father, child etc. 
Within devices, various rules of application (below) are ut ilised to achieve 
different categorial tasks. 
Standard relational pair (SRP).  
Common sense understandings of the category collect ion set up 
expectations of member categories in relat ion to each other, so within the 
device ‘family’, SRPs such as husband/wife, mother/child occur which 
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describe normat ive relat ionships. By invoking such pairs the speaker draws 
on culturally shared inferences about the obligations and rights of each 
member with associat ed expect ed act ions, otherwise known as category 
bound activit ies. 
Category bound activities (CBA).  
A CBA is any activity linked in situ to a category. An activity such as 
‘feeding’ is a CBA that could be linked to a variety of member categories 
such as mother, zoo keeper, pet owner, farmer.  For the purposes of this 
explanation let ’s choose two, those of mother and pet owner. Each of 
these belongs to a SRP, mother/child and owner/pet . Marion is a mother 
who has a baby called Katherine (nicknamed Kitty), and a kitten Tabatha 
(also referred to as Kitty). Yes it ’s laboured but bear with me. If someone 
said “Marion is feeding Kitty” both SRP’s mother/child and owner/pet are 
relevant, the recipient of the food would remain uncertain and we may 
need to ask for clarificat ion which Kitty is Marion feeding? Imagine though 
that we are told “Marion is breastfeeding.” We automatically assume that 
the baby is being fed. ‘Breastfeeding’ is a CBA linked pretty exclusively to 
the category ‘mother’ and the SRP mother/child. It  is not linked to the SRP 
owner/pet. Were we to discover that Marion was breastfeeding the kitten, 
we would make certain assumptions about her actions which might be 
regarding her motives (to shock) or her character (she’s eccentric) or her 
mental health (she’s delusional). In any case such actions, which transgress 
a social norm, will be an accountable matter and will lead us to infer 
certain attributes, otherwise known as category bound predicates. 
Category bound predicates. (CBP) 
Cuff (1993) developed Sacks work to show how members actively create 
and modify different versions of SRPs to achieve different actions. So, 
interactants use common understandings of different categories in order to 
negotiate what t ype of member one is, a good mother, or an eccent ric 
cat owner. However, it  is important not to confuse all attributes with CBPs. 
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Only if the attribute is part of a category in use is it  a CBP. In other words it  is 
the action to which an attribute is put that makes it  a CBP. For example, 
Marion is also fair haired but this attribute is irrelevant to the part icular CBA 
in use, that of feeding and the member categories it  evokes. 
 
CBAs and CBPs feature strongly in the analysis that  follows. 
Duplicative organisation 
This refers to categories that work together in a team like way, for instance 
a football team. 
 
The categories in such collect ions in such MCDs may have, as a 
feature, numerical restrict ions such as ‘no more than one goalie at a 
t ime,’ or ‘no more than one husband/ wife at a t ime’. I f the numerical 
restrict ion is met, categorizing several persons with categories from 
such an MCD is likely to be heard as treating them as co-incumbents 
of the same team; that is, referring to ‘the father, the mother, the son 
and the daughter’ will be heard as referring to the members of the 
same family, not the father from one family and the son from another. 
(Schegloff, 2007, p. 468)  
The economy rule 
While any person can be a member of innumerable categories, at the 
core of competent talk is the capacity to apply only those categories that 
are necessary to achieve the task at hand and to combine categories in 
recognisable ways. Often a single category is sufficient. Marion is a mother, 
a cat owner, and the CEO of a mult i-national company. ‘Breastfeeding’ 
will clearly imply that the relevant member category is mother while 
‘attending a shareholders meeting’ will evoke her role as a CEO. The 
important point here is that if one member category is enough, when two 
or more are used, then why? 
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The consistency rule 
I f two or more categories are used next to each other and they belong to 
a standard collect ion such as family then they are heard as coming from 
the same device. Imagine I am introducing myself in a workshop, the first  3 
part icipants introduce themselves as a psychologist , a teacher and a 
social worker, would I introduce myself as a wife or a therapist? If I  describe 
myself as a wife, what inferences might the others make about me? In this 
instance the collect ion in use is profession. In a carers meeting however, 
the member categories wife, sister, husband etc. would not  follow the 
duplicative organisat ion rule, but the consistency rule because the 
collect ion in use would be ‘carers’ not  ‘family’ and the collect ion ‘carers’ 
does not have a team like character. 
Hearer’s maxims. 
These can be understood as the consequences of the rules of application 
in the form of instruct ions for hearing a category term used by another and 
which of the alternative ways of hearing should be oriented to. The 
hearer’s maxim for the above then is: 
  
…if two or more categories are used to categorize two or more 
members of some populat ion, and those categories can be heard as 
categories from the same collect ion, then: hear them that way. 
(Stokoe, 2012, p. 281) 
 
Disjunctive categories 
Jayussi’s (1984) work on disjunctive categories builds on Cuffs work to 
elucidate how the practices of categorizat ion underpin the construct ion of 
the moral order. When two categories are in use, such as in ‘breastfeeding 
at the shareholders meeting’ Marion’s moral accountability would be in 
quest ion because t his behaviour is not  t he norm and because member 
categories are hierarchically arranged in different contexts.  “Asymmetric 
category pairings … generate conflict ing characterizat ions of the same 
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person (Lepper, 2000, p. 36). Remember the economy rule, because two 
categories are referred to we need to ask what action is being performed. 
Which member category is invoked will imply different category bound 
predicates. In this scenario we can imagine a feminist  argument drawing 
on the member categories ‘mother’ and ‘woman’ to construct Marion’s 
identity as a good mother and equal rights act ivist . Others might draw on 
the normative behaviours of the category ‘CEO’ and construct the identity 
of a CEO who is at best ‘distracted’ or ‘lacks judgement ’ and should be 
putt ing the needs of the company before her baby. Disjunctive categories 
can be (and are) deployed to infer and resist  blame. Member categories 
are ‘inference rich’ and store “a great deal of the knowledge that 
members of society have about the society” (Sacks, 1992, p. 41). 
Categories can be implied, inferred, resisted and denied by mentioning 
category incumbent features. This makes their use flexible and ambiguous. 
It  is their very ambiguity which enables interactants to test out how 
inferences might be received and pursue or abandon certain actions.  
Summary 
MCDs are central to analysing how members make sense of one another 
by drawing on common sense knowledge of what people are like and 
how they behave. They are the rules by which inferences are managed 
and utterances understood and, like CA, are both context dependent and 
context renewing.  
Critique of MCA 
Sacks work on Membership Categorisat ion has not been taken up by 
scholars in the same way as sequential analysis, largely because of the 
perceived ambiguity of member categories which has led MCA to be 
seen as too interpret ive:  
 
I t  is because mult iple MCDs are available with their mult iplicity of 
categories that relevance is the issue, and how categories and their 
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MCDs become relevantly oriented to becomes a key topic for inquiry. 
(Schegloff, 2007, p. 475)  
 
Schegloff points to the problem that categories are repositories of social 
knowledge and will therefore be ‘obvious’ to the researcher, but: 
 
The ‘obviousness’ of it  is not the invest igator’s resource, but the 
invest igator’s problem. […]. It  can thereby become a vehicle for 
promiscuously introducing into the analysis what the writ ing needs for 
the argument-in-progress. To avoid this, there must be analysis to show 
the claim is grounded in the conduct of the part ies, not in the beliefs 
of the writer. (Schegloff, 2007, p. 476)  
 
Thus the arguments against MCA resemble those against DA. An addit ional 
difficulty is where sequential analysis has developed a large corpus of 
empirical findings, the MCA corpus is less sophist icated, leading Schegloff 
(2007) to argue that its lack of development precludes its incorporation 
within current CA practice. Stokoe (2012) argues that the fact MCA has 
been neglected does not mean that it  should continue to be so. She calls 
for a revival of the method within (or without) the CA community with a 
view to building a corpus of MCA principles to complement exist ing CA 
work.  Fitzgerald (2012) warns against MCA following this corpus building 
route and suggests MCA’s relat ive simplicity is its st rength. Whitehead 
(2012, p. 338) suggests that Stokoe “somewhat underplays the extent to 
which recent conversat ion analyt ic work has attended to categorial 
matters”, and cites a range of CA practit ioners who have successfully 
incorporated the two.  
 
What MCA offers is the discipline of tying the categories in use to the 
empirical data as far as members pract ices allow . Stokoe suggests it  is not 
the job of the analyst to be more specific about categorizat ion practices 
than the members themselves and it  is the very inference richness of 
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categories that gives them their defeasability. What MCA does offer is a set 
of pract ices which orient the researcher to the way t hese part icipants use 
categories in interaction. Schegloff for instance draws our attent ion to the 
temptation for the researcher to see any attribute as a category in use: 
 
…part ies to talk-in-interaction can and do discriminate between 
attributes and categories, so analysts should not simply treat the 
former as virtually doing the latter. (Schegloff, 2007, p. 482) 
 
Whitehead agrees with Schegloff’s pursuit  of empirically grounded analysis 
but argues that the on-going debate endangers the research itself:  
 
I  am not overly concerned about whether my contribut ions are 
characterized as exemplifying a CA or MCA approach, or both. I  am 
concerned, however, with whether my work is faithful to the empirical 
details of the data on which it  is based, and whether it  makes a 
contribut ion to the understanding of social organisat ion broadly, and 
the social categories and talk-in-interaction in part icular. (Whitehead, 
2012, p. 341) 
 
Fitzgerald celebrates both CA and MCA as “aids to a sluggish imagination which 
produce ‘reflections through which the strangeness of the world can be 
detected’ (Garfinkel, 1992, quoted in Fitzgerald, 2012, p. 308). I t is this pragmatic 
position that I  assume. As a relatively novice researcher I  could spend years 
reading competing claims for the superiority of one method over another by 
scholars far more knowledgeable than I . CA appeals to me because its discipline 
is indeed an aid to my sluggish imagination, but, as an anxious soul, keen to do 
things correctly I  could lose my way by getting too caught up in identifying formal 
features of talk. MCA adds an additional layer by examining taken for granted 
knowledge. Its relative simplicity offers flexibility to examine identity work but also 
retains that discipline of participant orientation which, for me, helps to make the 
familiar strange. Also, as a systemic therapist , how could I resist  test ing 
Lepper’s claim that the application of MCA coupled with the sequential 
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analysis of CA, offers a unique contribut ion in recognising that “t he 
phenomenon we are dealing with -context- is neither st ruct ure nor process, 
but  bot h” (Lepper, 2000, p. 58, italics in original). 
 
Summary 
I  have argued that one of the reasons that it  is difficult  to research blame 
as an objective phenomenon is because its production and meaning is 
t ied inextricably to its social context. Rather than de-contextualise the 
phenomenon of blame, I have therefore turned to a form of research 
which conceptualises subject and object as inextricably linked. Discourse 
analysis, like contemporary systemic theories, has turned to language as a 
key medium through which social actions are performed and social 
inst itut ions co-constructed. This mutual concern with language makes for a 
good fit  with the field of family therapy process research.  There are many 
and various forms of Discourse Analysis which broadly fit  within two camps 
(although many have a foot in both).  Some forms of Discourse Analysis 
focus more on wider historical processes and the product ion of power 
relat ionships; others take a narrower focus and examine the local practices 
of talk in interaction through which social actors co-construct social 
inst itut ions. It  is this latter t radit ion that best fits my quest ion, and I have 
turned to a form of analysis that sits within an ethnomethodological frame.  
 
So, I  locate this study in the realm of therapy process research, using the 
discourse research methods of Applied CA and MCA. I have summarised 
the key analyt ical procedures that I used in the analysis of the therapy 
sessions. I  argue that this choice of methods offers a way of gett ing at t his 
quest ion in a way that I hope will illuminate something of interest in t his 
data.  
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Part 2 – The Design of the study 
Introduction 
This section concerns how the research quest ions, the review of the 
literature and the methodological considerat ions combine into a specific 
design for the study. The recruitment and selection of part icipants, the 
collect ion and transcript ion of recordings of therapy sessions and the 
selection of data for analysis are described. Issues of ethics and reflexivity 
are discussed. Finally, the aims of the study are summarised to provide the 
context for Chapters 4 and 5, in which the results of the analysis are 
described. 
The research site and participants 
The research site was chosen because of its reputation as a service 
specialising in work with families affected by psychosis. The therapists 
adhered to a model of family work that combined systemic and family 
management elements. 
Therapists 
I  recruited three experienced systemic therapists working with families 
accepted for systemic therapy where the experience of living with 
psychosis was part of the reason for referral. Only two of the three therapy 
teams successfully recruited families willing to be included in the research 
which I have called Therapy 1 and Therapy 2. 
 
Each therapy was delivered by a separate team of therapists, each team 
comprising one qualified systemic psychotherapist  and one other therapist . 
The other therapists are adult  mental health professionals who have 
undergone a minimum of one year’s addit ional t raining in a method 
designed for working with families affected by psychosis, incorporating 
systemic and family management theories and accredited by the 
Associat ion for Family Therapy. In both Therapy 1 and Therapy 2, T1 
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denotes the qualified systemic psychotherapist  and T2 the allied mental 
health professional. 
Families 
‘Family’ means more than one adult  engaged in the therapy, but could 
include any combination of family members or members of the referred 
persons’ close network. Because the sample is small I  did not priorit ise 
attempts to represent difference. Both families who part icipated in the 
research are couples, each couple including one person with lived 
experience of psychosis. For reasons of confidentiality names and possible 
identifying factors have been changed, although the salient features, such 
as caring for dependent children or not, have been retained. For example, 
in Therapy 2, Mandy has a number of psychiatric diagnoses, the part icular 
combination of which may reveal her identity to those involved in her care. 
For this reason I have omitted a detailed descript ion of the diagnoses of 
both Janet and Mandy but have retained those that are pert inent to the 
research quest ion. My rat ionale for this is that these diagnoses carry with 
them taken for granted knowledge that is used by part icipants to produce 
social actions within the texts analysed.  
Therapy 1 
The couple are Janet and her husband Steven. Janet has a diagnosis of bi-
polar affective disorder and she has a history of recurrent psychotic 
episodes and hospital admissions. Steven is in paid employment. Janet has 
been in paid employment most of her adult  life but in the last three years 
has not.  
Therapy 2 
The couple Mandy and her husband Kevin have been referred for family 
work following Mandy’s most recent psychotic episode. Mandy has 
gathered a number of diagnoses over the years, one of which is 
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schizophrenia. Kevin describes himself as Mandy’s main carer. They have a 
number of school aged children. 
Ethical issues 
I  was aware that for families, knowing that the therapy would be taped 
and examined might increase their anxiet ies. On the other hand, it  is part 
of common practice in many family therapy teams to tape family therapy 
sessions for clinical, research and training purposes. In this sense, I  was 
confident that the therapists would be familiar with and sensit ive to the 
ethical issues involved when gaining consent for taping. In addit ion, I  met 
with the therapists to talk through with them the part icular issues 
concerned with recruitment of families for research purposes and ensured 
that they felt  confident to address these with the families they recruited. 
For example, ensuring families were aware that their refusal would not in 
any way affect the service they would be given.  I  was also conscious that 
the follow up interview could segue into unforeseen, potentially painful 
areas (Hollway and Jefferson, 2000) and therefore arranged that families 
could be referred back to the therapy team if they wished. As well as 
potential harm to part icipants it  is equally important to consider the 
potential benefits. Procter and Padfield (1998) found that research 
part icipants on the whole found their experience enjoyable because they 
believed the subject to be worthwhile and also they enjoyed the 
opportunity to talk to a genuinely interested audience. This certainly 
appeared to be the case with the family that I did interview. The change in 
design of the study (see Appendix A) raised a further ethical issue for me. 
How could I do just ice to the family who offered the follow up interview? It  
seems important that the interview is represented in the thesis, despite the 
change in design. 
 
For therapists, issues of anonymity are equally important. Although systemic 
therapy is a much more public endeavour than many therapies due to our 
rout ine use of teams, screens and recording equipment, the intense 
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scrut iny of a researcher may leave the therapist  feeling exposed and open 
to crit icism. As a therapist  engaged in a large research trial myself I  
sometimes wonder what researchers will make of the recordings of my own 
work and if I  will be found wanting.  It  is the very gap between what our 
theories say we should do and how we actually manage the cut and thrust 
of the real therapy encounter that I am interested in. My aim in this study is 
to uncover the local logic of talk, not judge whether it  is good or bad. 
However neutral I  intend my analysis to be however, I  am well aware that 
my observations might be received by part icipants as crit ical or just  plain 
wrong. On the other hand, one of the great strengths of our t raining is that 
we become familiar with watching ourselves and others in practice and 
discussing alternative perspectives as an integral part of our work. Thus I 
believe that the therapists who part icipated were able to make an 
informed judgement about the risks they exposed themselves to, and I am 
grateful to them, and to the families who part icipated.  
Informed consent 
All respondents were given a written explanation including the process 
and purpose of the research and the limits of confidentiality (Appendix B3). 
They were informed that they could withdraw from the research at any 
t ime. Written consent for the taping and transcript ion of therapy sessions, 
follow up interviews plus possible future publication was obtained.  
Ethical approval 
The therapies were carried out within the NHS and the study was rigorously 
examined and rat ified by the relevant national and local ethics 
committees to ensure that informed consent, information security and 
safety issues were paramount.  (Appendix F) 
                                                 
3  
I have omitted any reference to the location of the study, including the location of the REC and  
NHS Trust logos, to protect the anonymity of the participants. 
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Data collection and analysis 
Therapists made audio recordings of all therapy sessions with families. I  
wanted the therapy to be as naturalist ic as possible and therefore asked 
the therapists to work according to their usual practice. Four sessions in all 
were recorded, the first  two sessions from each family. Both families ended 
therapy after two sessions. One family agreed to a follow up interview 
which I audio recorded. All tapes were transcribed following a modified 
version of CA conventions based on those init ially developed by Jefferson 
(2004) (Appendix E). Influenced by Stancombe (2002) I subjected each 
transcript of the therapy sessions to an init ial turn by turn analysis, coding 
turns as potentially blaming, mit igating or exonerating as follows: 
 Explicit ly blaming – unambiguously allocating responsibility for a 
negative event. 
 Potentially blaming – referring to a negative event with some causal 
implications. 
 Mit igating - implying some responsibility for a negative event but with 
extenuating circumstances. 
 Exonerating – implying a causal relat ionship to a negative event but 
with no responsibility, or fault , implied. 
 
I  was highly inclusive with these codes, many of which overlapped. For 
instance one turn might be coded as both blaming and mit igating, eg. 
(we:ll Kevin Kevin is st ressed wit h me (1) and right  (1) he’s st ressed wit h t he 
ho:use and st uff but  he just  wont  ↑say it  and it  makes  me cross cos I I 
↑know he i:s) (Therapy 2 lines 247-249). Here fault  can be seen to be 
attributed to Kevin for not admitt ing stress, but mit igation may be implied 
due to the speaker claiming to be the cause of his st ress. If blame could be 
read as implied in Turn 1, but not responded to as such in Turn 2, then Turn 1 
would be coded as potential blame. This init ial coding helped me to begin 
to see the range of potentially blaming turns, some very subtle as well as 
the numerous different ways that they could be taken up. The sequences I 
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had identified as explicit ly blaming or potentially blaming were then 
independently reviewed by peer researchers. There was strong agreement 
in identifying explicit  blaming sequences while the potentially blaming 
sequences were open to debate and different interpretat ions.  
 
I  then selected one sequence from each therapy that was unanimously 
identified by peer researchers as explicit ly blaming.  Both these sequences 
occurred in the second therapy session. I  subjected the transcripts from 
both these sessions to further analysis, influenced by ten Have’s (2007) 
suggested model. This involved tracking back through the transcript of the 
entire session to identify the sequential processes within which these 
‘blamings’ were nested. I  worked through the transcripts in terms of the four 
interlocking procedures of turn-taking organisation, sequence organisat ion, 
repair organisat ion and the organisat ion of turn-design. I  then used another 
layer of analysis, Membership Categorisat ion Analysis to explore how 
therapists and family members ut ilise socio-cultural knowledge to ascribe 
identity categories in the achievement and resistance of blaming.  
 
The research falls in the tradit ion of a single case analysis, in this instance a 
comparison of two cases. Single case analysis in CA has a long legacy 
following Sacks (1992) original lectures. It  involves examining a single 
conversat ion or section of one in order to track in detail the various 
conversat ional st rategies which inform and drive its production. The 
advantage of a single case analysis is that it  can show the development of 
a piece of social action as it  develops over a series of turns and sequences 
of turns (Sacks 1979; Schegloff, 1987, 1988, 1992; Hutchby and Wooffitt , 
1998; Antaki and Horowitz, 2000; Antaki et  al., 2004). I  have come to think 
of this as akin to an archaeological process, digging down from the 
blaming event to uncover more and more layers of context and meaning. 
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Reflexivity and self-reflexivity 
One of the dangers of t rying to build theory from the analysis of micro 
processes is that the very activity of looking for the phenomena to be 
studied will increase the likelihood of finding them (Seigfried, 1995). Byng 
Hall suggests that "A theory can be a story to oneself wrapped up in a story 
to others", (Byng Hall, 1998, p. 136). My personal stories about blame as well 
as my training as a systemic therapist  inevitably influence what I see. My 
job as a researcher is to make my thinking and practice transparent and 
open to challenge. I  have been drawn to the discipline of CA as a means 
of helping me to get beyond my immediate assumptions through rigorous 
attent ion to empirical data. This process in itself can reveal some of the 
tacit  assumptions, both helpful and unhelpful, that I  may share with others 
of my profession. Nevertheless, we can never be free of preconceptions, 
and to help me to become aware of and challenge my inevitable biases I 
used colleagues in the research community at the Tavistock Clinic to help 
me review my work at frequent intervals.  The most powerful tool available 
to qualitat ive researchers however is to make our work as transparent as 
possible, and in Chapters 4 and 5 readers can judge the validity of my 
findings for themselves.  
Summary of the aims and design of the study. 
Sacks has shown how in ordinary conversat ion part icipants are concerned 
with presenting themselves as ordinary people doing whatever we would 
expect ordinary people to do. When people breach these norms they are 
held accountable, and if their account fails to fit  a local evaluation of 
reasonableness then other inferences can be made, such as 
incompetence or intent ional malice. Blame is an important tool in the 
construct ion and maintenance of moral order.  
 
Arguably, families come to therapy when they have failed to negotiate 
what const itutes reasonable behaviour, or at least failed to find a way to 
live with their differences. In therapy we can expect couples who are 
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presenting with difficult ies to produce different descript ions of events in 
such a way as to persuade the hearer to different moral evaluations of the 
same event, presenting themselves and others as reasonable or not 
according to their part icular interactional task at the t ime. Part icipants are 
highly attuned to perceptions of their moral standing. The problem is that 
to preserve one’s own moral standing in a dispute often involves ascribing 
blame to the other, thus threatening their moral standing which they will 
work hard to defend. Part icipants in therapy, in common with members of 
any social inst itut ion, have to maintain relat ionships in order for the 
conversat ion to continue, and for relat ionships to be maintained, they 
have to find ways of keeping the conversat ion going. The following analysis 
examines how this is achieved in practice. 
 
Systemic therapists, whose job is to help people successfully negotiate their 
relat ionships in one way or another, approach blame with caution. 
However, as ordinary conversat ionalists we have a wide range of 
strategies with which to achieve blaming without  resort ing to explicit  
accusation with its concomitant danger of conflict and communication 
breakdown. The flexibility of our conversat ional procedures enables us to 
attribute or avert blame in a myriad of more or less subtle ways, to check if 
someone is willing to listen, to hint, to withdraw an inference if the context 
feels host ile, to avoid answering, to change the topic or to counter attack. 
Conversat ions flexibility also means that our intent ions are always open to 
differing interpretat ions and interactional problems often occur. Often, 
subtle inferences of blame are readable only within the context of the 
relat ionship, and innocent comments may be read as blame because 
people are speaking and listening from different contexts. It  is in how 
part icipants take up a comment that they display how they have 
interpreted what has been said. Two therapy sessions have been selected, 
each containing a blaming event. Each session has then been subjected 
to a turn by turn analysis using CA and MCA.  The analysis shows the co-
production of a context where the blaming event in quest ion is made 
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relevant. What is const ituted as reasonable blame is shown to be a local 
matter, co-constructed through talk-in-interaction. 
The data analysis. 
In CA, as in systemic therapy, interactional problems can be seen as the 
result  of interactional solut ions that members have locally produced.  In 
the following two chapters I  show how CA and MCA illuminate how explicit  
blame is prompted by a recurring misalignment between different part ies 
about the legit imacy of a part icular topic and how it  should be resolved. 
Explicit  blame then can be seen as a solut ion to an interactional problem 
whose part icular meaning can only be understood within its local context. I  
will also show how a set of linked sequences from a single session can also 
be seen as part of a set of sequences that link conversat ions beyond the 
boundaries of the session between the couples and their social networks.  
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Chapter 4 
Introduction  
This is the first  of two chapters presenting the results of the analysis. Each 
chapter examines the construct ion of a blaming event in the second 
session of two separate therapies, Therapy 1 in Chapter 4 and Therapy 2 in 
Chapter 5.  The presentation of the material follows a similar format in each 
chapter.  Both chapters are divided into three parts, each part concerned 
with an excerpt of t ranscript selected from a different stage of the therapy 
session concerned. These excerpts are then divided into a number of 
smaller segments, interspersed with the analysis and commentary. This is to 
enable the reader to follow the detail of the analysis more easily. For 
example, Part 1 of this chapter contains a single excerpt of t ranscript which 
begins 12 minutes into the session. The excerpt is presented in 5 sections, 
each section following directly from the previous one, with no turns omitted 
unless otherwise stated. Part 2 contains an excerpt beginning twenty seven 
minutes into the session, divided into 4 sections and so on. The original line 
numbering of the entire transcript has been retained to orient the reader to 
the place of each section in relat ion the whole. The selected excerpts of 
t ranscript are presented in their ent irety in Appendix C. 
 
Where extracts from the sections are included as part of the commentary 
itself, the number in brackets refers to the line number in the transcript, eg. 
(how you live your life)(111). Very occasionally, line numbers are omitted 
where they do not appear to contribute to the orientat ion of the reader to 
the part of the transcript being discussed.   
 
In this chapter, Part 1 shows how an unresolved misalignment of goals 
between part icipants creates a context for an explicit  blaming later in the 
session. Part 2 demonstrates how the blaming event unfolds and can be 
understood as an attempted solut ion to the problems set up by the earlier 
misalignment.  In Part 3 a third, brief sequence from the final stages of the 
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session shows that the misalignment is related to a disagreement about the 
goals and tasks of therapy that precedes the therapy session itself.  
The Therapy Context 
The family 
The couple are Janet and her husband Steven. Janet has a diagnosis of bi-
polar affective disorder and she has a history of recurrent psychotic 
episodes and hospital admissions. Steven is in full t ime paid employment. 
Janet has worked most of her adult  life but in the last three years has been 
unemployed.  
The therapists 
T1 is an experienced, qualified systemic psychotherapist . T2 is a mental 
health professional who has also completed a minimum of one year’s 
specialist  family therapy for psychosis t raining. T1 is male, T2 female.  
The context of the data selected. 
The excerpt begins about twelve minutes into the second therapy session. 
Present are two therapists T1 and T2, and the couple. In the init ial meeting 
(not included), the therapists gathered information about the couple, their 
family, the history of Janet ’s difficult ies and current circumstances. There 
has been a gap of several weeks between this session and the first , during 
which Janet has experienced another psychotic episode. The init ial part of 
this session is taken up with talking about what Janet and Steven noticed 
triggered the episode and what helped Janet to recover.  The 
conversat ion has flowed smoothly, with all part icipants seemingly aligned 
to the task of elucidating factors that helped Janet to notice her symptoms 
quickly and take action to prevent hospital admission. In systemic terms the 
therapists could be described as having been engaged in the task of 
thickening stories of st rength, resilience and agency regarding her speedy 
recovery.  
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Part 1  
The construction of an interactional problem 
The analysis begins with a detailed examination of the very first  sequence4, 
lines 111 to 116.  I  will argue that these init ial two turns form the basis for a 
misalignment between the interactional tasks of the part icipants. This 
misalignment encompasses a key recurring theme which links sequences 
over the course of the therapy which builds to create a local context in 
which an explicit  blaming event takes place. 
Accounting for ‘not going back’  
111 T1 So have you adjusted what you d:o during the da:y or how you live your life as  
112  part of this (.) process of getting better? 
113 J Well I did go voluntary today I done one day today I thought I’d go and see  
114  how I get on (.) and I was just basically walking around a furniture shop  
115  with a can of ha ha u(h)m (.) ↑cleaner (.)  n I thought this int me (.) I’m  
116  worth a bit more than this (.) so I’m not goin ↓back. 
 
T1’s quest ion introduces the topic of how Janet takes responsibility for her 
own recovery (line 111). Conversat ion analysts have examined the 
constraining nature of such pre-supposit ional quest ions in different 
inst itut ional contexts such as the courtroom (Drew 1992), news interviews 
(Clayman, 1992, 1998) and counselling and therapy ( Peräkylä, 1995; 
MacMart in, 2008). Their rhetorical force depends upon the implication of 
the embedded proposit ion, in this case that to adjust what you do during 
the day or how you live your life is part of a process of gett ing better. 
Within this lies an implication that not to do so would be accountable and 
                                                 
4  
The beginning of a sequence in CA is marked by a turn in which one of the participants initiates an 
action which is taken up by recipients. Its end is marked by the place where participants are no longer 
responding to that action. Different CA practitioners use the term sequence differently with some limiting it 
to the smallest possible sequence, an Adjacency Pair, while others incorporate lengthier segments of talk and 
topic sequences (ten Have 2007). I will draw on both meanings during the course of the analysis, but here I 
am referring to a question and answer adjacency pair.  
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as such invites (or in CA terms ‘projects’) agreement. The accounts 
literature uses the term ‘account ’ in different ways. Following Antaki (1994) I  
am using the term to include any explanations called forth by the hearer’s 
interpretat ion of the previous turn to require some form of explanation. 
Janet ’s response (lines 113-116) is delivered in a dispreferred turn shape 
which shows that she has understood the implication and that her decision 
not to go back requires just ificat ion. There are a number of features that 
mark Janet ’s awareness of the potential interactional t rouble her response 
may elicit . She opens her response with ‘Well’, a preface often used to 
signal a dispreferred response or disagreement (Pomerantz, 1984). She 
aligns with T1’s invitat ion to describe how she has adjusted what she does 
during the day ( I did go volunt ary5 t oday) (113) and then provides an 
account to just ify her decision not to return. Atkinson and Drew (1979) in 
their study of court procedures show that accounts just ifying subsequent 
events are often found as a defence after a perception of failure to take 
action. Her account is peppered with hesitat ion and laughter tokens 
frequently associated with marking a turn as dispreferred. 
Membership category devices- What kind of person doesn’t go back? 
MCA helps us to understand the moral implications contained in this 
quest ion answer sequence.  Member categories serve as the repositories 
of social knowledge upon which we draw to describe people and their 
actions. These are combined with rules of application in what Sacks (1992) 
terms Membership Categorizat ion Devices (MCDs). Just prior to this 
sequence, part icipants have been discussing a recent psychotic episode 
and what has helped Janet to recover. The MCD in use is ‘illness’ and more 
specifically ‘mental illness’. T1 then introduces two alternative versions of 
the Category Bound Activity (CBA) ‘gett ing better’. The first , ‘adjust ing 
what you do during the day’ is an expectable activity for anyone who has 
been ill, in order to meet social obligations to do their best to recover. His 
                                                 
5
 “Voluntary” is heard as voluntary work. 
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subsequent upgrade of (how you live your life) (111) could be heard to 
imply a more serious and enduring category of illness of which mental 
illness is generally understood to belong. Patients have the right to be 
helped, balanced by the duty to do all in their power to get better, and 
the more serious the illness the more radical the lifestyle adjustment that 
may be required.  
 
In Janet ’s response (Well I did go volunt ary t oday I done one day t oday I 
t hought  I’d go and see how I get  on), the CBA ‘voluntary work’ is 
produced as a version of the CBA ‘gett ing better’. Janet thus 
demonstrates how she has met her obligation as a member category 
‘patient ’ to adjust her life in order to recover. However, Janet then 
constructs her account for why she has chosen not  to continue with this 
obligation, (and I was just  basically walking around a furnit ure shop wit h a 
can of ha ha u(h)m (.) ↑cleaner)(114). This descript ion  serves to transform 
the CBA voluntary work from a ‘process of gett ing better’ to a process that  
diminishes ones sense of self-worth through activity that is neither socially 
valued nor generally seen as a site for developing skills and confidence. 
Unpaid work that fails to give either support or sat isfaction is commonly 
seen as exploitat ive or demeaning. Janet validates this reading of her 
account by her subsequent claim ( I’m worth more t han this) (115).  Thus we 
can see the CBA voluntary work evaluated as either good voluntary work 
(that which can be used as a process of gett ing better) or bad voluntary 
work (that which is exploitat ive or demeaning).  Cuff (1993) built  on Sacks 
work to show that Standard Relat ional Pairs (SRP) such as 
employer/employee have numerous versions available to hearers to 
subvert the action of the speaker. To make what is being said intelligible 
the SRP is not enough. Identit ies have to be specified further, what kind of 
employer/employee are they?   
 
Janet ’s account achieves a descript ion that presents her as a part icular 
version of employee, one with mental illness who is willing to meet her 
 85 
obligations as a patient but just ified in reneging on them in this case due to 
the inadequacy of the work for her needs.  
Thickening the story or justifying the action? 
In systemic terms T1 can be seen to be continuing his project of helping 
Janet to thicken her story and make visible the small adjustments she has 
made in her life that have been helpful. The construct ion of the quest ion 
(have you adjust ed what  you d:o during t he da:y or how you live your 
life)( 112-113) is an example of the kind of narrat ive practice  where 
‘intent ional state understandings of identity’ (White, 2007, p.100) are 
highlighted; the construct ion of the ‘agentive self’ (Freedman and 
Coombes, 1996, p. 97). Janet ’s choice of response aligns with the structural 
propert ies of the quest ion in describing such an adjustment but misaligns 
wit h t he t herapist s design in that she describes a failure to adjust 
successfully. Rather than thicken the story of the achievement of her goals 
she describes her failure. Her account is designed to show that the failure is 
through no fault  of her own, her lack of agency.  
Marking trouble -What constitutes a reasonable account? 
The session continues: 
 
117 S hhhhh well I said to Janet I said it’s a confidence builder 
118 T1 mm 
119 S I know she’s sayin its all men there at work obviously but there’s different  
120  days int [there 
121 J     [>yeah I ↑didn’t mean it like that< (.) what I’m sayin is it was all  
122  men when I went for a coffee (.) it’d be nice if there was a lady there but  
123  .hhh I felt like I’m worth more than this basically you know if you like  
124  ↓summin don’t you 
125 T2 mmmm  
126 T1 So you didn’t feel you fitted in there very well? 
127 J ↑Yeah I think I was all right but I- in myself I thought I think I’m worth a bit  
128  more than this hm hm 
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129 T2 mhm do you think it was something to do with it jus- the first day, that they  
130  thought they’d kinda give you something easy to do the first day or d’you 
131  [ know 
132 J [>no I just thought it weren’t me< (.) what I was doin really 
133 S How would you feel if some of your mates came in n you were there cleanin  
134  (.)  would you get embarrassed by that?  
135  (2)  
136 S Is that part of it? 
137 J ↑No I’m just saying I- I just feel it wasn’t for me. I don’t think I’d like to do  
138  that all the time. 
 
Accounts do interactional work, but the work they do may be received as 
insufficient to their task (Buttney, 1990). An important feature of member 
categories is that they have associated a range of predicates which will 
be heard as an explanation for actions.  However, hearers must find a 
relevant fit  between the descript ion of activit ies and the implied identity. If 
not, inferences can be made either about the action (is it  good or bad, 
normal or abnormal) or about the speaker.  For instance is the story told 
sufficient to the task? If not then inferences will be made about the 
speaker’s intent ions.  
 
In the next turn, Steven’s response shows both his reception of Janet ’s 
account as insufficient and that this has been discussed before ( well I said 
t o Janet ) (117) followed by ( I know she’s saying) (119). I  will return to the 
significance of the re-occurrence of a pre-exist ing conflict below, for now 
lets look at how the session unfolds. Steven fails to respond to Janet ’s claim 
that she is worth more than that and instead offers an alternative account 
for her not going back, that she feels uncomfortable with men. He 
introduces another version of ‘gett ing better’ by referring to the CBA of 
(building confidence) (119). ‘Building confidence’ within the MCD mental 
illness is generally associated with obligations to overcome discomfort 
through perseverance (think of all the self help books concerned with 
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feeling fear and doing it  anyway). Janet ’s implication that the work was 
demeaning or exploitat ive, a morally worthy reason for not going back, is 
undermined by Steven’s implication that an alternative version of the SRP 
employer/employee is relevant. Not bad employer/good employee but 
good employer/uncomfortable employee. Within the MCD gender, and 
social knowledge about gender relat ions, it  might be expectable for a 
lone woman to feel uncomfortable in exclusively male company and 
Steven’s (obviously) (119) claims this as unquest ionable knowledge. The 
effect of Steven’s response is to both contest Janet ’s account and offer an 
alternative, socially acceptable reason for her decision. However, his next 
utterance, (t heres different  days int  t here) (119-120) implies she is acting 
too hast ily as she has not yet tested if other women do work there. Thus the 
moral weighting subtly shifts to good employer/bad employee. Janet 
denies this as a relevant feature with an ‘agreement-prefaced 
disagreement ’ (Pomerantz, 1984).  She softens her disagreement by 
conceding ( it ’d be nice if t here was a lady t here) (122) but restates her 
claim ( I’m worth more t han t his) (123) as her reason for not going back. She 
then adds (you know if you like somet hing don’t  you) (123-124). Drew and 
Holt  (1988) show how idiomatic expressions are often posit ioned 
sequentially to summarise a complaint in an environment where the 
recipient ’s affiliat ion to the complaint is in doubt. The rhetorical force of 
maxims such as these are shown to be especially resistant to challenge as 
they invoke a kind of vague common knowledge, devoid of specifics that 
are open to quest ion. The negative interrogative ‘dont you’ st rongly 
projects an affirmative answer (Heritage, 2002). So Janet can be seen to 
be both resist ing the force of Steven’s claim and limit ing further 
opportunit ies for explorat ion.  
Pursuing alternative reasons 
T1’s next turn displays his alignment with Steven’s search for an alternative 
reason to Janet ’s stated one. Heritage and Watson’s (1979) influential work 
has shown how formulat ions serve an important role in the achievement of 
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inst itut ional tasks. Their findings have been confirmed and elaborated in 
the study of different tasks formulat ions achieve in psychotherapy (Antaki, 
2008). Formulat ions immediately follow a person’s turn and ostensibly give 
the gist  of what that person has said by selecting elements of a person’s 
account, delet ing others and presenting it  as merely a summary of that 
person’s words. In this way they limit  relevant answers to eit her agreement 
(I did say that) or disagreement.  By delet ing Janet ’s reason ( I’m wort h 
more t han t hat ) T1 t ies his formulat ion to her modified agreement with 
Steven that ( it’d be nice if t here was a lady t here) and transforms it  into (So 
you didn’t  feel you fit t ed in t here very well?) (126). Janet resists this 
interpretat ion with another agreement prefaced disagreement, ( ↑yeah, I 
t hought I was alright ) (127) and restates ( I t hink I’m wort h a bit  more t han 
t his).  T2 then joins in the quest (lines 129-130). She embeds the suggest ion 
that Janet has been given this task because it  was her first  day and 
wonders if (t hey t hought  t hey’d kinda give you somet hing easy t o do t he 
first  day) (130) thus aligning with Steven’s ‘building confidence’ version of 
‘gett ing better’. Janet disagrees this t ime in preferred turn shape, thus 
displaying less concern for mit igating interactional t rouble. Steven’s next 
turn, a quest ion containing an embedded suggest ion (How would you feel 
if some of your mat es came in n you were t here cleanin (.)  would you get  
embarrassed by t hat ?) (133-134) strongly projects an affirmative answer. 
Janet ’s lack of response with a two second pause therefore displays 
‘t rouble’. I f we consider the potential implication in Steven’s version of 
employee, one who refuses to work due to pride, we can perhaps 
understand Janet ’s lack of response as an avoidance of conflict. Her 
choice is to agree, thus potentially acceding to a morally dubious posit ion, 
to disagree and by doing so orient to an argument (see below), or to 
choose not to take up her turn.  Steven orients to potential conflict by 
mit igating his previous implication ( Is t hat  part  of it ?)(136) offering an 
opportunity for Janet to both agree to his version and offer alternatives. 
Janet again resists agreement but also offers a way out of incipient conflict 
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by offering unelaborated, formulaic responses designed to close down the 
topic ( I just  feel it  wasn’t  for me)(137). Idiomatic expressions are often used 
to terminate a topic co-operatively as the recipient can affiliate with the 
idiomatic expression if not the task in hand (Drew and Holt , 1988)  
 
The relat ionship between Janet and the rest of the part icipants is 
becoming increasingly marked by opposit ion and incipient conflict, with 
Janet repeatedly displaying her resistance to exploring this topic further 
while the rest seem concerned to work out a solut ion. How come? 
Misalignment - Troubles telling or help seeking? 
Schegloff (2006) has termed the persistent effort  to maintain a part icular 
direction as ‘an interactional project ’. A clue to how the part icipants get 
into this redundant pattern may relate to the part icipants misalignment 
regarding their interactional projects. Jefferson and Lee (1992) show how 
the preferred response to ‘t roubles telling’ in mundane conversat ion is 
emotional reciprocity, often in the form of a story of a similar t rouble by the 
hearer. The identit ies of t roubles teller and troubles hearer in this context 
are symmetrical, in that their roles are usually interchangeable. In what  
Jefferson and Lee call a ‘service encounter’ the troubles teller and troubles 
hearer roles are asymmetric, with the expectations of t roubles hearer 
(service provider) being help giving and the troubles teller as help seeking. 
Interactional t rouble occurs when the troubles teller and troubles hearer 
are talking from different contexts. It  was Janet who first  used the CBA 
voluntary work as her choice of activity within the process of gett ing better. 
Her announcement that she was not going back then was heard as a 
problem. T1 has heard this account as ‘help seeking’ and it  is towards this 
asymmetric paradigm that T1 and T2 continue to orient. Janet however 
seems to resist  the problem solving activity that casts her into the category 
of help seeker.  
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Unhappy incident reports 
Pomerantz’s work into the attribut ion of responsibility has demonstrated 
that a standard way of apport ioning either praise or blame: 
    
is with a construct ion in which the candidate praised/blamed party is 
referenced in subject posit ion with an active predicate. That is the 
candidate praised/blamed party is formulated as an act or agent  
performing a blamewort hy/praisewort hy act ion.  (Pomerantz, 1978, p. 
116, italics in original) 
 
In contrast, an ‘unhappy incident ’ is reported in such a way that the event 
is not linked with an actor/agent but as something that just happened and 
most frequently, in an unelaborated way. 
 
By report ing an unhappy incident as an announcement, a speaker 
reserves accounts of the background, sett ing, circumstances etc. for 
subsequent turns. It  is in these subsequent turns that the allocation of 
responsibility is rout inely oriented to. (Pomerantz, 1978, p. 117) 
 
and crucially for this analysis, “Such deliveries may occasion subsequent 
searches for ‘responsible’ part ies”, (Pomerantz, 1978, p. 116). Furthermore 
these requests rout inely transform them from an incident that happened to 
an incident that happened as a result  of an action performed by someone 
before the unhappy incident occurred. Thus, “A device for allocating 
blame involves treating an event, eg. an ‘unhappy incident ’ as a 
consequent event in a series”,(Pomerantz ,1978, p. 119). 
 
So we can see that by delivering a story of an ‘unhappy incident ’, ( I was 
just  basically walking around a furnit ure shop wit h a can of ha ha u(h)m (.) 
↑cleaner’) Janet creates a context which rout inely invites part icipants to 
seek who is to blame. Thus the procedural rules that underpin ordinary 
conversat ion can act as a track along which the conversat ion will 
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ordinarily run unt il either the conclusion made relevant by that rule is met or 
part icipants display, and are underst ood t o be displaying, that this t rack is 
not taking us in the right direction. T and T2 are co-operating with the 
performative force of Janet ’s telling of an unhappy incident in their search 
for the responsible agent and the possible reasons for Janet being given 
the task of cleaning. This is not to imply a determinist ic interpretat ion of 
conversat ion. The projected response is a) always open to different 
interpretat ions and b) part icipants can always choose to do the expected 
or not. Janet may have unintentionally invited an explorat ion of why she 
was given an unsuitable task, and certainly her subsequent replies indicate 
that she does not wish to pursue this line of enquiry, yet the others choose 
to pursue it . Why they choose to pursue it  remains opaque at present. At 
this point, S’s project seems aligned to that of T1 and T2, although later 
events show his project to be slight ly different in design.  
Explaining or explaining yourself. 
So why did Janet make relevant her decision not to return to the voluntary 
work in answer to T1’s quest ion? The answer might lie in Steven’s turn (well I 
said t o Janet  I said) (117) which displays that Janet is recycling a pre-
exist ing conflict between them. Janet ’s response to T1s quest ion is perhaps 
presenting her version of events first , in a bid for the therapists’ support. The 
CA literature on argumentation makes a useful dist inct ion between 
“explaining and explaining oneself” (Antaki and Leudar, 1992, p. 181) the 
former being an utterance designed to explain the relat ionship between 
one thing and another (explanation as answer) and t he latter designed to 
persuade the other to the validity of ones argument (explanation as claim 
backing). In CA arguments, like all conversat ion, are essentially co-
operative. By this I  mean that the management of disagreement follows 
certain structural procedures which conversat ional partners both orient to 
in order to interpret each others moves (Pomerantz, 1984). If all utterances 
are constructed within certain procedural and categorial assumptions 
which, if accepted, give them validity, then to offer or seek an explanation 
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holds within it  certain expectations about what const itutes a valid 
explanation. Validity might rest on assumptions of personal knowledge or 
impart ial observation for example.  Antaki and Leudar argue that 
explanations as answers refer to descript ions of causal relat ionships where 
the validity of the claim is not expected to be disputed. The explainer is 
assumed to have reasonable grounds for the claim and is not expected to 
be distort ing that claim for their own ends.  The key focus of the 
conversat ion is non-dialogical in that it  is concerned with affairs external to 
the conversat ion itself. Explanations as claim backing display a concern 
with dialogical matters, whether the hearer finds the explanation 
persuasive or not. What is made relevant concerns one’s status as a 
socially rat ional agent within the conversat ion. All explanations have both 
these propert ies in common and so it  is to the pragmatic performance of 
the explanation that we look to different iate between the two. One of the 
main keys to unlocking the meaning is “t he assumed agreement  on, or 
quarrel about , t he st at e of affairs being explained.” (Antaki and Leudar, 
1992, p. 186, italics in original). 
 
In family therapy, families often present with troubles that they hope the 
therapist  will adjudicate, preferably on their side.  In this case it  seems the 
therapists hear Janet ’s response in the frame of ‘explanation as answer’, 
and they join with Steven in what they assume is a search for the cause of 
the problem. The problem as they see it  is that Janet thought that 
voluntary work would fit  her chosen route for gett ing better but either the 
nature of the task, or Janet ’s perception of the task, needs adjustment. It  
seems that all part icipants are working from an assumption that work is a 
CBA relevant to the process of gett ing better. T1, T2 and Steven seem to 
be adhering to a ‘building confidence’ version and trying to persuade 
Janet that the voluntary work fits her chosen goal and can be adjusted. 
Meanwhile Janet is drawing on another version ‘some work is demeaning’ 
and is t rying to persuade the others that this work is not relevant to the 
process of gett ing better. As Jayussi (1984) demonstrates, different versions 
 93 
have different identity implications. For Janet, if the former prevails then 
she can be found culpable for not going back, while the latter absolves 
her of her obligation to return. The therapists are facing an interactional 
problem, do they co-operate with problem solving activity (aligning with 
Steven) or with closing down the topic (aligning with Janet). Both therapists 
in this sequence adopt a problem solving stance. Janet ’s attempts to close 
the topic show a sequential t ransit ion from mit igated to unmit igated 
disagreement displaying increasing potential for conflict both between the 
couple but also between Janet and the therapists. In therapy terms, this 
poses a potential threat to both the alliance between the couple and to 
the therapeutic alliance. 
Attempting a repair 
139 T1 I- I don’t want us t- to kind of (.) I don’t want you to feel we’re trying to >get  
140  at you or anything like that< but I’m feeling a- a bit the same as Steven  
141  and I guess a-as you Mary I’m thinking I’m sure this isn’t your permanent  
142  (.) role in life its not something you’re going to do f-for↑ever its like a  
143  stepping stone (.) its just something to get you back into the (.) ↑swing of  
144  things=  
145 J =I found it boring to be honest (.) it was just cleaning heh heh I thought I do  
146  enough of that at home basically (.) I thought here I go again 
 
In CA repair refers to any action that is focussed towards resolving 
interactional t rouble in order to maintain co-operation of part icipants in 
the ongoing conversat ion. In systemic therapy, a rout ine task is to maintain 
a therapeutic engagement with each member of the family and to 
remain neutral to conflict ing posit ions. This potential conflict prompts T1 to 
action and he makes a formulat ion which ostensibly summarises the 
interactional process. He begins by topicalising Janet’s resistance with ( I- I 
don’t  want us t - to kind of (.) I don’t  want you t o feel we’re t rying t o >get at 
you or anyt hing like t hat )(139). He marks this as a ‘delicate issue’ with his 
halt ing delivery. Research into the organisat ion of ‘delicacy’ (Maynard 
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1991; Silverman 1997) shows how in certain situations it  is functional to 
proceed with caution.  By accounting for this line of quest ioning, he 
anticipates and counters the potential accusation of ‘gett ing at ’ J. T1 goes 
on to just ify their joint activit y by spelling out the version of the CBA ‘gett ing 
better’ implied in previous turns with idiomatic formulat ions (a st epping 
st one) (142) and (get  you back int o t he (.) ↑swing of t hings)(143). Idioms 
are frequently used in environments of potential conflict  as their general 
character enables a conflict ing posit ion to be offered without directly 
accusing the other (Drew and Holt , 1988)  
Doing neutrality 
In systemic terms T1 can be seen as making his posit ion transparent. By 
clarifying the intent of his quest ions he offers the possibility of the posit ion 
he is taking to be quest ioned. In CA terms we can see identity work in 
action. The CBA ‘gett ing at ’ in the context of family therapy implies a 
coercive version of the member category ‘therapist ’. T1 displays the 
normative understanding that therapists should be neutral by displaying 
that a deviat ion from neutrality is accountable. In this case, T1’s account 
just ifies what might appear to be seen as a part isan alliance with Steven. 
By marking the issue as delicate, he displays a collaborative stance, one 
where Janet ’s agreement with the process is important. In this way, despite 
T1’s acknowledged alignment with Steven, the normat ive assumption of 
neutrality is maintained. This is achieved by accounting for his actions as 
motivated by their assumed shared task, that of ‘gett ing better’.  
 
However, Janet continues to resist  T1’s stance as helper and the quest ion, 
answer sequence continues unt il it  is interrupted by Steven in line 153. 
Conflict 
153 S =>to be fair Janet< we were in town last week weren’t we (.) we went into this  
154  foundation shop dint we (.) where you worked  n we see the woman behind  
155  the desk (.) and Janet she put her application form in and Jan said like  
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156  she’ll come up and have a little taster day and she said y’know what d’you  
157  wanna in the shop, you can work the tills, do what you like n Jan said I’ll  
158  do a bit a cleaning she said [indecipherable] 
159 J  [well yeah, they give me a choice yeah but I found it boring [basically 
160 S           [theres  
161  other jobs to do there Janet in the shop besides cleaning 
162  J well I was bored, I do that every day [of the week 
163 S      [frinstance 
164 T1 so you cho:se to do cleaning 
165 J ↑yeah yeah 
166 T1 it wasn’t that they expected you to do cleaning 
167 S No 
168 J No no no not at all but I just thought this int me 
169 T1 So what would be you  
170  (3) 
 
Steven begins this turn with the phrase (To be fair), a rhetorical device that 
both posit ions him as an objective observer and acts as a pre-sequence 
marking an upcoming story. The denouement of the story is that Janet had 
chosen to do the cleaning (lines 157 to 158), a claim which is in opposit ion 
to Janet ’s prior implication that she was given a job unworthy of her. 
Janet ’s confession (Well yeah, they give me a choice yeah) fails to just ify 
her complaint (but  I found it  boring).  This is demonstrated by Steven’s 
response (theres others jobs t o do t here Janet  in t he shop besides 
cleaning) (106-107), implying that if cleaning is boring then Janet could 
choose another occupation.   
Argument or conflict 
In CA, argument or conflict is minimally defined as a three part sequence. 
If speaker A’s utterance is contested by speaker B, A can either make a 
concessionary move or counter oppose B. An argument remains latent 
unt il the third move constructs it  as such (Norrick and Spitz, 2008). In 
ordinary conversat ion disagreement is marked as dispreferred. It  is usually 
 96 
mitigated by reluctance markers and pushed back into the turn 
construct ion following an init ial agreement. In conflict sequences the 
preference structure is reversed.  Part icipants emphasise the opposit ional 
character of their turns by a lack of hesitancy, affective displays (such as 
raised tone of voice), overlapping speech and dissent markers. Once an 
argument is under way, the preference for disagreement means that 
conflicts tend to take on a life of their own. Speakers orient to the 
preference structure to give meaning to their responses meaning that 
even conciliatory moves are often interpreted as opposit ional (Kotoff, 
1993). Thus agreement in preferred turn shape will be read as opposit ional 
making it  difficult  to escape from conflict without explicit  markers such as 
‘OK, I see your point ’ or ‘let’s agree to disagree’.  Strong agreement tends 
to hold a ‘yes but ’ kind of quality, evident in Janet ’s agreement prefaced 
disagreement in line 159. In this sequence we see a shift  from agreement 
prefaced disagreement (line 159) to disagreement (line 162) delivered with 
no hesitat ion. Overlapping talk is a feature and voices are raised as 
part icipants mark mutual orientat ion to incipient conflict. 
Empirical evidence for systemic theory and practice 
CA reveals the structural processes by which conflict sequences are 
init iated and maintained and how, once started, they are difficult  to 
interrupt. Thus once conflict is established, exit  from conflict and the re-
establishing of agreement is much more difficult  to achieve. In the systemic 
literature Bateson’s (1980) work on schismogenesis described these as 
symmetrical patterns of communication. So CA offers further empirical 
evidence for systemic theory and good reason for the rout ine therapeutic 
practice of the interruption of escalat ing symmetrical arguments. 
 
In this case the conflict is interrupted by T1 who indexes Janet ’s choice as 
‘news’ (so you cho:se t o do cleaning)(164) and spells out the implication 
contained in her previous account ( it  wasn’t  that  t hey expect ed you t o do 
t he cleaning) (166). So in this way T1 implicates Janet as potentially 
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culpable because she has failed t o disclose her choice in this matter and 
therefore implied someone else was to blame. Thus T1 marks a change of 
context in his understanding of Janet ’s init ial response to his quest ion from 
non dialogical to dialogical. He moves from the context ‘explanation as 
answer’ where the state of affairs being described was not quest ioned but 
the reason for that state of affairs. Now it  is Janet ’s descript ion of that state 
of affairs which is made relevant as quest ionable. 
 
T1 solves this problem by making relevant Janet ’s choice with a direct 
challenge (so what  would be you) (169). This marks the start of a new 
sequence. T1 shifts the context from past, being given the wrong job to 
future, how to choose the right job. Thus Janet ’s agency is made relevant. 
However, the puzzle of why Janet chose this account of voluntary work as 
a version of the CBA gett ing better remains unexamined.  Janet ’s 
continued resistance to this problem solving stance is marked by a 3 
second pause preceding her response ( I don’t  know). 
Repair 
182 T1 you said um (1) did you say I’m worth more than that?  
183 J Well I think I am than running round with a [duster 
184 T1       [So I think that’s good (.) I like to  
185  hear you saying [that 
186 J      [I felt a bit how can I put it (.) they were very nice to me  
187  don’t get me wrong, very helpful (.) but I really felt like £I’d really  
188  lowered me standards from what I us(h)ed to be£  
I  have omitted a few lines between the last section of t ranscript and this. In 
line (182) we can see T1 init iat ing a new sequence by referring back to 
Janet ’s earlier claim ( I’m wort h more t han t hat )(182) and posit ively 
connoting it . This offers an opportunity for Janet to elaborate her problem, 
that she felt  she had lowered her standards.  The focus in the next phase of 
the session is an elaboration of the history of Janet ’s employment history. 
All part icipants collaborate on elicit ing and telling stories which give 
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evidence for Janet ’s identity as a hard working and diligent employee who 
has persevered in the face of mental illness and the negative effects of 
medication. Thus the preference structure for agreement is restored and 
conversat ion continues with few markers of t rouble unt il some 27 minutes 
into the session, which is where Part 2 begins.  Before moving on to the 
second extract of t ranscript I  will summarise the findings so far. 
Discussion 
This extract of t ranscript is significant because it  part ly creates the context 
for an explicit  blaming later in the session (see Part 2). I  have shown how a 
misalignment emerges between Janet and the other part icipants, how 
part icipants orient to this misalignment  and the interactional resources they 
deploy to avoid overt conflict and blame. The key conflict between Janet 
and the other part ies involves the construct ion of Janet ’s rights and 
responsibilit ies in relat ion to ‘gett ing better’. This includes her implied 
responsibility to adjust what she does during the day as part of the process 
of ‘gett ing better’. It  also includes her rights and responsibilit ies in the 
present moment of therapy and her obligations to co-operate with the 
therapeutic task in hand. 
The therapists’ interactional project 
In the above analysis we can see each part icipant pursuing dist inct 
interactional projects concerned with the goals and tasks of the session. In 
other words, what is the problem, is it  relevant to talk about it  here, who is 
to blame and what should be done about it .  
 
I  have shown that T1 started with a rout ine systemic task, thickening the 
story of Janet ’s st rengths and resilience in pursuit  of recovery from a 
psychotic episode. Janet ’s descript ion of voluntary work as one of her 
chosen routes to recovery, foiled by being given boring work, was read as 
a request for help rather than an argument to support a claim. Thus the 
therapists seem to orient to the goal of resolving the problem of Janet 
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being given an inappropriate task. They are clearly attuned to Janet ’s 
resistance to this task but her idiomatic and generalised responses leave 
t he meaning of her resist ance open to interpretat ion and so the therapists 
continue their problem solving activity in the absence of a clear cue as to 
what else they should be doing. Two concepts from CA, troubles telling 
and unhappy incident report ing help us to understand the influence of 
normative responses in making decisions about how we move on in a 
conversat ion.  Thus the combination of unhappy incident report ing and 
the way troubles are normally heard in a service encounter coupled with 
the ambiguity of Janet ’s closing down responses, may have led the 
therapists to continue the project of  problem solving despite their 
displayed awareness of interactional t rouble. 
Janet’s interactional project 
The embedded suggest ion in T1’s init ial quest ion, makes it  difficult  for Janet 
not to offer an example of what she is doing to aid her recovery. In this 
sense T1’s quest ion sets the trajectory of the sequence. However, recipients 
always have choices about how they co-operate with the speakers 
design. Janet seems to have another goal altogether to that assumed by 
the therapists. She presents her version of a trouble, (I  t ried to adjust my life, 
it  didn’t  work and I ’m not going back through no fault  of my own) in order 
to seek third party validation for her decision. As the session unfolds we can 
see that her version of the trouble is contested by Steven. Where T1 and T2 
hear the troubles telling as an invitation to problem solve, Janet appears to 
have told the trouble in order to elicit  a sympathetic hearing from the 
therapists. However, by offering the topic in response to T1s quest ion about 
gett ing better, Janet invites the problem solving activity but then fails to 
co-operate with it  in a way that is sat isfactory to the others. Failing to 
provide an adequate account promotes further searches and they all get 
t rapped in a redundant quest ion answer sequence which becomes more 
and more conflicted. When T1 and T2 seem to affiliate with Steven’s 
version, Janet unsuccessfully attempts to close down the topic. 
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Steven’s interactional project 
Steven is aware from the start that Janet chose cleaning and thus his 
continued offering of alternative reasons for not going back can be read 
as displaying that her stated reason is irrelevant. Steven’s goal then seems 
to mirror Janet ’s, seeking third party validation for his version of the trouble, 
but in his case the direct opposite of J, the reasons why she should go 
back. In this sense his quest ions can be read as embedded arguments 
delivered to persuade Janet to return to the shop. However, his task, 
although ostensibly similar to that of the therapists is in fact different.  
Steven’s task is that of quest ioning Janet ’s claim while the therapists task is 
of uncovering t he fact s. This misalignment of tasks remains obscure to the 
therapists unt il Steven reveals the ‘fact ’ of Janet ’s choice and as a result  
highlights her agency in the construct ion of the trouble she is report ing.  
Constructing a non-blaming therapy 
All part icipants deploy a number of interactional resources to persuade 
one another to their posit ion. The whole sequence is showing a preference 
not to blame, with Steven holding back his ‘incriminating evidence’ thus 
offering Janet several opportunit ies to confess that it  was her who was 
responsible for choosing the cleaning in the first  place.  Only through failing 
to self-repair (or confess, or self-blame) does Janet invite blame from 
others. In terms of the socially prescribed norms that govern talk then she is 
failing in her social obligation to provide just enough information (the 
economy rule) to enable us to infer what is going on but sufficient (the 
relevancy rule) to represent the world accurately.   MCA helps us to 
identify how different social knowledges are drawn upon to account for 
actions and ascribe different moral identit ies. Is Janet a good patient 
fulfilling her obligations to get better? Are the therapists good therapists, 
helping Janet to resolve her difficult ies or bullying therapists who are 
‘gett ing at ’ Janet? Neither Steven nor Janet challenge therapist  neutrality 
by for instance explicit ly asking for their opinion or quest ioning their stance. 
Thus the CBA of neutrality associated with the member category ‘therapist’ 
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is act ively constructed by the actions of all part icipants, and therapist  
actions are evaluated through that lens.   
 
I t  is because Janet implies another is at fault  that Janet becomes culpable 
for an interactional omission which is made explicit  by the therapist  (so you 
cho:se t o do cleaning […] it  wasn’t  t hat  t hey expect ed you t o do 
cleaning)(164-166). This is read as a misrepresentation of the facts by 
omission. Perhaps to avoid blame for this omission, the therapist  shifts focus 
from the past to the future. The explorat ion has been ‘How come they 
gave it  to you?’ Now Janet ’s agency in the matter has been revealed the 
quest ion could turn to ‘How come you chose it?’ or even ‘How come you 
chose to talk about this now?’ Instead the quest ion the therapist  puts is 
‘What would you like to do instead?’ By this means the therapist  avoids 
exploring Janet ’s agency for a negative event in the past or her agency 
for the act of omission in the current conversat ion, both acts being 
potentially blameworthy. Instead T1 focuses on Janet ’s agency in a 
hypothetical future. This focus fits with the inst itutional task of privileging the 
construct ion of the agentive self towards an assumptive goal of ‘gett ing 
better’.  
 
In Part 2, I  will show how the failure to negotiate the discrepancy between 
the goals of the different part ies leads to overt conflict later in the session.  
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Part 2 
Introduction 
Part 2 picks up the conversat ion midway through the therapy and shows 
how a blaming event is used as a solut ion to an interactional problem.  
The context 
This section occurs 27 minutes into the session. Following the sequence 
described in Part 1 the therapists orient to Janet ’s repeated claim that she 
is worth more than this and a different area of explorat ion opens up. Janet 
and Steven offer descript ions of Janet as a hard working woman despite 
obstacles of ill health and strong medication. The therapists ask quest ions 
that invite elaboration of Janet ’s st rengths. The conversat ion is marked by 
co-operation and collaboration in the construct ion of Janet ’s identity as 
diligent and persevering. Immediately preceding this section T2 references 
care work as sat isfying because it  can help people. Janet agrees but also 
says that she cannot return to care work because she is vulnerable to 
relapse if st ressed. So as we rejoin the conversat ion the CBA ‘work’ is again 
linked to the MCD ‘mental illness’ and different t ypes of work are 
implicated with relat ion to ‘gett ing better’ or ‘gett ing worse’. 
Recycling the argument 
481 T2 yeah mmm (1) .hhh I suppose I was just (.) I was thinking in relation to the  
482  charit:y shop(1) was it a charity shop you volunteered in this morning? 
483 J yea:h. yeah 
484 T2 cos you don’t (1) you don’t see the people that you’re helping do you cos it is  
485  a really worthwhile job cos you are raising money for ↑charity and it’s a  
486  really good thing to do but you’re not actually 
487 S         [mmm  
488 T2      [in touch with the people you’re helping 
489 J ↑£I did meet an old lady today she asked if they had a reclining cha(h)ir in(h)  
490  the shop= 
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491 T2 =Oh r(h)ight!= 
492 J =↑I says it’s my first day but as far as I’m a(h)ware there’s not£ 
493 T2 heh heh 
494 S She says there is one but I’m (h) sat in it 
495  [laughter]  
496 J          [ I explained I was cleaning and I think hang on I do that twenty four  
497  seven at home really 
498 T2 yeah↓ 
499 J clean, clean, clean 
 
In line 481 T2 begins a formulat ion designed to link Janet ’s immediately 
preceding talk with the earlier topic of voluntary work discussed in Part 1.  
She starts her turn with the pre-sequence ( I was t hinking)(481). This serves 
both to request the floor for an extended turn and also to herald a 
formulat ion or interpretat ion of previous talk. She asks the rhetorical 
quest ion (was it  a charit y shop you volunt eered in[…]) which links 
upcoming talk with the earlier conversat ion and indeed only makes sense 
in relat ion to the earlier sequence. This is important. My claim that the 
meaning of this turn depends on the context of the sequence in Part 1 is 
the validation for my claim that these sequences say something about the 
turn by turn construct ion of the subsequent blaming event over separate 
but linked sequences. The formulat ion of the quest ion serves three 
purposes. It  elicits Janet ’s co-operation by projecting agreement. It  
formulates the relevant Category Bound Predicate as ‘Charity’ in relat ion 
to the shop (rather than other possible attributes such as ‘big’ or 
‘furniture’). This serves as a platform for the second part of her argument. It  
also serves to posit ion her argument as a natural upshot of what Janet has 
previously implied, that she enjoys caring for people. The st art of T2’s next 
turn (cos you don’t  (1) you don’t  see t he people t hat  you’re helping do 
you) (484) refers back to Janet ’s immediately preceding talk (not shown) 
concerning the job sat isfaction associated with care work. She does this by 
implicit ly comparing care work which has direct contact with its 
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beneficiaries and charity work which does not. Thus the CBA ‘helping’, and 
the SRP’s helper/helped, are drawn upon to link both activit ies. The MCD 
made relevant here is ‘illness’ with types of work being versions of the CBA 
gett ing better (or worse). T2 makes very explicit  her evaluation of these 
types of work with ( it  is a really wort hwhile job cos you are raising money for 
↑charit y and it ’s a really good t hing t o do)(485-486).  Thus Janet would 
remain the incumbent of the member category helper despite not being 
in direct contact with those she helped, the performative force of which is 
to construct an honourable motive for Janet to reconsider work in the shop 
and crucially therefore to undermine Janet ’s previous argument that the 
job is unworthy of her.  
The costs and benefits of ambiguity 
Janet ’s introduction of humour in the next turn displays both her 
understanding of and rejection of the performative force of T2’s project. 
Although the member category (old lady)(489) might fit  the type of 
beneficiary T2 is implying, the CBA ‘looking for a reclining chair’  evokes an 
old lady with choice and leisure rather than one in need.  Janet thus 
effectively subverts T2’s action by shift ing the SRP helper/helped to that of 
sales assistant/shopper. T2 receives the joke with laughter tokens and 
Steven co-operates with Janet in extending t he joke (494). Norrick and 
Spitz (2007) show how humour is often used to mit igate potential host ility 
and avert conflict. However, due to its ambiguity its intent is open to 
interpretat ion and can equally be seen as provocative. Steven’s  extension 
of the joke to imply Janet is sit t ing doing nothing (line 494) potentially 
mit igates offence but could equally be heard as an implication that Janet 
is lazy, which in this context could also be heard as blaming. Janet ’s next 
turn supports the view that in this case humour was heard as potentially 
derogatory. Interrupting the laughter, in a loud voice Janet recycles and 
upgrades her earlier account for not going back to the charity shop with 
an extreme case formulat ion (Pomerantz, 1986) ( I explained I was cleaning 
and I t hink hang on I do t hat  t went y four seven at  home really) (496-497). 
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Janet ut ilises the CBA ‘cleaning’ and associates it  with the notoriously 
unrewarding and undervalued task of housework,  thus contest ing both 
Steven’s  implication (in jest) that Janet might be lazy and T2’s ascript ion of 
the work being valuable. Janet ’s response displays the possibility of 
incipient conflict, while T2’s soft, downward inflected (yeah) (498) displays 
avoidance of conflict (in CA terms agreement proferred  in a dispreferred 
turn shape heralds concession). Janet reinforces her account by loudly 
repeating (clean, clean, clean)(499), an extreme case formulat ion often 
used to back an argument where opposit ion is expected.  
Making the implicit explicit 
500 T1 But ↑ if if you’d said something else when they asked you what would you  
501  like to do today (1) and you said give me ↑anything but cleaning cos I do  
502  enough of that at home= 
503 J =it was me that said cleaning= 
504 T1 =I wonder what they would’ve given you= 
505 S =yeah= 
506 T1 =and I wonder what you’d be saying now. 
507 S That’s what I said (.) in a way John coming up in the car this afternoon (1) 
508 T1 mmhm 
509 S didn’t I? 
510   (1)  
511 S in a way 
 
This opposit ional sequence becomes the context into which T1 responds 
with an extended turn that leads to an explicit  blaming. Let ’s look at how 
this blaming gets constructed.  T1 begins his turn with (But ) (500), indicating 
a challenge to Janet ’s account. He goes on to construct a rhetorical 
quest ion that projects agreement that Janet chose to do the cleaning. 
Structurally, he matches Janet ’s ut ilisat ion of an extreme case formulat ion 
(give me anyt hing but  t hat ) (502) which serves to upgrade the force of his 
argument. At the next TCU, with latched talk, Janet concedes ( it  was me 
t hat  said cleaning)(503). T1’s quest ion was recognisable as a rhetorical 
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quest ion that was incomplete.  Latching in this case may indicate either 
strong agreement or a shift  in preference organisat ion heralding argument. 
The proof is in how Janet continues her response.  
Two domains of accountability 
What is T1 doing here? First  he makes relevant the inadequacy of Janet ’s 
account given that she had asked to do cleaning. He draws attent ion to 
the consequences of her actions in two domains. First ly the causal 
connection, out there, between her choice (her agency) and the work she 
was given. Secondly the int eract ional consequence, here and now, of her 
account for her choice. Thus he offers a direct and unequivocal challenge 
to Janet to offer a different account for her actions. 
 
Although this challenge is directed to Janet, it  is Steven who responds. 
Steven warrants his agreement with T1 with a descript ion of an earlier 
conversat ion with Janet where he said the same thing. He upgrades his 
argument with a negative interrogative (Didn’t  I) (line509) which projects 
agreement. The power of the structural propert ies of a quest ion/answer 
adjacency pair means that Janet ’s refusal to answer strongly displays 
opposit ion, especially because the projected answer is apparently merely 
confirming the facts. Thus Steven draws on the epistemic authority of the 
professional to back his claim. However in the face of Janet ’s refusal to 
reply his immediate downgrading of his claim ( in a way) (511), can be 
seen as an attempt to avoid potential conflict. 
Blame as an invitation to take responsibility 
T1 makes relevant Janet ’s response with an upgrading of his challenge.  
 
512 T1 cos you don’t know what else they might have offered you 
513 S mm 
514 T1 they might have said ↑would you like to do this or this (.) and you might have  
515  picked one of those (.) and come back and said >cor I’ve never done that  
516  before<or >that was quite interesting cos we did such and such and<(2)  
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517  you picked the boring one didn’t you 
518 J [I ↑did 
519 T1 [and you have no one to blame but yourself really 
520 J                      [no, no, that’s ri↑ght.  
 
Note how, in contrast to her lack of agreement with Steven,  and less 
explicit ly with T2, Janet responds in the affirmative to T1’s two rhetorical 
quest ions which spell out in turn Janet ’s agency and culpability very 
explicit ly (you picked t he boring one didn’t  you) (517) and (you have no 
one t o blame but  yourself)(519).  I  will return to the consequence of this 
point later, for now let ’s continue with the sequential analysis to see the 
upshot of this exchange. 
 
521 S I said on the way coming up is there any girls at all work in there,  
522 J ↑Its not the point its all men but I just felt (.) 
523 S bu- but ↑say you worked tomorrow >for a couple of days< and there  
524  was two women (.) there aswell (.) you’d feel more comfortable wouldn’t  
525  you 
526 T2 mmm, mm 
527 J But I’m not going back there really so that’s that (.) theres no good  
528  going on about ↑ i(h)t 
529 T2 [ha ha ha] 
530 T1 is that right↓ 
531 J I’ve made me ↑mind up 
532 T1 Really (1)£ is this the Janet that you know Steven?£ 
533 S Yes (1) she tries it once (.) if it’s no good (.) never go back (2) 
534 T1 ri:ght 
535 S But I think it’s a bit more determination I think you need on your part 
 
Janet has now explicit ly accepted the blame for choosing the cleaning 
role. Thus implicit ly her account for not going back is also revealed as 
wanting. Steven orients to this with a re-cycling of his earlier project ( is t here 
any girls at  all work in t here) (521) persuading Janet to return to the shop. 
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Janet however interrupts with ( it ’s not  t he point ) (522) thus explicit ly 
rendering Steven’s interactional project as irrelevant. Steven pursues his 
argument with a hypothetical situation using a rhetorical quest ion to 
project agreement which Janet again contests and makes an explicit  bid 
to finally close the topic with (But  I’m not  going back t here really so t hat ’s 
t hat  (.) t heres no good going on about  ↑ i(h)t ’) (lines 526-527)  
Doing neutrality -The co-construction of power 
CA has shown that in general conversat ion, agreement is preferred over 
disagreement and disagreement is displayed as dispreferred. Unmarked 
disagreement such as this then marks a shift  in the usual preference 
structure. The different construct ion of Janet ’s responses to Steven,  T1 and 
T2 illuminate how part icipants are co-operating with the maintenance and 
creation of hierarchical differences in who has the power (right and 
obligation) to say what to whom. Janet most  frequently mit igates her 
disagreements with the therapists, thus avoiding direct conflict with those 
who, through their posit ion as expert have greater speaking rights. This is 
reciprocated by T1 and T2 who frequently mark their contribut ions as 
delicate. It  is not iceable that T2 makes more effort  to mark her 
contribut ions as delicate than T1. This may display an asymmetric 
relat ionship between T1 and T2 marking T1’s relat ive seniority in terms of his 
professional role. T1 certainly contributes far more to the therapy than T2, 
and in Therapy 2, the contribut ions from the qualified family therapist  also 
far exceed those of her co-therapist . Thus the imbalance can be read as a 
co-operative display of who has greater epistemic rights. When Janet 
undermines with humour the delicacy with which T2 attempts to recycle 
the topic of returning to the shop, T1 displays his power to formulate ‘the 
facts’. Janet agrees with T1 (no, no, t hat ’s ri↑ght  ) (520), yet when Steven 
picks up the topic and pursues it , Janet responds with unmit igated 
disagreement (t heres no point  going on about  it ) (527) showing their 
relat ionship to be more symmetrical. In ordinary conversat ion, once the 
preference structure has changed to one of argument, a st rong 
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agreement usually marks opposit ion. Thus Janet ’s st rong agreement with T1 
(a ‘yes but ’ form of answer), in lines 518 and 520 foreshadows her 
complaint to Steven. T1 and T2 have consistent ly displayed alignment with 
Steven regarding the interactional task in hand. Janet ’s response therefore 
implicates both T1 and T2, but  wit hout  direct  confront at ion. In this way 
Steven is direct ly accused of part iality while the therapists’ posit ions of 
neutrality, though implicated, remain unchallenged. 
 
Janet ’s laughter token at the end of this utterance, its reciprocation by T2 
and the ‘smile voice’ T1 produces in line 531 shows all three to be engaged 
in the mit igation of this conflict. T1’s quest ion ( Is t his t he Janet  you know?) 
(531) may have been designed as an idiomatic marker to display co-
operation with the end of the topic, requiring merely a rueful “yes” from 
Steven.  Steven however, orients to the conflict with Janet in his response, 
and evokes the CBA ‘t ries it  once […] never go back’ thus offering an 
explanation based on a descript ion of a character type, that of someone 
who gives up too easily. Jayussi (1984) shows how character type 
categories can be used as rhetorical devices similar to those of idioms in 
their generality. By posit ioning someone as ‘a type’ it  is harder to refute the 
accuracy of the claim. Thus T1’s quest ion ( is t his t he Janet  you know) offers 
an opportunity for Steven to make relevant a disjunctive category from 
that constructed immediately preceding this sequence. From Janet as 
hard worker to Janet as someone who gives up too easily. Dersley and 
Wootton (2001) show that this kind of complaint, that calls into quest ion 
someone’s moral character, is most likely to end in physical or verbal 
withdrawal or violence. I  suggest that it  is this argument that is the reason 
why Janet chose the example of voluntary work in the first  place. Her 
argument was designed to invite T1 to join her in persuading Steven that 
she does not  give up too easily. This may account for her withdrawal from 
the argument earlier on. Instead the therapists pursuit  of the topic, and the 
quest ion ( is t his t he Janet  you know) has inadvertent ly opened a slot for 
 110 
Steven to explicit ly blame Janet and the relat ionship between Janet and 
Steven is increasingly threatened. 
Discussion  
In Part 2, we can see how T2 rekindles the task of persuading Janet to 
return to the charity shop which Janet emphatically resists. Where Part 1 
was marked by the avoidance of conflict, here the conflict ing posit ions 
and their implications for the evaluation of Janet ’s character are explicit ly 
revealed.  
 
Two quest ions emerge when considering this blaming event. First ly, why do 
the therapists keep returning to this vexed quest ion which seems to hurt le 
towards a trajectory of blame. Secondly how does a therapist , working 
within a model which urges non-blaming, get to a point where saying “you 
have no-one but yourself to blame” makes sense.  These are skilled, 
experienced and respected practit ioners who have signed up to a non-
blaming model, yet this phrase, taken out of context could appear to be 
(and some might argue is) an example of ‘unsystemic’ practice. Yet any 
therapist  will have had the experience of reflect ing on a session and 
thinking, why did I say that? CA, through its explication of the underlying 
rules of interaction, helps to illuminate such quest ions. What was the 
problem for the therapists that such a blaming event solved?  
 
In Part 1 I  have shown how Janet ’s production of an ‘unhappy incident ’ 
invited a problem solving stance from the therapists. I  have also shown that 
the context of a service encounter made relevant ‘t roubles telling’ as a 
request for help. The ambiguity of Janet ’s responses, the use of idiomatic 
expression, the lack of detail in her account makes the design of her 
responses opaque to her interlocutors. Thus although T1 and T2 are aware 
of incipient interactional t rouble the nat ure of that trouble is not clear, 
making relevant their continued search for the responsible party. Blaming 
of self (ie. confession or apology) is rout inely preferred in ordinary 
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conversat ion over other blame (Pomerantz 1979). Steven’s delay in 
disclosing the information regarding Janet ’s choice can be understood as 
offering her the opportunity to confess.  Only when his account is offered, 
which sat isfies the search for the responsible party, does the sequence 
end. It  is then that Janet ’s claim, ‘I’m worth more than this’, is made 
relevant and the next task, what type of work would suit  Janet is launched. 
However, the puzzle of why she rejected the job, given that she was 
allocated the very task she requested, remains unresolved. T1 defuses 
potential conflict, and avoids blame, by aligning with Janet, highlight ing 
her search for a job worthy of her and obscuring her responsibility for 
choosing the job she complains about. In sequence 2, T2 reintroduces the 
topic and subtly challenges Janet ’s claim that it  is unworthy of her. I  
suggest that two elements of Janet ’s subsequent responses make T1’s 
explicit  blame relevant. First ly, it  is Janet ’s reiterat ion of an explanation that 
has already explicit ly been judged as irrelevant. Secondly, Janet ’s 
response implies that it  is T2’s contribut ion that is irrelevant and does so 
wit hout  delicacy.  
The various functions of blame in argument. 
I  have shown how two different domains of culpability are made relevant, 
that of how Janet has acted in the events being presented and how Janet 
is accounting for that action in the present moment. I  will now introduce 
some addit ional concepts from the CA literature relat ing to the structure of 
arguments.  
 
Let’s turn again to the sequence in Part 2. T2 reintroduces the quest ion of 
Janet ’s return to the shop. She t ies her claim that working in a Charity shop 
is worthwhile with Janet ’s immediately preceding talk about care work. We 
can read this as contest ing Janet ’s earlier claim ‘I’m worth more than this’ 
as a relevant explanation for not going back. Thus T2 makes relevant the 
insufficiency of Janet ’s account. I  now want to turn to some of the CA 
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literature regarding what is variously termed conflict talk or arguing to 
illuminate what happens next. 
The structure of arguments 
All conversat ion is seen as const itut ive of social st ructure, but argument 
can be seen as a major site where social worlds and social st ructures are 
negotiated (Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998). I  have discussed how conflict is 
defined in CA as a three part turn, A makes a claim, B opposes, A counters 
B. The practices available for deployment in these turns are many and 
have different implicative consequences. Muntigl and Turnbull show how 
these practices can be broadly grouped into four turn types each of which 
is more or less oriented to mit igating or aggravating the dispute. Of these 
turn types the irrelevancy claim is most aggravating because it  attacks a 
fundamental social skill, that of making competent contribut ions to a 
conversat ion, which effectively shuts down negotiat ion. In other words, 
irrelevancy claims are more potentially damaging to the identit ies of the 
part icipants and to their relat ionship. How might these findings help us to 
understand what is going on in Part Two?  
What kind of talk is reasonable here? 
Janet ’s response to T2’s claim in the form of a joke could be heard as an 
irrelevancy claim. It  potentially ridicules T2’s argument in a way that fails to 
mit igate potential damage to the relat ionship. Janet ’s delivery of her next 
turn (I explained I was cleaning and I t hink hang on I do t hat  t went y four  
seven at  home really)(496) is in preferred turn shape, and the recipient 
design is ambiguous. It  may be addressed to Steven’s joke immediately 
preceding her turn but may equally be addressed to T2, and certainly T2’s 
downward deflected, mit igating ‘yeah’ (498) warrants this reading. 
However, Janet does not t ie her response to the design of T2’s serious 
intent, that the work is worthwhile, and in this sense Janet displays her 
evaluation of T2’s argument as irrelevant. Within the MCD therapy it  is a 
therapist ’s right to quest ion the validity of a client ’s claim but clients are 
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generally not expected to quest ion therapists. Where T2 withdraws from 
incipient conflict with an agreement marker it  is T1 who mirrors Janet ’s tone 
with an unmit igated challenge to the relevancy of Janet ’s argument (line 
500). In this way T1 upholds the relevance of his colleague’s quest ion and 
challenges Janet ’s dismissal of it .  
 
This unusually explicit  challenge then is made relevant by;  
 
 Janet ’s t ransgression of the maxim of t ruthfulness (we will say as 
much as necessary to not misdirect)  
 Janet ’s implied quest ioning of the competence of T2  
 Janet ’s resistance to acknowledging her responsibility for her actions, 
with the consequent implication that someone else is responsible. 
 
Thus the tacit  local moral order of the therapy session is both revealed and 
constructed by the shared assumptions that these actions warrant 
just ificat ion.  
 
In Part 3 I  will show how this blaming is inextricably t ied to the negotiat ion of 
tasks that part icipants are engaged in. 
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Part 3 
Introduction 
Part 3 presents a brief extract of t ranscript from the final part of the session.  
This reveals an unspoken difference between the family members 
regarding their goals for therapy, which helps to make sense of t he session 
as a whole. 
The context 
This extract occurs thirty nine minutes into the session. Following Janet ’s 
explicit  avowal that she is not going back to the charity shop the 
conversat ion again turns to what other forms of work might suit  her. So 
although the task has moved away from the specifics that prevent Janet 
from returning to the charity shop, the broad topic and assumed goal 
remains the same, the explorat ion of the obstacles that prevent Janet from 
returning to work. The pros and cons of kitchen work and hotel work are 
discussed.  This section shows T1’s attempt to change the topic. 
Immediately prior to this extract Janet has made a joke about taking a 
break at work. 
The problem of agreeing on the problem. 
703 T1 well if you work hard and have a little break that’s jus (1) hhh I was just thinking 
704  T2 um (.) we were going to ask you y’know (.) whether you’ve had further thoughts 
705  about (.) how best we can u:se these sessions (.) u:m (.) have you had (1) either your 
706  own thoughts about it or have you had any conversations about that (.) I know that 
707  you having had this set back and getting ill again (.) is yknow (.) probably got in the 
708  way of some of that but (.) have you given that some thought? (2) How we can best 
709  help you? 
710 (3) 
711 SI  think really the best thing I think is really t-to find a bit of work (.) for Janet an- 
712 give her a bit more confidence (.) that’s what I want to get out of this (.) as well as 
713 [undecipherable] (2) what do you think? 
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714 (2) 
715 J ↑ye↓a↑eh 
716 (4) 
717 S cos you’re always tryin (.) putting yourself ↑down cos (.) 
718 J but I’ve always been a people pleaser as well haven’t I  
719 S mm 
720 J I always please other people so I want to really do somethin that’s gonna (2) that I 
721  want to do. 
722 T2 mm 
723 J not that I sort of gotta (.) do this for the sake of doing it (.) that’s how  I look at  
724  it 
725 T2 that’s important isn’t it mm 
 
In lines 703 and 704 T1 links his turn with Janet ’s joke (not shown) by referring 
to taking a break and then heralds a change of topic by addressing his 
colleague directly ( I was just  t hinking T2) and referring to an earlier 
agreement between the therapists (we were going t o ask). He then t ies this 
session to the end of the last therapy session by asking Janet and Steven 
(whet her you’ve had any furt her t hought s about  how best  we can use 
t hese sessions)(705). At the end of their last meeting the therapists had 
asked Janet and Steven to discuss, and write down, what issues they 
hoped to address in therapy. In lines 706 to 710, possibly because there is 
no immediate take up at the first  TRP following his quest ion, T1 delicately 
offers Janet ’s illness as a possible reason why they may not have 
completed this task.  The long pauses in lines 710 and 713 indicat e some 
trouble and Steven’s response in the singular ( I t hink really t he best  t hing I 
t hink is really t -to find a bit  of work (.) for Janet )(711) implies either that they 
have not discussed it  or that they have been unable to come to an 
agreement. Steven’s goal is clear and unequivocal, what he wants from 
therapy is for Janet to get a job and gain some confidence. The two 
second pause before Janet ’s response to his quest ion indicates trouble. 
The agreement she offers in an extenuated and modulated tone 
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(↑ye↓a↑eh) (715) indicates at best part ial agreement. Following a long 
pause, where Janet chooses not to elaborate, Steven again proffers the 
rat ionale for his goal (cos you’re always put t ing yourself down). Janet ’s 
response (but  I’ve always been a people pleaser) (718 ) and ( I want  t o 
really do somet hing t hat ’s gonna (2) t hat  I want  t o do) (720) implies that 
their goals are different.   T2 validates Janet ’s posit ion in line 725.  
 
I  have omitted about 3 minutes of talk where T1 also validates Janet ’s 
posit ion and then turns to whether or not they have managed to complete 
some forms concerning their hopes from therapy. Janet and Steven can’t  
remember where the forms are or what they said and T1 suggests that the 
difficult  t ime they have had because of Janet ’s relapse makes this ent irely 
understandable. He also talks about how impressed T1 and T2 have been 
in the way they handled this relapse. Janet then offers an alternative topic 
 
782 J I do sometimes though feel with that illness problem you get treated  
783  differently as well from certain people (1) I know you do cos it affects  
784  your mo:ods, the way you look (.) and even people can look at you and say  
785  phor, your not happy again today 
 
This leads to a discussion about how Janet ’s wider family have not invited 
her to a party and how hurt and angry she feels about it . 
Summary and Discussion of Therapy 1 
These extracts show how an unresolved difference between the couple 
about their goals for therapy has influenced their talk throughout the 
session. Where Steven’s goal is to persuade Janet to return to work, Janet ’s 
interest is in resist ing doing t hings she does not  want  t o do. Where Steven’s 
stated goal is about action, Janet ’s stated goal is about resistance. T1s 
init ial query in Part 1, about how Janet has adjusted her life as part of the 
process of gett ing better is a rout ine systemic quest ion designed to 
uncover stories of st rength and resilience. In this case it  provides a slot for 
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Janet to defend herself in a pre-exist ing conflict with Steven. Her resistance 
is cloaked in co-operation with Steven’s goal and her aims and desires are 
presented ambiguously. This means that the therapists interpret her goal of 
resistance as a goal of action thwarted by an obstacle. They therefore see 
their job as helping her to overcome this obstacle and unwitt ingly appear 
to join with Steven in a goal that Janet has set out to resist . Janet ’s agency 
t hen has been expressed in t he act  of resist ance in t he session it self.   
 
The continued misalignment in the session is not revealed until the 
therapists explicit ly ask the couple what they want to talk about in therapy. 
Janet ’s stance (I want to really do somet hin that ’s gonna […] t hat I want to 
do)(726-727) is validated by T2 (t hat ’s important  isn’t  it  mm)(730) and later 
by T1 (not shown). This serves to further repair the conflict described in Part 
2. Janet now seems to have provided a rat ionale for not going back which 
sat isfies the therapists. When the therapists pursue the quest ion of what 
Janet wants to talk about directly, Janet tentat ively raises the issue of the 
painful personal consequences of mental illness. This leads to further talk 
about how people see her and respond to her different ly and how her 
extended family has excluded her (lines 782-785).  
Summary  
This chapter has shown how a misalignment of goals between part icipants 
creates a context for an explicit  blaming. I  have suggested that Janet 
introduced the topic of ‘not going back’ to pursue an argument with 
Steven while the therapists read it  as a request  for help. As the therapists 
pursue problem solving, Janet tries to close down the topic. However her 
reason for doing so remains opaque. When Steven reveals the reason, the 
therapists note Janet ’s failure to disclose her choice but to avoid 
implications of blame, do not enquire why. When T2 reintroduces the 
unresolved puzzle, Janet repeats a claim already noted to be insufficient 
to the task. T1’s explicit  blame can be understood as an attempted 
solut ion to a repeated misalignment by holding Janet responsible for the 
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way she talks in the session. I  introduce the concept of explaining versus 
arguing as an important factor in the misalignment of goals and also 
suggest that Janet ’s resistance to the topic can be understood as an 
expression of agency within the session. Part 3 shows that misalignment is 
related to a disagreement about the goals and tasks of therapy that 
precedes the therapy session itself.  
 
In terms of systemic therapy this shows the difficult ies encountered in 
negotiat ing goals where different  versions of events exist . The therapists 
seem to be trying to work on a problem that Janet offers, and the 
ambiguity of Janet ’s responses serves to perpetuate the misalignment. A 
quest ion remains about why Janet should present her agency with such 
ambiguity.   
 
I  will return to this discussion in Chapter 6. First  I  will present an analysis of a 
blaming event selected from the second therapy, where these themes are 
further elaborated.  
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Chapter 5 
Introduction 
In this chapter the analysis of Therapy 2 is presented. A similar format to 
Chapter 4 is followed, start ing with an introduction to the therapy context 
before presenting the analysis in three parts. The excerpts are all taken 
from the second session. For ease of reference, the excerpts are divided 
into smaller sections followed by an analysis.  Within each part, each 
smaller section of t ranscript follows contiguously from the previous one, 
with no turns omitted. Each section retains the original line numbering of 
the transcript of the entire session.  
The selected excerpts of t ranscript are presented in their ent irety in 
Appendix D 
The Therapy Context 
The family 
The couple Mandy and her husband Kevin have been referred for family 
work following Mandy’s recent psychotic episode. Mandy has gathered a 
number of diagnoses over the years, one of which is schizophrenia. Kevin 
describes himself as Mandy’s main carer. They have a number of school 
aged children. 
The therapists 
T1 is an experienced, qualified systemic psychotherapist . T2 is an 
experienced mental health professional who has also completed a 
minimum of one year’s specialist  family therapy for psychosis t raining. Both 
are female. 
The context of the data selected. 
Present are two therapists T1 and T2, and the couple, Mandy and Kevin. 
The init ial meeting (not included) had been dominated by a history taking 
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format, where the therapists systematically gather details about each 
member of the family, their relat ionships with each other and their 
extended family and social networks. Following the init ial meeting, the 
couple missed one appointment. They had also forgotten about this 
present meeting, but following a telephone call from the therapists earlier, 
they had managed to attend. The confusion and rush had led to an 
argument between the couple on their way to the session. The first  twelve 
minutes of the session are taken up with talking about the difficult ies the 
couple have had in juggling numerous hospital and other appointments 
for different members of the family and agreeing that they would value a 
text message reminder. This is done with great delicacy on all sides to 
avoid blame but does not form part of this analysis.  
 
Part 1 
The construction of an interactional problem 
This excerpt begins about twelve minutes into the session. 
 
222 T1 so how are you feeling at present Kevin coming along today with all that  
223  going on and 
224 K ◦I don’t mind coming along◦ 
225 T1 rig(h)ht   
226 K [not worried] 
227 T1 [o(h)k  u:m (1) an-and are you feeling Ok cos as as Mandy was  
228  saying she can be quite [.hhh  
229 K       [yeah, yeah its hard 
230 T1             [hard on you] 
231 M      [You have] been stressed 
232 K yeah 
233  (1) 
234 M He has been stressed (.) he he just wont he just wont say [he wont be honest 
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The transcript begins immediately after the exchange of telephone 
numbers marking the end of the discussion about arranging further 
appointments. T1 opens a new topic with ( so how are you feeling at  
present  Kevin coming along t oday with all t hat  going on) (222). ‘So’ at the 
start of a sentence often marks the return to the business at hand following 
a diversion (Bolden 2009). T1 t ies her turn to their earlier talk by enquiring 
about the effect on Kevin of the argument described earlier. Therapists 
rout inely package previous talk and present it  in a way that makes it  a 
legit imate topic for therapy (Antaki, 2008). Here we see T1 making relevant 
both Kevin’s feelings and the earlier argument as a suitable topic for 
discussion. Kevin’s response (◦I don’t  mind coming along◦) (224) resists the 
performative force of the quest ion. T1’s laughing acknowledgment tokens, 
(rig(h)ht ) and (O(h)K), display her receipt of his response as misaligned. 
Laughter as a conversat ional phenomenon is often associated with 
displaying affiliat ion, where preference is for it  to be done together. Where 
laughter is not reciprocated then it  is usually followed by repair (Jefferson 
et . al., 1987). T1’s laughter here can be seen as an affiliat ive move. She 
pursues her quest ion by indexing Kevin’s feelings (are you feeling OK) and 
then offering a repair by accounting for the reason for her enquiry ( cos as 
as Mandy was saying she can be quit e .hhh […] hard on you) (227-230).  
 
Kevin’s agreement ( it s hard) (229) is produced through the form of an 
‘unhappy incident report ’. By omitt ing reference to who or what might be 
responsible for it  being hard, Kevin co-operates with the implication that 
the situation is difficult  while at the same t ime resists the implication that 
Mandy is the cause. Mandy takes up T1’s project to elicit  Kevin’s feelings 
(you have been st ressed) (231). A statement that does not contain ‘news’ 
is heard as a request to offer further information (Pomerantz, 1980). Kevin ’s 
minimal agreement is followed by a one second pause (233) indicating 
that a mere agreement is judged insufficient to the task as part icipants 
wait for Kevin to account for his st ress. This expectation is made explicit  by 
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Mandy (he has been st ressed (.) he he just  wont  he just  wont  say [he wont  
be honest ) (234).  
Negotiating a legitimate topic. 
This section reveals part icipants negotiating what it  is relevant to talk about 
in therapy. T1 and Mandy seem to be pursuing one line of enquiry while 
Kevin resists it . Throughout this study, the context of therapy is an example 
of an omni-relevant MCD (Schegloff 2007). Despite no direct reference to 
therapy, it  is the overall organisat ional resource which underpins the reason 
why people are involved in the conversat ion and therefore the MCD from 
which category memberships are priorit ised. Although the interactional 
rules of a family therapy session are not commonly understood in the way 
that say, a GP consultat ion would be, people entering psychotherapy 
would generally expect to speak about personal matters and in family 
therapy, family matters. In the context of family therapy the SRP 
therapist/client invokes category bound activit ies where a client ’s 
obligation would commonly be understood to encompass speaking about 
their emotional state and family relat ionships in order to enable the 
therapist  to undertake their obligation to help them.  However, the exact 
nature of the troubles that can legit imately be brought to fulfil these 
obligations is a matter of local negotiat ion. Kevin is displaying a problem 
with the line of enquiry which seems to be invit ing his agreement with the 
implication that he is being negatively affected by Mandy’s behaviour. In 
other words he is avoiding blaming Mandy for being hard on him. 
However, his ret icence creates a context for Mandy to blame him for not 
fulfilling his obligation as a client to be honest. 
Talking versus not talking 
235 K               [Yeah I have been its  
236  my brother’s birthday next week and that (.) an it was his anniversary last  
237  month 
238 T1 right 
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239 K that’s not helped 
240 T1 is that a wedding anniversary? 
241 K no he died 
242 T1 the anniversary of his death 
243 K ◦ he died◦ (1) once it comes up always I think about him a bit more than  
244  normal so 
245  (1) 
246 T1 and is that what you meant(.) Mandy when you said that Kevin was stressed? 
247 M we:ll Kevin Kevin is stressed with me (1) and right (1) he’s stressed with the  
248  ho:use and stuff but he just wont ↑say it and it makes  me cross cos I I  
249  ↑know he i:s 
250 T1 mm 
251 M but he wont say and he wont get help and then (.) it all just builds up and then  
252  there’ll be a a massive like humungous outburst  
253 T1 ◦right◦ 
254 M to the point where like the kids are going up in their rooms or 
255 T1 wow 
256 M putting something on really loud because they just cant ↑take it any more they  
257  just cant .hhh there’ve even been times when the  kids have actually cried  
258  cos theyre just so stressed with it all with us fi:ghting and (1) yknow its  
259  just (3) ◦and so yeah◦ 
260  (2) 
 
K’s solut ion to this problem is to agree that he has been stressed and to 
offer an alternative account (Yeah I have been it ’s my brot her’s birt hday 
next  week and t hat  (.) an it  was his anniversary last  mont h)(235-6). Thus 
Kevin fulfils his obligation to talk about his st ress and address family issues 
while maintaining his resistance to the implication that trouble in the 
couple relat ionship is the cause. He does this by invoking the SRP brother. 
Grief is the expected reaction to the death of a brother. Thus Kevin offers 
an account for his st ress which is both reasonable and non-blaming of 
Mandy. Kevin marks the ending of his turn with ‘so’ (245) Here, of the many 
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functions of the discourse marker ‘so’ the marking of causal connections 
and a bid to close a topic are made relevant.  
The expectation of relevance 
The pause in line 245 indicates possible trouble, which T1 topicalises with 
her quest ion to Mandy ( is t hat  what  you meant [..]?), inferring that Kevin’s 
account remains insufficient to the task. Mandy offers the counter claim 
that Kevin ( is st ressed wit h me […]st ressed wit h t he ho:use and st uff) (246-
249) and furthermore (he wont  say and he wont  get  help )(251). Thus the 
different obligations evoked in the context of therapy change the moral 
dimensions of talking or not talking. What is proper behaviour is always a 
local matter, so where not publicly blaming your wife may usually be 
judged reasonable behaviour, in this context it  is not. ‘Talking’ is one 
version of the CBA ‘gett ing help’ with its implication of the CBA ‘gett ing 
better’. Those who are stressed (through no fault  of their own) and whose 
stress is negatively affecting their loved ones, become blameworthy if they 
refuse help to get better.  Mandy warrants the seriousness of his failure with 
an extreme case formulat ion, (t here’ve even been t imes when t he kids 
have act ually cried cos t heyre just  so st ressed wit h it  all) (257), a 
conversat ional form often associated with situations of accusing, just ifying 
and defending (Pomerantz, 1986). Within the SRP parent/child the 
obligation of a parent is to protect their children, not to frighten them. 
However, note that Mandy posit ions both herself and Kevin as culpable for 
fight ing. Thus Mandy presents herself as the cause of the stress and claims 
equal blame for frightening the children however she also presents herself 
as reasonable through the CBA of confession or admitt ing fault , thus 
fulfilling her obligations as a client.  Kevin on the other hand is posit ioned as 
culpable for not accounting for his st ress in a way made relevant in this 
context and as such resist ing help. So, Kevin may be fulfilling his 
requirement to talk, but not about the things that matter.  
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Although Mandy addresses her turn (lines 246 to 249) to T1 it  can equally 
be heard as designed for a response from Kevin. The preferred response to 
an accusation is denial or just ificat ion (Pomerantz 1984). The two second 
pause following Mandy’s accusation displays trouble as Kevin chooses not 
to respond.  
Misalignment between the couple 
Thus in CA terms we have a trouble, a misalignment between Mandy and 
Kevin which requires repair in order for conversat ion to continue co-
operatively. In terms of therapy, T1 is faced with a potential therapeutic 
impasse.  Mandy has taken the posit ion that she is the cause of Kevin ’s 
st ress, making relevant talk about trouble in their relat ionship.  Kevin has 
resisted explicit  agreement or disagreement with Mandy’s claim and has 
shown resistance to opening up the topic. T1’s problem is how to move 
forward in a way that doesn’t  alienate one party or another while at the 
same t ime maintaining a therapeutic focus. 
Use of embedded presupposition to repair couple misalignment 
261 T1 is there any kind of pattern to how (1) frequent things can build up (.) due to  
262  kind of stress (.) on you Kevin? 
263 K no its just (1) I always forget to do things n’ that then it sort of goes from there  
264  al-(.) always forget things and [forget 
265 T1          [so in in terms of frequency would that be kind  
266  of  ↑daily or 
267 K     [no, it’s not 
268 T  [or every other day or weekly or? 
269 K its the last two weeks have been the worst cos it seems to be (.) the house has  
270  been messed up and things (.) and that stresses me out as well so .hh 
271 M but its (.) its not that I think theres ↑other problems as ↑well because .hh like  
272  (1) I think he treats like Alfie different from the ↑girls and so (1) when like  
273  hes (1) having a go at Alfie  
274 T1 mmm 
275 M yknow I’ll I will  jump in and (.) and then tha- tha that’ll yknow that gets out  
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276  of hand too 
277 T1 ◦right◦ 
278 M y’know cos sometimes [like 
The therapist  reformulates the quest ion ( is t here any kind of pat t ern t o how 
(1) frequent  t hings can build up (.) due t o kind of st ress (.) on you Kevin?) 
(261). The embedded proposit ion in this quest ion, that (t hings can build up 
(.) due t o kind of st ress (.) on you Kevin) is not open to debate. The 
quest ion format makes it  difficult  for Kevin to answer the quest ion without 
implicit ly agreeing to the embedded assumption. Note that T1 removes 
any reference to the cause of stress referring instead to (how (1) frequent  
t hings can build up (.) due t o kind of st ress). We have seen that unhappy 
incident reports generally project a search for the cause of the event. By 
designing her quest ion in this way the therapist  offers a way out of the 
direct confrontat ion between Mandy and Kevin. She implicit ly accepts 
Mandy’s version of events, that rows occur and they are due (at least in 
part) to Kevin being stressed but she remains agnost ic to the cause. She 
also implicit ly rejects Kevin’s account (the stress of bereavement) as 
insufficient, by enquiring into the pat t ern of st ressful events that occur.  This 
creates a context which both aligns with Mandy’s design to get Kevin to 
talk more about his st ress while offering a wider scope of legit imate 
responses for Kevin without direct agreement or disagreement that Mandy 
is to blame.  
Misalignment between T1 and Kevin 
However, in Kevin’s response T1 encounters resistance to her project (no it s 
just  (1) I always forget  t o do t hings) (263). Claims of remembering or 
forgett ing can perform a range of activit ies in couple therapy, including 
resist ing the therapist ’s agenda and not wishing to deal with interpersonal 
issues (Muntigl and Tim Choi, 2010). However, indexing forgetfulness might 
also relate to the previous sequence (not shown here), where Kevin’s poor 
memory was presented as the just ificat ion for the missed appointment. T1 
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t reats Kevin’s response as insufficient and upgrades her quest ion by 
offering a choice of acceptable responses (so in t erms of frequency would 
t hat  be kind of  ↑daily or [...] or every ot her day or weekly or?)(265-266). 
Kevin’s subsequent turn is designed to fit  better with T1’s agenda while st ill 
evading the performative force of her quest ion ( its the last two weeks have 
been t he worst  cos it  seems t o be (.) t he house has been messed up and 
t hings)(269-270). So Kevin orients to the quest ion of frequency by alluding 
to the last two weeks and implies a general and fairly innocuous reason 
(t he house has been messed up) (269-270). So we can see Kevin evading 
the therapists’ agenda while offering an answer that appears to be at 
least minimally co-operating with it .  
The use of questioning 
Systemic therapists frequently work with families where one or more 
members contribute lit t le to the conversat ion. A rout ine way of t rying to 
engage quieter members is to ask choice point quest ions, projecting a 
response by constraining answers to the alternatives offered (see lines 265-
268). By enquiring into pattern and frequency T1 also shifts the focus away 
from linear cause and effect and towards relat ionship.  Focusing on 
feedback and relat ionship, serves to ameliorate blame. This is an example 
of T1 drawing on systemic SIKs regarding the use of different forms of 
quest ioning to pursue different therapeutic tasks.  
 
Mandy’s next turn explicit ly challenges Kevin’s version (but  its (.) it s not t hat  
I t hink t heres ↑ot her problems as ↑well) (271) and indexes trouble in their 
relat ionship as the relevant topic, this t ime upgrading her complaint. She 
moves from claiming joint culpability for arguments to allocating the blame 
to Kevin ( […]when like hes (1) having a go at  Alfie [..] yknow I’ll I will  jump 
in and (.) and t hen t ha- t ha t hat ’ll yknow t hat  get s out  of hand t oo)(272-
276). Thus within the SRP parents, Mandy’s responsibility to protect her 
children is presented as a reasonable, while Kevin’s (having a go) is 
implicated as unreasonable. The ensuing arguments ( t hat ’ll yknow t hat  
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get s out  of hand t oo) are presented as agentless. So although Mandy 
neither claims responsibility nor blames Kevin the implication is that they 
are the result  of his unreasonable and her reasonable actions. 
Good talking and bad talking  
278 M y’know cos sometimes [like 
279 T1     [SO HOW KEVin reacts can then lead to you to react 
280 M             [yeah 
281 T1                [in a  
282  particular kind of way too [Mandy       
283 M                      [cos sometimes like he’s like inappropriate in what  
284  he says (1) he can be really nasty to Alfie and he just wont accept it when I tell  
285  him 
286 K no it [indecipherable ] 
287 M          [its like the girls have a lot of leeway 
288 T1 .hhhh I’ve got a suggestion is that we ↑don’t try to get into too much detail (1) 
289 K yeah 
290 T1 beca:use what we would hope to do over yknow a series of appointments is  
291  that  we can kind of look at the details of (.) yknow these kind of examples but  
292  in a kind of (1) y’know if that’s the kind of thing you want [to look at 
 
Mandy’s blaming of Kevin prompts T1 into a less tentative strategy than her 
previous formulat ion. She interrupts Mandy in a loud voice and offers the 
formulat ion (SO HOW KEVin react s can t hen lead t o you t o react  [...] in a 
part icular kind of way t oo Mandy)(279-282). T1’s interruption seems 
designed to assert the relevance of her interactional project (pursuing the 
topic of relat ionship) over Mandy’s (pursuing a complaint). In terms of her 
therapeutic agenda this is a clear example of the therapist  highlight ing the 
circular nature of their difficult ies in order to diffuse or avert further blame. 
By not marking the interruption as dispreferred T1 can be seen to be 
claiming asymmetric speaking rights, in other words, claiming her power 
and authority as a therapist . As a therapist  it  is more acceptable to 
interrupt clients than the other way round. However, Mandy barely pauses 
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for a peremptory (yeah) and continues in overlapping talk upgrading her 
complaint further with an extreme case formulat ion (he can be really nast y 
t o Alfie)(284). Kevin now responds with direct opposit ion (no it ), although 
his words, are indecipherable as she overlaps him with further elaboration 
of his unfairness ( it s like t he girls have a lot  of leeway) (287) drawing on the 
SRP parent/child, and obligations of parents to treat children fairly, to infer 
Kevin’s culpability and her just ificat ion to ( jump in) to protect Alfie.  
Potential conflict 
The opposit ion between Kevin and Mandy has escalated over a series of 
turns, start ing when Mandy offered Kevin the opportunity to account for his 
st ress himself. When he fails to do so she offers a series of incrementally 
upgraded complaints in the face of Kevin’s continued resistance.  She 
begins by blaming herself for causing stress, then blames Kevin for not 
gett ing help, then implies shared blame for arguments that upset the 
children, and finally attributes blame to Kevin alone for t reating the 
children unfairly.  The implication that he is an unfair parent seems to 
provoke Kevin into his first  firm contradict ion which signals a potential 
conflict sequence.  
Repair 
This unequivocal blame and display of conflict again prompts T1 to action. 
This t ime T1 makes an explicit  move to define what sort  of talking is 
appropriate (.hhhh I’ve got  a suggest ion is t hat  we ↑don’t  t ry t o get  int o 
t oo much det ail (1) beca:use what  we would hope t o do over yknow a 
series of appoint ment s is we can kind of look at  t he det ails of (.) yknow 
t hese kind of examples but  in a kind of (1) y’know if t hat’s t he kind of t hing 
you want  [t o look at )(288-292) 
 
T1’s somewhat ambiguous turn could be understood as aligning with Kevin, 
implying that talking about problems is unhelpful. Kevin’s ready agreement 
in line 288 perhaps shows he hears it  as such. The implication is that gett ing 
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into detail may be more appropriate later (over yknow a series of 
appoint ments). Notice how T1 phrases what details should be delayed ( the 
det ails of (.) yknow t hese kind of examples). In CA terms we can see her 
marking her contribut ion as ‘delicate’. T1’s caution displays her 
considerat ion that her previous interruption of Mandy and subsequent 
suggest ion may be heard negatively, perhaps as treating Mandy’s 
contribut ion as irrelevant or even culpable. She demonstrates concern not 
to offend and also that her suggest ion is tentat ive and open to 
negotiat ion. She chooses a morally neutral phrase ( t hese kind of examples) 
thus neither aligning with Mandy’s descript ion of conflict nor with Kevin’s 
st rong resistance to such a definit ion.  
‘Doing’ collaborative 
T1’s avoidance of terms like argument, conflict or problem reflects a 
common systemic SIK, that of avoiding problem talk. The function of 
delicacy could also be read as a part icular type of CBA within systemic 
therapy. Consider for instance if T1 had said instead “I  would like us to stop 
talking about this now because it  is unhelpful. We’ll come back to it  later”. 
This would imply a very different type of therapist  to that constructed by 
T1’s hesitant approach. T1 is showing the t ype of therapist  identity she is 
projecting and the type of talking that is relevant. Through these means 
the construct ion of a collaborative therapist , and collaborative therapy, is 
achieved. Furthermore, by interrupting at this moment, the main function 
of the therapist ’s intervention is to interrupt a conflict sequence to prevent 
it  from escalat ing.  
 
So far I  have argued that the part icipants are negotiat ing what kind of 
talking is relevant to this context and what implications this has for their 
identit ies. Kevin has shown a marked resistance to t alking about feelings 
and relat ionships. How can he maintain the identity of a reasonable client 
while preserving his avoidance of the topics the therapist  and Mandy 
seem to see as relevant? Mandy has shown that she sees the problems in 
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their relat ionship as relevant, how can she persuade Kevin and the 
therapist  to her agenda without being seen as unreasonable? T ’s quest ions 
and formulat ions so far have demonstrated that feelings, relat ionships, self- 
blame and the effects of arguments invite quest ions, probes and 
formulat ions from her but repeated other blame is explicit ly (if delicately) 
diverted. T1 then seems to be presented with a therapeutic dilemma, how 
to encourage Kevin to talk and prevent Mandy from making inflammatory 
accusations. Both tasks are necessary for talk to continue and resolut ion to 
be reached. However the first  might invite inferences from Kevin that she is 
intrusive, while the second might invite inferences from Mandy that she is 
controlling.  
Self-blame 
293 M                      [I just think stress 
294  is everything to do with me yknow I stress him out (.) right (.)  he has to do  
295  school run [and 
296 K       [oh I don’t [indecipherable] 
297 M   [and look after the kids and yknow I have panic attacks daily 
298 T1 mmm 
299 M right not just one neither (1) and they can be like (.) I can just be sitting there  
300  watching the telly and I’ll ju- it just comes on and so Kevin constantly like  
301  watching me to make sure I’m not self ha:rming [or er 
302 T1               [so we’re talking about a lot  
303  of stress aren’t we on a kind of daily basis [an 
304 K              [yeah I suppose yeah 
305 M yeah if I start self harming Kevin starts like safe proofing the house and  
306  everything  
307 T1 mm 
308 M and taking stuff away= 
309 T1 =the obvious things away (.) that you might hurt yourself with 
310 M yeah  
311 T1 yeah 
312 M so (.) I suppose .hh its like someone looking after a toddler isn’t it. 
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313 K ◦no I don’t think its like that◦  
314 T1 mm 
315 K I ↑wanna look after you I like it (1) its stressful yeah so ◦I like doing it◦ 
316  (2) 
 
Mandy responds by blaming herself ( I just  t hink st ress is everyt hing t o do 
wit h me yknow I st ress him out  (.) right  (.)  he has t o do school run [and) 
(293). Kevin tries to contest Mandy’s claim in overlapping talk (296) but 
Mandy continues with an extended turn in which she elaborates the 
stresses that she sees as relevant, her panic attacks, Kevin having to look 
after the children, and make sure that she is not self-harming (293 - 308).    
 
So we can see that T1’s suggest ion (that we ↑don’t  t ry t o get  into t oo much 
det ail) has been heard by Mandy as an invitat ion to change the topic 
rather than the amount of detail. T1s response, ( so we’re t alking about  a lot  
of st ress aren’t  we on a kind of daily basis) (302-303) which ostensibly 
summarises Mandy’s turn, in effect answers the quest ion she put to Kevin 
earlier ( is t here any kind of pat t ern t o how (1) frequent  t hings can build up 
(.5) due t o kind of st ress (.) on you Kevin?)(261-262). Kevin’s agreement in 
the next line (yeah I suppose yeah) supports that reading. T1’s formulat ion 
successfully invites Kevin to move towards an agreement with Mandy, that 
her behaviour does cause stress.  In line 305 Mandy continues with her 
descript ion of her stressful behaviour and Mandy and T1’s latching talk 
demonstrates T1’s receptiveness to t his kind of detail ( Mandy and t aking 
st uff away […] t he obvious t hings away (.) t hat you might hurt yourself wit h) 
(308 – 309).  
Identity categories 
Let us compare the membership categories implied before and after T1’s 
intervention. Just before, Mandy was drawing on the SRPs parent/parent 
and parent/child. The SRP parent/parent is symmetric, with equal dut ies 
and obligations while parent/child is asymmetric, with each member 
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having different rights and responsibilit ies. Mandy constructed herself as an 
equal to Kevin, assuming her right to defend her child against Kevin ’s 
unreasonable parenting. Thus the details of descript ion in this case were 
used to ascribe Kevin the qualit ies of bad parent and just ify Mandy’s 
actions. Following T1’s intervention Mandy draws on a different set of CBAs 
to describe Kevin, doing the school run, looking after the kids and then 
safe-proofing the house. So Kevin is ascribed the identity of responsible 
parent and Mandy, within the SRP parent/parent as not only failing to fulfil 
her obligations but making unreasonable demands. She confirms these 
implications with (so (.) I suppose .hh it s like someone looking aft er a 
t oddler isn’t  it .) (312). The descript ive detail is used in the service of 
mit igating Mandy’s failings and warranting Kevin’s moral worth. The CBAs 
‘panic attacks’, ‘self-harm’ and ‘safe-proofing’ imply the SRP patient/carer 
within the MCD mental illness. Patient/carer is another asymmetric pair, 
where Mandy is fulfilling her dut ies as patient to get better (by talking 
about her difficult ies) and Kevin is fulfilling his dut ies as carer to look after 
her. T1 then can be seen to encourage details that exonerate and praise, 
while details that blame and just ify are discouraged. 
 
Kevin responds (◦no I don’t  t hink it s like t hat ◦ [..] I ↑wanna look aft er you I 
like it  (1) it s st ressful yeah so ◦I like doing it ◦)(313). Thus Kevin has now 
explicit ly conceded that Mandy’s behaviour is st ressful but, despite this, he 
wants to be a carer. The two second pause is difficult  to read. Kevin has 
directly addressed Mandy and Mandy therefore has the right to the next 
turn. However, part icipants might be wait ing for Kevin to elaborate further. 
This marks a disturbance in preference organisat ion, with conflict 
interrupted and all part ies recalibrat ing to begin a new sequence.  
Therapist repair of the couple alliance 
317 T1 We talked (1) I don’t know ho:w how clearly you remember the conversations  
318  we had last time 
319 K not very much (.) I’m getting a really bad memory [actually I] forget 
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320 T1        [ha ha] 
321 M We was talking about when we first met 
322 K >yeah, yeah, yeah that’s right yeah< 
323 T1 Cos yknow I think you were touching on there Kevin that that you y-you kinda  
324  like (.) wanting 
325 K           [yeah yeah] 
326 T1   [to help Mandy (.) and that even if its stressful its something  
327  that yo-you do 
328 K yeah 
329 T1 and you’re the(h)re 
330 K   [yeah] 
331 T1       [ you(h)re h(h)ere u:m but I think yknow that’s kind of what  
332  Mandy’s also saying .hh theres a lot of things which happen just on a daily  
333  ↑basis .hhh involving you, involving the children, involving how (.) you  
334  react or how Mandy’s reacting that either one of you will react to .hhh  
335  which actually can be a lot of stress  
336 K yeah it can be actually um 
337 T1 and you’ve talked a bit about a lot of your kinda role has been as a carer.hh 
338 K yeah= 
339 T1 =over the years you know to your mum an:d= 
340 K =yeah=  
341 T =and to Mandy when you got together and(.) yeah so its something which  
342  you’ve become used to doing  
343 K yeah 
344 T1 ha ha ha and in many ways you’ve elected to do you’ve chosen to do 
345 K yeah 
346 T1 haven’t you 
347 K yeah 
348 T and that’s important to not lose sight of. 
349 K ◦I like it◦ 
350 M its hard because I feel like I don’t show Kevin enough affection (1) 
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T1 solves the problem by support ing Kevin’s claim that he wishes to care for 
Mandy by construct ing a long formulat ion for which she draws from their 
first  meeting (not included), the upshot being that caring is something 
Kevin has (elect ed t o do you’ve chosen t o do) (345). Thus T1 makes 
relevant Kevin’s choice to be a carer, and shifts the responsibility to Kevin 
as a responsible agent rather than a passive vict im of Mandy’s behaviour. 
Mandy’s response mirrors this shift , by claiming responsibility for a negative 
event rather than blaming Kevin ( it s hard because I feel like I don’t  show 
Kevin enough affect ion) (351).  
Discussion 
Doing systemic- how systemic therapy is talked into being 
I  have shown how T1 packages previous talk of an argument and the 
feelings evoked in order to introduce them as a topic suitable for therapy. 
Thus T1 displays key elements of a systemic therapy. That therapy is a place 
to explore relat ionships and feelings, and that the experiences of all family 
members are relevant. Mandy co-operates by talking about relat ional 
difficult ies and stress. However, the therapist  encounters a difficulty. Kevin 
doesn’t  talk easily while Mandy talks readily, and furthermore Mandy is 
highly crit ical of Kevin’s ret icence. Mandy’s main complaint can be 
summarised thus; Kevin’s st ress causes arguments and despite Mandy 
being the cause of the stress he is to blame because he will not admit his 
difficult ies and get appropriate help.  The therapist  is faced with two 
problems. How does she encourage Kevin to talk, a minimal requirement 
for a talking therapy, without being perceived as favouring Mandy’s 
posit ion? Also, how does she stop Mandy from blaming Kevin without 
causing offence to her?  
What is the problem?   
T1 uses the structural propert ies of quest ions to pursue answers from Kevin 
that fit  with her therapeutic agenda. By means of these quest ions she 
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demonstrates which answers are seen to be relevant and which not. She 
embeds the pre-supposit ion that arguments do occur due to stress and by 
demonstrat ing her curiosity about these arguments, displays that these are 
a relevant topic to the task in hand. However she resists Mandy’s linear, 
blaming explanations and favours those answers that imply the reciprocal 
nature of Kevin and Mandy’s relat ionship. By these means T1 successfully 
achieves Kevin’s agreement that stress does build up and arguments do 
occur, while also enabling him to avoid specifically blaming Mandy. Thus 
the task of construct ing a relat ional problem suitable for family therapy is 
achieved.  
Who is to blame? 
Once a problem is identified, the next task is to work out who or what is 
responsible for it  in order to resolve it . As T1 pursues the challenge of 
gaining Kevin’s co-operation in admitt ing to an interactional problem, so 
Mandy co-operates by elaborating her complaints. As Mandy builds her 
complaints against Kevin her descript ions become increasingly blaming.  
Explicit  blame prompts T1 to interrupt the complaint sequence. Following 
T1’s delicately and somewhat ambiguously worded invitat ion not to go 
into detail Mandy changes tack, and rather than blame Kevin she blames 
herself. T1 encourages details of Mandy’s illness and the effect on Kevin. T1 
then has used her authority as a therapist  to sanction Mandy’s 
contribut ions that blame Kevin and encourage Mandy’s contribut ions that 
blame her-self. Pomerantz has shown that in rout ine conversat ion, ‘self-
depreciat ion’ usually invites a reversal of preference structure, where 
agreement is dispreferred:  
 
I f crit icizing a co-conversant is viewed as impolite, hurtful or wrong (as 
a dispreferred action), a conversant may hesitate, hedge, or even 
minimally disagree rather than agree with the crit icism. (Pomerantz 
1984, p. 81) 
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Self-blame then projects disagreement in general conversat ion. In a 
therapy context however, the usual preference structure is overturned and 
self-blame projects further explorat ion. This fits with a common therapeutic 
theme of the importance of taking responsibility for one’s actions, with self- 
blame potentially seen as a first  step towards change. T1 displays the 
relevance of Mandy’s self-blame to the local context by her take up of the 
topic. However, self-blame has problematic implications for Mandy’s 
identity which she mit igates with descript ions of her mental illness. As 
Mandy co-operates with accounts that become increasingly self-blaming 
Kevin challenges her, warranting his disagreement by agreeing that he 
does get stressed and then arguing that it  is his choice to look after her. T1 
then packages the talk in this sequence and in a prior session in order to 
formulate the natural upshot of the talk to be:  
 there is an interactional problem caused by stress  
 stress is caused by Mandy’s behaviour  
 Mandy’s behaviour is not under her control (and therefore she is not 
to blame)  
 Mandy is not to blame for Kevin’s st ress because he chooses to 
place himself in this posit ion  
 Kevin is not to blame because the stress is enough to make losing 
one’s temper reasonable. 
How do we talk about it? 
By interrupting and mit igating blame T1 has successfully interrupted a 
conflict sequence and enabled the conversat ion to continue in a way that 
strengthens the alliance between the couple. Alternative narrat ives and 
identit ies are constructed for Kevin, from an unfair father and 
argumentative husband to a diligent father and caring husband. T1 has 
displayed impart iality by first ly aligning with Mandy and pursuing responses 
from Kevin despite his resistance. She has then aligned with Kevin and 
stopped further explorat ion of the topic as it  has become too crit ical.  
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Within the session Mandy has displayed her engagement with the process 
of therapy with her ability to claim her speaking rights and the topics she 
brings. Kevin however has shown resistance to the topic under discussion in 
his minimal responses. T1’s packaging of Kevin’s contribut ions from the 
previous session then could also be seen as a way of displaying her 
understanding and empathy towards Kevin as a means of building an 
alliance with him.  
 
The delicacy with which T1 interrupts blame displays respect for the 
relevance of the topic. She implicit ly proscribes blame by suggest ing not 
going into too much detail now but also suggest ing they will come back to 
this subject in t ime. The formulat ion offers a means to close the topic while 
paying attent ion to the moral identit ies of both Kevin and Mandy. Thus the 
therapist  implicit ly proscribes blame in a non-blaming way. 
What are the consequences? 
T1’s formulat ion seems to resolve the threat to the couple alliance that 
blame and conflict bring. However the solut ion depends on Mandy being 
seen as not responsible for her actions. Also Kevin’s behaviour is only 
deemed reasonable due to the weight of his burden of care. Mandy’s 
complaint that Kevin neither talks about nor gets help for his st ress has 
been largely evaded. Agency has been evoked in terms of Kevin’s choice 
to be there but neither Kevin nor Mandy are held accountable for their 
behaviour. T1 has done most of the work to reformulate Kevin’s posit ion 
and although Kevin has agreed with this reformulat ion, he has actually 
contributed lit t le to the conversat ion.  
 
As we will see in Part 2, rather than the problem being resolved it  will 
emerge later in the session in another form.  
 139 
Part 2 
Introduction 
Part 2 picks up the conversat ion midway through the session and shows 
how the unresolved problem in Part 1 leads to a misalignment between 
Mandy and T1. The transcript can be found in Appendix D, sequence 2.   
The context of the data selected. 
This sequence occurs 40 minutes into the session. Between this and the first  
sequence the conversat ion has turned to an explorat ion of why Mandy 
finds it  difficult  to show affection to Kevin and the effects of her early 
history on her current mental health and relat ionships. Just prior to this 
sequence Mandy has been describing a history of severe physical and 
sexual abuse, part ly perpetrated by her mother.  
Shaping a systemic explanation  
700 T1 .hh So coming back to th- the question Mandy how does (.)  those experiences  
701  affect you in the present in terms of (.) how you are trying to cope and deal  
702  with (1) events in your life and (.) how that fits in with your stress levels.  
703  How-how do you [make sense] of that. 
704 M    [U::m ] I’m doing a lots of work with Anne at  
705  the moment I’m trying to deal (.) cos I am an emotional personality  
706  disorder but that is because of how I’ve been brought up 
707 T1 mm 
708 M So I try and focus on my feelings a lot (.) to try and show Kevin some love an- 
709  (.) ◦ and some compassion and that◦. 
710 T1 So having those experiences (.) a lot of your growing up years (.) ha- makes  
711  you feel that you don’t show that kind of c-care  and (.) love to Kevin  
712  towards Kevin. 
713 M Sometimes I feel that with my mouth (.) sometimes I catch myself thinking  
714  God I’m turning into my mum? because she was- she was vicious with her  
715  mouth (.) and I hate myself for that 
716 T1 So you find yourself reacting in ways you don’t 
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717 M ◦yeah◦ 
718 T1 that you’d kind of experienced yourself 
719 M ◦yeah◦ 
720 T1 others people other people being (.)[ yeah?] 
 
T1 formulates Mandy’s previous talk to package it  into a task that fits a 
common therapeutic agenda, how the past ( t hose experiences) (700) 
affects Mandy ( in t he present ) (701). T1 frames her quest ion in terms of 
strengths rather than problems ( in t erms of (.) how you are t rying t o cope 
and deal wit h (1) event s in your life) and ordinary human experience (and 
[..] your st ress levels) rather than diagnost ic categories. The one second 
pause before the phrase (event s in your life) may indicate T1 searching for 
a neutral word.  Mandy has been talking about abuse in her family and her 
own experience of Schizophrenia, which she has unambiguously named as 
a diagnosis with which she agrees (not shown). Due to the sequential 
placement of this formulat ion, we can see how T1 makes two MCDs, ‘the 
family’ (t hose experiences), and ‘mental illness’ (st ress) relevant but in a 
rather ambiguous manner.   
The costs and benefits of ambiguity 
The cost of utterances that are designed to be ambiguous is that they can 
create a problem for the hearer to know how to take them up. The benefit  
is that they can offer the hearer an opportunity to interpret the speaker ’s 
intent in a variety of ways. T1’s language places both experience and 
stress within the realms of ordinary human experiences that go to make up 
types of personhood. In this way she is opening up the possibility of 
different narrat ives and identit ies for Mandy. Imagine if T1 had instead said 
“So in terms your abuse, how are you dealing with present problems like 
your arguments, schizophrenia and self-harm. How do you make sense of 
that?” By making the formulat ion ambiguous T1:  
 
 avoids judgement and overt causal connections  
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 offers a formulat ion that reframes Mandy’s extraordinary experience 
as ordinary  
 offers Mandy a choice about whether she wishes to accept the 
causal connection subtly implied  
 
This is an example of the therapist  opening up different narrat ive 
possibilit ies for Mandy, and through her lexical choices moving away from 
a diagnosis driven story to one of ordinary human experience.   
Doing non-blaming   
Mandy’s response draws on the CBA ‘therapy’ ( lot s of work wit h Anne) 
(704). Anne is a therapist  and therapy here is a version of the CBA ‘dealing 
with’. She is t rying to deal with the membership category (emot ional 
personalit y disorder) (705) which fits within the collect ion ‘psychiatric 
diagnoses’ which belong to the MCD ‘mental illness’. This psychiatric 
diagnosis is of the type caused by (how I’ve been brought  up) (706). By 
adding this descript ion Mandy is implying different iat ion from other 
diagnoses.  ‘How I’ve been brought up’ then is a CBA made relevant by 
the MCD Mental I llness. How Mandy is t rying to deal with mental illness then 
is to (focus on my feelings a lot  (.) t o t ry and show Kevin some love an-(.) ◦ 
and some compassion and t hat ◦) (708-709). So the CBAs ‘focusing on 
feelings’ and ‘showing love and compassion’ are versions of the CBA 
‘gett ing better’ or perhaps in this case ‘coping better’ within the MCD 
‘mental illness’. They could equally be read as CBAs within the MCD 
‘family’ as what should happen in families. Recovery from mental illness 
becomes interwoven with transforming trans-generational patterns from 
abuse to love within a family, a belief that clearly fits with the systemic 
project. T1’s next formulat ion in line 710 emphasises the connection 
between Mandy’s childhood experience and her claim that she does not 
show enough love to Kevin. This invites further elaboration from Mandy 
(Somet imes I feel t hat with my mout h (.) somet imes I cat ch myself t hinking 
God I’m t urning int o my mum? because she was- she was vicious wit h her 
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mout h (.) and I hat e myself for t hat ) (713 -716). Note Mandy’s self-repair 
where (somet imes I feel) is changed to (somet imes I cat ch myself). This 
serves to mit igate the culpable action of ‘being vicious with ones mouth’ 
with the implication that it  is something that has ‘just  happened’. The 
responsible agent becomes the Mandy who both ‘catches herself’ and 
‘hates herself’ rather than the Mandy who is vicious.  T1 responds with 
another formulat ion which emphasises the systemic theory that relat ionship 
patterns are transferred across generations and maintains the structure of 
Mandy’s construct ion of something that ‘just  happens’(So you find yourself 
react ing in ways you don’t  [..] t hat  you’d kind of  experienced yourself [..]) 
(my emphasis).  Mandy’s soft agreement tokens during this formulat ion and 
overlapping “yeah” at the beginning of her response shows strong 
agreement.  
Constructing responsibility without blame. 
Mandy and T1 thus co-construct a causal explanation for Mandy ‘being 
vicious with her mouth’ which bot h holds her responsible for her behaviour 
and absolves her of blame. Apart from general norms that verbal abuse is 
seen as reprehensible, Mandy has already implied that ‘showing love and 
compassion’ is a CBA she is st riving for as a means of gett ing better. It  is 
also a CBA connected with how families are expected to behave. ‘Being 
vicious’ is a mark of not gett ing better (being ill) and of replicating socially 
proscribed behaviours in families. Thus Mandy’s moral standing rests on her 
not  being responsible for her culpable behaviour (constructed as the result  
of illness caused by abuse) but being responsible for ‘catching herself’ and 
striving to do something different. This double descript ion, displays a rout ine 
systemic practice of separating the problem from the person that serves to 
both decrease blame and increase agency.  
Upgrading an agreement or recycling a complaint? 
721 M             [yeah] I’ll ↑be honest with you (.) I I really  
722  punish Kevin I do. yknow I’m absolutely sur↑prised he’s still with me to  
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723  be honest with you.  I mean I-I suppose I abuse ↑Kevin. I’ve severely  
724  abused him. 
725 T1 mm 
726 M He’s always there to take the brunt of it when my schizo↑phrenias bad  
727  y’know? he’s the one who takes the brunt of it. 
728  (2)  
729 M sh- He (h) don(h)’t ↑say anything he always says I don’t care, I don’t care. 
730  (2) 
731 K [indecipherable] 
732 T1 I mean clearly (.) Kevin what Mandy has experienced is [absolutely horrific] 
733 K              [yeah yeah definitely] 
734 T1 [isnt it] 
735 K [yeah ]↑yeah 
736 T1 a:nd um (1) I-I guess she’s usin:g (.) strong words isn’t she like 
737 K yeah 
738 T1 y’know  I guess I:: abuse Kevin is whats she saying 
739 K yeah 
740 T1 i-is that how you experience it?  
741 K .hh ◦no- not all the time I mean ↑sometimes its: its bad but (1) dunno? Its:◦ 
742 T1 You don’t kind of th-think of in those terms yourself 
743 K ◦no◦ 
744 T1 a-as abuse or 
745 K Dunno? I don’t think so  
746 T1 Ha, ha 
747 K ◦don’t know◦ 
748 T1 No (.) you don’t. 
749  (1) 
Mandy continues, ([yeah] I’ll ↑be honest  wit h you (.) I I really punish Kevin I 
do. yknow I’m absolut ely sur↑prised he’s st ill with me t o be honest  wit h you.  
I mean I-I suppose I abuse ↑Kevin. I’ve severely abused him.)(721-724). 
Mandy upgrades her descript ion from the CBA ‘vicious with her mouth’ to 
‘abuse’ within the MCD family. She places herself firmly in posit ion of agent, 
and consequently, as culpable. The level of her abuse is such that by any 
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normal standards within the SRP couple she has infringed her right to their 
continued relat ionship. However, while claiming the identity of abuser 
Mandy also defends herself against it  by displaying both her recognit ion of 
and tacit  agreement with the socially proscribed nature of her behaviour. 
Mandy then shifts the context by evoking the MCD ‘mental I llness’ (He’s 
always t here t o t ake t he brunt  of it  when my schizo↑phrenias bad 
y’know?)(726).  Mandy’s culpability is mit igated by the membership 
category ‘schizophrenic’, shift ing her from category of abusive (culpable) 
wife to mentally ill (exonerated) wife. So bot h Mandy and Kevin become 
constructed as vict ims of the abuse that schizophrenia causes.  
Trouble 
The two second pause in line 728 indicates some trouble regarding turn 
take up. Mandy has constructed herself as severely abusing Kevin and so 
Kevin would usually have a ‘right to reply’.  Mandy validates this reading 
with (sh- He (h) don(h)’t  ↑say anyt hing)(727), presenting Kevin’s silence as a 
complainable. Schegloff (2005) defines complainables as those tentat ive, 
often ambiguous utterances that are designed to test how a complaint 
may be received. Mandy’s elaboration (he always says I don’t  care, I 
don’t  care) (727) further compounds the complaint that Kevin’s lack of 
resistance to her abuse is accountable. So we can see how Mandy’s 
descript ion of her abuse of Kevin is an upgrading of her earlier confession 
that she causes stress to Kevin (see Part 1). It  is designed with the same 
intent, to invite Kevin to talk. Mandy’s laughter tokens are somewhat 
ambiguous. They may mark this is a delicate matter and an att empt to 
mit igate potential conflict. On the other hand they may be read as 
displaying frustrat ion and even contempt.  
Mitigation as repair  
Mandy’s complaint is followed by another two second pause before 
Kevin’s response (so quiet it  has not been possible to transcribe). The pause 
indicates some trouble and despite being unable to hear Kevin’s response 
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we can see from its shape it  is brief and therefore resist ing Mandy’s 
invitat ion (or challenge) for him to speak. T1’s response confirms this 
reading of an impasse between Kevin and Mandy. She attempts a repair 
by quest ioning Mandy’s descript ion of her t reatment of Kevin as abuse. 
She uses an extreme case formulat ion (absolut ely horrific) (732) to describe 
Mandy’s experience in a rhetorical quest ion designed to elicit  Kevin’s 
st rong agreement, which she readily receives in overlapping talk. Her next 
turn (usin:g (.) st rong words [...]I:: abuse Kevin is what s she saying)(738) is 
designed to compare Mandy’s experience of abuse with her claim that 
she abuses Kevin. The comparison implies that while Mandy’s experience 
was absolutely horrific, Kevin’s experience is not. Thus the preferred answer 
to her quest ion ( i-is t hat  how you experience it ?) is ‘no’. Kevin marks his 
answer as dispreferred by an audible intake of breath, a very quiet 
negative agreement followed by a mit igated disagreement (hh ◦no- not  
all t he t ime I mean ↑somet imes it s: it s bad but  (1) dunno? It s:◦) In lines  742 
to 745 T1 pursues his agreement but Kevin continues to resist  the force of 
her formulat ion with weak agreements and (don’t  know)(747), which T1 
finally acknowledges (No (.) you don’t )(748).  
The benefits and costs of mitigation 
By comparing Mandy’s experience of childhood abuse with her 
descript ion of abusing Kevin, T1 is attempting to mit igate the culpability of 
Mandy’s actions. She does this by implicit ly invoking the comparison 
between the asymmetric SRP parent/child with the symmetric SRP 
husband/wife. The abuse of a child by a parent is commonly seen as worse 
than the abuse of an adult  by another adult .  By mit igating the severity of 
the abuse the therapist  is also mit igating Kevin’s culpability for failing to 
stand up for himself. In systemic terms T1 is reframing the meaning of the 
behaviour by changing the context. However, by quest ioning Mandy’s use 
of the term abuse in this way the therapist  also potentially quest ions 
Mandy’s standing as a competent judge of reasonable and unreasonable 
behaviour. A further problem created by T1’s attempted resolut ion of the 
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impasse is that it  places Kevin in a bind. To agree with T1 means he 
exonerates Mandy’s behaviour, the very posit ion which Mandy has 
complained about. Kevin resolves this interactional problem by saying 
(dunno?) a strategy commonly used to avoid potential conflict. (Muntigl  
and Tim Choi, 2010) 
Repairing the consequence of mitigation  
750 T2 ↑I sort of get a sense you’re quite frus↑trated that Kevin doesn’t react to that. 
751 M yeah 
752 T2 I-I it feels ju- listening to you explain it Mandy it sounds like you’re really  
753  looking fo:r .hhh some sort of reaction for Kevin not to just keep taking 
754 M [yeah] 
755 T2 [the things] that you deliver. 
756 M .hhh sometimes I’ve wanted Kevin to beat me, I’ve wanted him to I think I n- I  
757  need him to .hh yknow= 
758 T2 =because? 
759 M because um praps I-it’ll make me a better person 
760 T1 ◦right◦ 
761  (2) 
 
T1’s attempted repair is met with a one second pause, marking trouble. T2 
takes up the turn, ( I-I it  feels ju- list ening t o you explain it  Mandy it  sounds 
like you’re really looking fo:r .hhh some sort  of react ion for Kevin not  t o just  
keep t aking [..] [the things] t hat you deliver)(750-755).  She t ies her turn with 
Mandy’s complaint and constructs a reinterpretat ion (Bercelli et  al., 2008). 
Reinterpretations differ from formulat ions in that the therapist explicit ly adds 
something of their thoughts rather than (purportedly) merely presenting a 
summary of the clients talk. T2 invokes the SRP couple, where it  is 
reasonable to be frustrated if ones partner fails to react to them. Thus 
Mandy has the right to a response from Kevin, to be stood up to and dealt 
with as an adult .  Both are constructed as responsible agents and as such 
Mandy can be heard as culpable for her actions and Kevin as culpable for 
his passivity. Mandy shows her agreement with this by upgrading her 
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complaint against Kevin with (.hhh somet imes I’ve want ed Kevin t o beat  
me, I’ve want ed him t o I t hink I n- I need him t o .hh yknow=) Pomerantz 
(1984) shows how agreements of assessments are often produced by a 
stronger term. In response to T2’s (because?) she offers the explanation, 
(because um praps i-it ’ll make me a bet t er person).  
Claiming agency 
Let’s look at how Mandy constructs this rather extraordinary claim. She 
draws on the CBA punishment as a version of ‘gett ing better’ (make me a 
bet t er person). Punishment might relate to the judicial system or to other 
inst itut ions such as the family and its use here is somewhat ambiguous. 
Mandy uses it  to construct a complex posit ion where she both claims 
responsibility for her action by declaring her need for punishment while at 
the same t ime mit igating it  by implying a subordinate posit ion, like that of a 
child. Children not taught by their parents how to behave cannot be held 
responsible for their actions. Thus the MCD family is made relevant as she 
implies that Kevin’s failure to discipline her has deprived her of the 
opportunity to become ‘a better person’. However, Mandy is not a child 
and even if she were, within current white western social norms, beating a 
child would not be seen as reasonable.  Gender identity categories may 
also be inferred. The implication that Kevin’s lack of response is culpable 
evokes patriarchal category identit ies where men are sometimes obliged 
to give women a slap to bring them to their senses. However, again within 
current white western social norms this would not be judged reasonable 
behaviour. Violence towards women and children is formally sanctioned 
within the law. Similarly within the MCD mental illness, Kevin as a carer 
would not be expected to beat a patient, regardless of provocation. So 
the activit ies and category memberships Mandy draws on are not the 
social norm, and as such we would expect Mandy’s account to be heard 
as problematic. We will examine the interactional consequences of these 
claims later, first  let us t ry to make sense of this sequence. 
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The importance of context and sequence 
One explanation, one that seems to inform T1’s response to Mandy, is that 
Mandy is replicating relat ional patterns learned in her family of origin.  T he 
CA literature offers another (not mutually exclusive) explanation. 
Emmerson and Messenger (1977) point to the role of complaints in the 
social construct ion and management of t roubles. Perceptions of 
something wrong are put into language as the first  step to mobilising 
remedial action.  Complaints serve to define what the trouble is and 
persuade third part ies to a part icular version of events. Formulat ing any 
event is contingent upon the interactional context, designed for part icular 
recipients and their ant icipated knowledge and beliefs. The complaint 
then is an emergent product of social interaction. What CA brings to our 
understanding of the complaint is the importance of sequential meaning. 
What has gone before in this conversat ion will influence the way that this 
utterance is constructed. Thus the meaning of the complaint depends on 
what has gone before.  
 
Immediately preceding this sequence, Mandy has been describing her 
mother as a woman who punished Mandy by smashing her hand with a 
hammer and who sold her for sex to the highest bidder. She has also 
described both her father and herself as schizophrenic.  Then T1 asks her 
how she makes sense of her current life in the context of her early 
experiences. We have seen how the MCDs ‘family’ and ‘mental illness’ are 
both made relevant. Mandy builds her case by drawing on the MCD 
‘family’. This carries with it  associated duties of care, but also transgressive 
associat ions, the CBAs of abuse and violence carried out behind closed 
doors.  
 
T1’s quest ions funnel Mandy’s responses into a formulat ion that links 
Mandy’s current experience with that of her past, a common therapeutic 
convention.  Mandy co-operates with T1 by drawing on the version of 
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family where the rights and obligations expectable are those of 
punishment and submission rather than love and care. Mandy then 
connects her own current behaviour with that of her mothers, (somet imes I 
cat ch myself t hinking God I’m t urning int o my mum? because she was- she 
was vicious wit h her mout h) (714-715) and thus builds the argument that 
she abuses Kevin. So the extremity of her formulat ion should not be taken 
as a representation of her beliefs alone but as a communication whose 
meaning has been forged within the sequential context of the 
conversat ion.  
Explaining or explaining oneself 
Let us return to the different iat ion between “explaining and explaining 
oneself” (Antaki and Leudar, 1992, p. 181) the former being an utterance 
designed to explain the relat ionship between one thing and another 
(explanation as answer) and the latter designed to persuade the other to 
the validity of one’s argument (explanation as claim backing). The former 
is concerned with affairs external to the conversat ion itself, the latter with 
whether the hearer finds the explanation persuasive or not. What is made 
relevant concerns ones status as a socially rat ional agent within the 
conversat ion. One of the main keys to unlocking the meaning is “t he 
assumed agreement  on, or quarrel about , t he st at e of affairs being 
explained.” (Antaki and Leudar, 1992, p.186, italics in original). 
 
With this in mind let us return to Sequence 1 to see what connections can 
be made. The gist  of Mandy’s complaints against Kevin in Part 1 were 
sequentially built  in the following way, 
 
(He has been st ressed (.) he he just  wont  he just  wont  say [he wont  be 
honest ) (234) 
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(we:ll Kevin Kevin is st ressed wit h me (1) and right  (1) he’s st ressed wit h t he 
ho:use and st uff but  he just  wont  ↑say it  and it  makes  me cross cos I I 
↑know he i:s) (247-249) 
 
( I t hink he t reat s like Alfie different  from t he ↑girls) (272) 
 
(he can be really nast y t o Alfie) (284) 
 
As Mandy’s blame of Kevin increased, T1 intervened, and a new sequence 
began. If we read Mandy’s complaint in the context of this earlier 
sequence we can see how an unresolved conflict in Part 1 is recycled in 
an intensified form.  
 
(we:ll Kevin Kevin is st ressed wit h me (1) and right  (1) he’s st ressed wit h t he 
ho:use and st uff but  he just  wont  ↑say it  and it  makes  me cross cos I I 
↑know he i:s)( 247-249) 
 
has been upgraded to: 
 
( I abuse ↑Kevin)(722)  
 
(He (h) don(h)’t  ↑say anyt hing he always says I don’t  care, I don’t  care.) 
(726-7). 
Extreme case formulations 
So as to legit imize a complaint and portray the complainable situation 
as worthy of complaint, a speaker may portray the offense and /or 
the suffering with Extreme Case formulat ions. (Pomerantz, 1986, p. 227-
8) 
 
Where the speaker expects some resistance to the complaint a worst case 
scenario is often presented in order to make a case. We have seen that 
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Mandy has good reason to expect her portrayal of the trouble to be 
resisted by Kevin. This explanation then can be read not as principally 
concerned with affairs outside the conversat ion (childhood abuse causes 
Mandy to abuse Kevin) but as a warrant for Mandy’s claim that the 
troubles in their relat ionship need to be talked about.  She does this by 
first ly producing the complaint to fit  the context constructed by T1’s 
quest ion, emphasising the effect of the past on the present. Then Mandy 
re-produces her complaint in a manner that fits the context constructed by 
T2’s quest ion, privileging the effect of Kevin’s withdrawal on her.  
 
Let me be very clear here. I  am not suggest ing that Mandy has a strategic 
plan. Neither am I suggest ing that the impact of abuse on her is not real. 
Mandy has available to her narrat ive construct ions that should not be 
available to anyone. She has them because people did terrible things to 
her.  Her history is written with scars on her skin and recounted by the 
voices in her head. I am arguing that we should be careful in interpret ing 
what is said as representing what is in her mind without carefully examining 
the other conversat ionalists’ part in its construct ion. Why have these 
part icular discursive resources been chosen now? 
Discussion 
What is the problem?   
At first  Mandy and T1 seem to be in agreement about the problem they 
are addressing, the effect of the past on Mandy’s current mental health 
and behaviour. However, as the sequence unfolds we can see that Mandy 
is focusing on a different problem, Kevin’s lack of response to her.  
Who is to blame? 
This second excerpt of t ranscript begins with T1 pursuing a common 
therapeutic task, making sense of current events in the context of patterns 
of thoughts, feelings and behaviours learned in the past. Systemic thinking 
posits that such patterns are not intrinsically good or bad but more or less 
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useful in any given context. Once established, interactional patterns have 
a self-reinforcing nature and can be difficult  to change. However, when 
contexts change, patterns that were helpful can become problematic. 
One of the tasks of the therapist  is to help people to adapt their habitual 
patterns to new circumstances in order to move on in their lives.  Here we 
can see how T1 is creating a platform for explorat ion of this concept first  by 
asking Mandy to reflect on how her past affects her present and then 
reinforcing this link in her subsequent formulat ions. 
 
This demonstrates a rout ine systemic (or perhaps common 
psychotherapeutic) means of ameliorat ing blame. By emphasising how 
present behaviours, no matter how unreasonable, make sense in the 
context of what has come before family members (patients, clients, 
analysands) can be offered an explanation which mit igates culpability 
while at the same t ime offering a rat ionale for change. 
What is reasonable blame? 
Init ially Mandy and T1 appear to be aligned as Mandy explains that she is 
t rying to change her relat ionship patterns and show more affection to 
Kevin. However at t imes she worries she is too like her mother. As she 
warrants her claim, so the descript ions of her behaviour become more 
extreme. Mandy’s claim that she abuses Kevin prompts T1 to challenge her 
descript ion (lines 732 to 749). By comparing Mandy’s childhood experience 
with that of Kevin’s adult  experience T1 reframes the term abuse to 
something less severe and thus mit igates blame. Reframes are a common 
tool of the systemic therapist , changing the meaning of a word or concept 
by changing its context. Thus T1 demonstrates what she judges to be 
reasonable blame in this context. 
What are the consequences of mitigation? 
T1 then is working hard to uphold Mandy’s moral standing through 
mit igation. However, by mit igating Mandy’s culpability T1 displays that she 
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judges Mandy’s claim to be exaggerated. This potentially undermines 
Mandy’s posit ion as a credible person. Mandy’s agency is quest ioned, 
both in the sense that she cannot be held responsible for her actions due 
to the severity of her abuse, and that the abuse has rendered her 
incompetent to evaluate what const itutes abuse and what doesn’t . In this 
case the cost of mit igating blame is to be posit ioned as socially 
incompetent. T1 also tries to recruit  Kevin to her project of challenging 
Mandy’s claim. However if Kevin agrees with T1 he will be displaying the 
very behaviour Mandy is complaining about (he always says I don’t  care, I 
don’t  care) (729). He resolves this dilemma by claiming ignorance. 
Misalignment- different problems require different solutions 
One of the reasons for this impasse seems to have been a misalignment 
between Mandy and T1’s interactional projects.  Where T1 is foregrounding 
the effect of Mandy’s past on her present relat ionships Mandy is 
foregrounding the problem of Kevin’s lack of response to her. T1 reads 
Mandy’s contribut ion as ‘explanation as answer’, explaining why her 
current behaviour is reasonable given the extremit ies of her past. Mandy 
however is talking from the domain of ‘explanation as claim backing’ 
where Kevin’s lack of response can be judged unreasonable given the 
severity of her abusive behaviour towards him.  
Realignment- redefining the problem 
T2 steps in to breach this impasse and reinterprets Mandy’s contribut ion as 
‘explanation as claim backing’. As well as acknowledging Mandy’s intent 
she also re-interprets Mandy’s complaint drawing on a common systemic 
concept, the pursuit  and withdrawal cycle. As one partner pursues the 
other for a response, the other becomes increasingly withdrawn, leading to 
increased pursuit  and so on in a redundant repetit ive pattern. These 
sequences demonstrate the construct ion of a pursuit  and withdrawal cycle 
within the micro process of the therapy session itself, with Mandy pursuing 
Kevin for a response and Kevin resist ing.  
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T2’s contribut ion thus serves to align with Mandy by indexing Kevin’s lack of 
response as the topic while also emphasising the circular nature of the 
problem. Mandy and Kevin become equal partners with choices about 
whether they continue to pursue and withdraw. In this way their agency 
and responsibility is highlighted. 
Team work 
In both therapies, the qualified systemic therapists contribute a great deal 
more talk than their co-therapists. In this case T2’s intervention interrupts 
T1’s interactional project in a way that helps to repair a misalignment 
between Mandy and T1. Mandy strongly agrees with T2s formulat ion; 
however her elaboration of that agreement, that she would like Kevin to 
beat her causes another ‘t rouble’ which results in further misalignment.  
 
In Part 3 we will see how the problem of continued misalignment is solved 
by explicit  blame, and how the pursuit  and withdrawal cycle is interrupted 
sufficient ly for Mandy and Kevin to pause and face one another in the 
session. 
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Part 3 
Introduction 
This final excerpt of t ranscript follows directly, with no omissions, from that 
analysed in Part 2. The rat ionale for breaking the sequence at this point is 
to highlight a kind of change of gear in the interactional process. The 
reasons for and consequences of this gear change are the main theme of 
this part of the analysis. This excerpt begins at line 762 where T1 shifts her 
stance towards Mandy to pursue a part icular interactional project. I  begin 
with a brief resume of the talk immediately preceding this extract and 
have included lines 759 – 761, discussed in Part 2, for ease of reference. The 
analysis shows how an explicit  blaming event serves as a solut ion to a 
recurrent misalignment between T1 and Mandy.  Finally, I  draw the threads 
of all three sequences together with a part icular focus on the impact of 
the therapists’ interactions on blame. 
The context of the data selected. 
In Part 2 we have seen how a misalignment between T1 and Mandy has 
led to an impasse. T2 has intervened in such a way as to reframe the 
problem to one of Mandy seeking a response from Kevin. Mandy agrees 
with T2’s reading and upgrades her agreement with the claim that 
sometimes she wishes Kevin would beat her. T2’s enquiry (because?) elicits 
Mandy’s explanation ( it ’ll make me a bet t er person) (759).   
From opposition to conciliation 
759 M because um praps I-it’ll make me a better person 
760 T1 ◦right◦ 
 761  (2) 
762 T1 and having Kevin (.) beat you (.) would that be: mo:re of the ↑old  
763  pattern or mo:re of something different happening in your own mind. 
764  (2)  
765 M .hh no it would jus- I don’t know I ↑just- I just feel it would just make me a  
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766  better person. 
767 T1 mmm 
768 M um 
769 T1 its interesting what you’re saying cos you’re looking for somethi:ng different  
770  to be happening like being a better person(.) I guess its an aspiration its  
771  something you strive for (.) yeah? 
772 M ◦yeah◦ 
773 T1 cos you’re saying you don’t feel you’re a very good person 
774 M ◦no◦ 
775 T1 how you think, or how you feel, or how you behave at times 
776 M yeah no I’m not a good person 
777 T1 but what you’re expecting from Kevin i:s (.) you said earlier that Kevin is the  
778  first person who hasn’t abused you 
779 M ◦yeah◦  
780 T1 but what you’re expecting from Kevin is almost to respo:nd back with  
781  physical abuse  
782 M ◦yeah◦ 
783 T1 to make you kind of better (.) but actually it would be part of what would have  
784  been happening before (1) of what you’d expect from people that people  
785  abuse you.   
786 M ◦yeah◦ 
787 T1 ◦yeah?◦ 
788 T1 But its interesting what Jan was asking before isn’t it that you are expecting a  
789  different response from Kevin. 
 
The pause in line 761 shows some problem encountered by part icipants 
with how to go on. Two issues seem relevant. One is that of structure, the 
other of moral evaluation. The structural problem is concerned with the 
management of quest ion and answer adjacency pairs. Generally, the 
person who asks a quest ion, in this case T2 has a right to the next turn 
following the reply. T1’s acknowledgement of Mandy’s response effectively 
interrupts the quest ion chain and creates some ambiguity about next turn 
speaking rights. The problem posed for the therapists is how to take up t his 
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claim. T1 has clearly displayed access to greater speaking rights 
throughout the session evidenced by the frequency of her contribut ions 
compared to T2. Here we can see how T2 co-operates with this asymmetric 
pairing by ceding her turn to T1.  
The strategic use of questions 
Within the inst itut ion of therapy, therapists have rights to quest ion while 
clients have the duty to respond, and to respond truthfully (Labov and 
Fanshell, 1977). Therapists hold the power to cont rol the conversat ional 
contribut ions of others in the exchange, and quest ioning plays an 
important role in the management of the session (Gale, 1991; Bartesaghi, 
2009; Peräkylä, 1995). Also, by virtue of their claims to professional 
knowledge, therapists have the power to interpret what is going on. In 
systemic therapy, quest ioning as a therapeutic tool forms a central 
component of the therapists’ SIKs.  The Milan associates conceptualisat ion 
of ‘circular quest ioning’ as the chief means of adhering to the t hree 
guiding principles of hypothesising, circularity and neutrality (Selvini 
Palazzoli et  al., 1980) and Tomm’s (1987a, 1987b, 1988) subsequent work, 
elaborating a taxonomy of quest ioning strategies, have had a major 
influence on the development of systemic theory and practice in the UK. In 
this sequence T1 can be seen to use the constraining power of quest ions to 
pursue her interactional project.  
 
T1 re-contextualises Kevin beating Mandy by comparing it  to Mandy’s 
previous story of abuse (and having Kevin (.) beat  you (.) would t hat  be: 
mo:re of t he ↑old pat t ern or mo:re of somet hing different  happening in 
your own mind) (762). By comparing Mandy’s previous account of being 
beaten, which she has condemned as morally wrong, with her claim to 
want to be beaten now, it  would be very hard for Mandy not to agree that 
it  is more of the old pattern. The natural upshot of this quest ion is that to 
expect Kevin to beat her would also be morally wrong. However, 
disagreement is interactionally t ricky and where therapists have 
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asymmetric rights to the interpretat ion of family t roubles, doubly so. In 
systemic terms this is an example of a fairly rout ine strategic quest ion, 
where the therapist  is not really asking a quest ion so much as making a 
point. Mandy marks her response as dispreferred, first  by a long pause and 
then (.hh no it  would jus- I don’t  know I ↑just ) (765). Note that she 
immediately follows her disagreement with ‘I  don’t  know’ thus mit igating 
her challenge to T1’s rights to specialist  knowledge. She continues ( I just  
feel it  would just  make me a bet t er person). This is an example of what 
Labov and Fanshell (1977) call an A-event statement, where the claim is 
based on personal knowledge not usually seen as accessible to others, 
and therefore more difficult  to refute. Where therapists have more claim to 
interpretat ive rights, clients have more rights to personal knowledge 
including thoughts, feelings and events. Mandy thus uses her feeling as a 
legit imate warrant for her disagreement with T1. T1 pursues her re-
interpretat ion by means of a series of rhetorical actions over a number of 
successive turns each of which make relevant Mandy’s assent.  
Upgrading the argument 
T1 begins by construct ing an argument which is ostensibly the natural 
upshot of Mandy’s earlier talk, ( it s int erest ing what  you’re saying cos you’re 
looking for somet hi:ng different  t o be happening like being a bet t er 
person(.) I guess it s an aspirat ion it s somet hing you st rive for yeah?)(769-
771). Mandy offers a soft minimal agreement ( ◦yeah◦). T1 then transposes 
Mandy’s previous words ( I just  feel it  would just  make me a bet t er 
person)(765) to a different context  (cos you’re saying you don’t  feel you’re 
a very good person). The emphasis on ‘feeling’ serves to undermine 
Mandy’s  implied claim that she is a bad person who feels that she can be 
made better and makes Mandy’s  badness a debatable matter. Following 
another minimal negative agreement token ( ◦no◦) T1 pursues her argument 
by separating evaluations of good or bad from Mandy as a person (the 
MCD types of person) and locates them in types of action (How you t hink, 
or how you feel, or how you behave at  t imes) (775). This serves an 
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important therapeutic function. Mandy is categorizing herself as the type 
of person who is bad. CBA ’s then become t ied to the category bad 
person so that even ostensibly neutral actions may be judged as 
potentially self-serving or suspicious due to the constraints of the category 
in use. By placing CBA ’s in the forefront, T1 makes possible alternative 
member categories within the MCD ‘types of person’. T1 thus achieves the 
systemic idea of separating the person from the problem with a view to 
deconstruct ing totalising descript ions and making possible alternative 
identity posit ions.   
Resistance 
Mandy counters the mit igating effects of T1s turn with an agreement 
prefaced disagreement, (yeah no I’m not  a good person)(776). She resists 
T1’s move on two grounds, first  by implying it  is not just  a feeling but a fact 
and, secondly, that it  is her personhood not her behaviour that is relevant. 
T1 treats Mandy’s response as irrelevant, instead pursuing her own 
argument (but  what  you’re expect ing from Kevin i:s)(780). At this point T1 
self- repairs, embedding her argument in Mandy’s prior words and seeking 
her agreement before pursuing her argument (you said earlier t hat  Kevin is 
t he first  person who hasn’t  abused you)(777). Although this is a statement 
rather than a quest ion it  follows the same procedural rules as a 
quest ion/answer adjacency pair by strongly projecting an answer in the 
next turn (Schegloff 1984). Mandy co-operates with a minimal agreement 
token and T1 then goes on to conclude her argument (but  what  you’re 
expect ing from Kevin is almost  t o respo:nd back wit h physical abuse [..]t o 
make you kind of bet t er (.) but  act ually it  would be part  of what  would 
have been happening before (1) of what  you’d expect  from people t hat  
people abuse you)(780-785).  T1 responds to yet another minimal 
agreement token from Mandy with a tag quest ion ( ◦yeah?◦) designed to 
confirm Mandy’s agreement before continuing.  
 
 160 
T1 counters Mandy’s claim that she is a bad person by implying that 
Mandy’s t hinking is faulty. Mandy is posit ioned as the passive recipient of 
family interactions which she replicates without full understanding or 
agency. Mandy’s responses to T1’s argument are ambiguous. In this case, 
T1’s argument takes the form of a re-interpretat ion. Bercelli et  al., (2008) 
have shown that therapist  reinterpretat ions are similar to therapist  
formulat ions in that they both refer to personal events that clients have 
greater access to. However because reinterpretat ions explicit ly propose 
views that are addit ional to or different from those that the client has said, 
client agreement or disagreement is necessary to warrant the 
reinterpretat ion. Where a minimal agreement token then is commonly 
sufficient following a formulat ion, therapists often pursue more extended 
agreements with reinterpretat ions.  
 
So, T1 is construct ing an argument in such a way as to make it  difficult  for 
Mandy to disagree without infringing both the procedural rules of the 
quest ion/answer sequence and the normative rules of the therapy 
encounter. T1 greatly constrains what is possible for Mandy to answer in the 
next slot. Thus Mandy’s minimal agreements in this context cannot be read 
as agreement with T1’s interpretat ion so much as co-operation with the 
structural propert ies of the talk. By establishing a structural dynamic in 
which Mandy’s  answers have the appearance of agreement, T1 can 
continue within the inst itut ional aim of persuading Mandy towards a 
different way of thinking.  T1’s next turn (But  it s int erest ing what  Jan was 
asking before isn’t  it  t hat  you are expect ing a different  response from 
Kevin) (788) is evidence that T1 has not heard Mandy’s responses as 
sufficient to the task in hand.  
Rupture 
790 M I ↑wish he would speak like I’m re(h)ally frustrated now cos he just  
791  wont speak .hh 
792 K      [indecipherable] 
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793 M      [and I just really want him to speak I really .hh I don’t want him to  
794  spare my feelings I [want him to sit there and say right] 
795 K    [I’m not I’m not] I don’t like it at ↑all 
796 M .hhh this is this and that is that and I- I get cross with her cos of this or 
797 T mm 
798 M [I jus-] 
799 K [No I ↑don’t] like it obviously 
800 M it’s like I feel like I’m layin I’m layin all my stuff bare here 
801 T1 yes 
802 M and (.) he’s not givin- he’s not he’s not giving ↑anything and its just like .hhh I  
803  don’t ↑know how he feels I don’t ↑know w-what he thinks I cant (.) and  
804  that really inf- infuriates me because .hhh I just feel like I’m on m-my own  
805  in this group be↑cause hes not .hh hes not giving anything 
 
M’s interruption of T1 and abrupt shift  of topic (I ↑wish he would speak like 
I’m re(h)ally frust rat ed now cos he just  wont  speak .hh) (790-791) displays 
the strength of Mandy’s  disagreement with the relevance of T1’s line of 
quest ioning. To end the quest ion answer sequence involves breaching a 
number of procedural and normative rules, first ly to stop answering 
quest ions, secondly to interrupt the therapist ’s turn and thirdly to introduce 
a new topic, thus overturning the usual weight of the asymmetric 
relat ionship. In CA terms this marks a trouble which in mundane talk signals 
the requirement of repair in order to move on smoothly. In therapeutic 
terms it  marks a rupture in the therapeutic alliance that  may require repair 
for therapy to continue effectively.  
When solutions become problems and vice versa 
How did this breach of the norms come to be relevant? What was the 
problem T1 was trying to solve by her insistence on this reinterpretat ion and 
what problem did it  set up for Mandy that made her overturning of the 
local order seem reasonable?  
 
 162 
Mandy’s choice of ‘beating’ as an activity associated with ‘gett ing better’ 
is a strong challenge to the inst itut ional norms of therapy and as such 
poses a dilemma for the therapists. Do they accept this as an argument 
which warrants explorat ion or take a posit ion against it? However, directly 
contradict ing a client ’s view does not sit  easily with a systemic therapists 
‘neutral’, ‘not knowing’ and/or ‘collaborative’ stance. In CA terms we 
know that a contradict ion might be seen as a first  move in a conflict 
sequence, one that orients part icipants towards disagreement. In systemic 
terms, an escalat ing symmetrical pattern is one which therapists have 
been trained to avoid. Thus T1 delicately constructs her argument to avoid 
the procedural st ructure of a conflict sequence by ut ilising a 
quest ion/answer sequence that projects agreement. By using Mandy’s 
previous utterances to warrant her argument, T1 strongly projects 
agreement which in turn invites a display of collaboration. By building her 
argument from judicious selections of Mandy’s previous words she makes it  
difficult  for Mandy to disagree without calling her own words into quest ion. 
At the same t ime, T1 constructs her posit ion as morally neutral, merely re-
interpret ing ‘the facts’ as Mandy has told her.  Also, by attending to 
Mandy’s past abuse as the reason why she should erroneously believe 
beating is good, T1 mit igates the culpability of making a statement that 
transgresses what is seen to be normal.   
 
The structure of T1’s argument serves to severely limit  the relevant responses 
available to Mandy. So we can see a recurrence of the misalignment of 
tasks between T1 and Mandy, where Mandy speaks from the posit ion of 
claim backing but T1 responds to her as if she were speaking from a 
posit ion of explaining the facts. Mandy’s abrupt change of topic serves to 
display Mandy’s evaluation of T1’s pursuit  of her agreement as irrelevant. 
Instead Mandy makes relevant another topic, and one that she has raised 
before.    
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Re-negotiating the problem 
Mandy recasts her complaint in a way that is unequivocal in design. ( I 
↑wish he would speak like I’m re(h)ally frust rat ed now cos he just  wont  
speak .hh [….] [and I just  really want  him t o speak I really .hh I don’t  want  
him t o spare my feelings I [want  him t o sit  t here and say right ]) (790-794) 
 
Mandy’s increasingly extreme descript ions of Kevin’s failure to respond 
have been building evidence for the claim that Mandy makes explicit  
here. She draws on the MCD ‘therapy’ to imply that she is working hard to 
comply with expectations ( it ’s like I feel like I’m layin I’m layin all my st uff 
bare here) (800) while Kevin fails to meet them.  Furthermore her anger is 
just ified (because .hhh I just  feel like I’m on m-my own in t his group 
be↑cause hes not  .hh hes not  giving anyt hing)(804-805). Kevin’s disavowals 
( I’m not  I’m not ] I don’t  like it  at  ↑all) (795) and again in line 799, mark a 
conflict sequence between Mandy and Kevin, evidenced by interruptions, 
raised voices and overlapping talk. This prompts T1 to action.  
 
806 T1 .hhh Part of what’s going on he:re is that we’re actually (.) yknow meeting and  
807  we’re all being polite. Which is if we ↑all talked at the same time (.) none  
808  of us would hear what the ot(h)her pe(h)rson was saying and .hhh um it  
809  would be very hard to make ourselves heard .hh so theres a kind of social  
810  etiquette isn’t [there] 
811 K [yeah] 
812 T1  that we take turns [to .hh] 
813 M          [yeah]  
814 T1 either speak, ask questions, or actually say how it is fro:m each of our points  
815  of view .hhh so I guess as ↑you’re saying things its very hard for you  
816  Kevin to actually say something [or respond] 
817 K        [yeah] 
818 T1 but what we would ↑hope to do is gi:ve (.) both of you time to kind of think 
819  about what the other person (.) has said [um 
820 K          [yeah I ↑know its bad bu- when she  
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821  says things then I will say things to ↑her (.) like horrible thin:gs an- 
822 T1 mm 
823 K ju- then after things have settled down I’ll feel really bad because (.) I’ve  
824  started s-swearing at her and calling her horrible na:mes 
825 T1 mm 
826 K makes it a lot worse I think (.) cos I said it 
827 T1 ◦right◦ so sometimes if you do react back to .hh Mandy an:d verbally you-  
828  you’re saying nasty things? 
829 K yeah 
830 M ve-very rare though (.) that probably happens like(.) twice a year?  
831 T1 [m↑hm] 
832 M [if that] 
833 K I feel bad because I don’t think I should be .hhh saying anything because of  
834  what shes been through 
835 T1 right (.) so in your own (.) for your own self Kevin actually that doesnt feel  
836  like an OK thing to do. 
837 K yeah, yeah 
838 T1 ◦yeah◦  
839 K sometimes you just can’t help an- it just happens so .hh h 
 
In lines 806 to 810 T1 diverts Mandy’s demand for Kevin to speak with this 
descript ion of the interactional process, a descript ion which is at apparent 
odds with what is actually happening. Why t his now? 
Repair 
A rupture signals repair, both in mundane talk and in therapy. T1 responds 
to this t rouble and abandons her task of re-interpret ing the content of 
Mandy’s explanation, instead re-aligning with Mandy’s interactional 
project. She achieves this by indexing therapy process issues, ‘how we talk 
in therapy’ as the relevant topic. Yet, where Mandy implies Kevin is 
culpable for not talking, T1 implies Mandy is culpable for talking in the 
wrong way, a move that is potentially risky to the therapeutic relat ionship. 
However, the manner in which T1 constructs this challenge to Mandy not 
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only mit igates potential blame it  also serves to avoid further conflict.  How 
does she achieve this?  
 
Init ially T1 draws on the language of ordinary conversat ion to evoke 
common social norms of turn taking ‘being polite’ and ‘social et iquette’ to 
evoke a moral order in the therapy context where (we t ake t urns [t o .hh]    
[…] eit her speak, ask quest ions, or act ually say how it  is fro:m each of our 
point s of view)(812-815). This descript ion evokes an ordinary, 
conversat ional relat ionship with equal rights and responsibilit ies. T1 draws 
on her authority as a therapist  to make explicit  that interruption and loud 
voices are not a reasonable expectation in t he therapy context but she 
does this in a way that minimises the asymmetry in the relat ionship. In this 
way she projects a collaborative rather than authoritarian stance. She then 
offers an account for her actions further mit igated by laughter tokens ( if 
we ↑all t alked at  the same t ime (.) none of us would hear what the ot (h)her 
pe(h)rson was saying)(807-808). This descript ion of ‘what we are doing’ 
makes relevant Kevin and Mandy’s t ransgression of these rules through 
interruption and overlapping talk without explicit ly saying so. In CA we 
know that accusation most frequently invites denial. By describing the 
ideal of a polite conversat ion as ‘what we are doing’ T1 thus projects 
agreement and shifts the structural propert ies of the talk.  Furthermore, T1’s 
turn shifts accountability for the transgression of the rules from Kevin to 
Mandy (as ↑you’re saying t hings it s very hard for you Kevin t o act ually say 
somet hing[or respond](815-816). Thus we can see T1 returning to the 
systemic idea of circularity, this t ime highlight ing that the more Mandy 
complains the harder it  is for Kevin to respond. 
 
As Mandy has repeated and upgraded her complaint against Kevin over 
the three sequences, culminating in this angry outburst against him, so T1 
has repeated and upgraded her responses to Mandy’s complaints, 
culminating in this explanation of the type of talk that she deems 
acceptable within a therapy context. The delicacy with which she does 
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this enables the conflict to be interrupted and achieves exactly what T1 
says she wishes to do (but  what  we would ↑hope t o do is gi:ve (.) bot h of 
you t ime to kind of t hink about what t he ot her person (.) has said [um)(818-
819). She opens a space for Kevin to respond. 
Resolution 
K’s response sums up his dilemma (yeah I ↑know it s bad bu- when she says 
t hings t hen I will say t hings t o ↑her (.) like horrible t hin:gs an-[…] ju- t hen 
after t hings have set t led down I’ll feel really bad because (.) I’ve st art ed s-
swearing at  her and calling her horrible na:mes […] makes it  a lot  worse I 
t hink (.) cos I said it )(820-829) 
 
Kevin displays how the disjunctive categories of husband/carer create a 
practical moral problem for him. When he responds to Mandy as a 
husband, within the symmetric pairing husband/wife, it  is acceptable to 
respond to complaint  with complaint. However, as a carer complaining 
about a patient for behaviour that is not their fault  is not reasonable. Thus 
Kevin makes explicit  his dilemma both inside and outside the therapy 
room. The severity of Mandy’s abuse, and her illness, serves to absolve her 
of responsibility and thus of blame for her unreasonable actions. However, 
if she is not responsible for her actions then she cannot be held to account 
and thus he cannot respond to Mandy’s demand to hold her to account. 
Discussion 
In Part 3 we have seen how a sustained misalignment between Mandy 
and T1 is solved by Mandy’s explicit  blame of Kevin.  Mandy’s argument, 
that Kevin should talk about their difficult ies rests part ly on the severity of 
the abuse she gives him. T1’s mit igating explanations in effect undermine 
Mandy’s argument.  Mandy’s angry outcry and explicit  blame of Kevin act 
as a solut ion to a redundant pattern of interaction between T1 and Mandy 
by making explicit  the purpose of her argument, that Kevin is reneging on 
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his responsibility as a client in therapy and, by implication, that T1 is failing 
to get the point. 
The interactional problems 
Mandy’s interactional problem seems to be how to persuade part icipants 
to her posit ion that Kevin is failing to respond to her adequately, while also 
co-operating with the interactional rules of therapy that are being 
constructed between them. T1’s interactional problem seems to be how to 
respond to Mandy’s claim, one that transgresses social and inst itut ional 
norms, while showing respect for Mandy, rejecting the moral implications of 
her claim and displaying a neutral stance.   
The attempted solutions 
Mandy’s claim that beating can be an acceptable means of 
improvement prompts T1 to action. The therapist  counters Mandy’s claim 
by highlight ing the logical flaws in Mandy’s argument while also offering an 
explanation for Mandy’s claim which fits the therapy agenda. She 
exonerates Mandy from any potential culpability for holding such 
transgressive beliefs by locating them as the result  of childhood abuse and 
mental illness. T1 maintains a posit ion of neutrality by embedding her 
argument in a re-interpretation of Mandy’s previous talk. However, the cost 
of mit igating blame is to posit ion Mandy as socially incompetent. 
The consequences 
M’s complaint  against Kevin, that he is not part icipating sufficient ly in the 
therapy, has an addit ional meaning given its sequential placement. It  can 
also be heard as an indirect complaint against T1 and the irrelevance of 
her lengthy interpretat ion.  The effect is t hat T1 changes tack and realigns 
more closely with Mandy’s interactional project by topicalising talking. We 
can also see a repeated pattern of interaction threaded through all the 
sequences. Where the interaction between Kevin and Mandy becomes 
more conflicted and emotionally heated, so T1 interrupts the 
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accusation/denial patterns by talking about talking. In this case her 
intervention seems to interrupt the pattern sufficient ly for Kevin to shift  from 
conflict to co-operation and make a conciliatory move towards Mandy 
that serves as a closing to the opening of Mandy’s interactional project in 
Part 1. He acknowledges her complaint as valid and offers a relevant 
explanation by explicit ly talking about his dilemma. 
 
The effect of T1’s use of the rout ine systemic strategy of ‘talking about 
talking’ is to interrupt a conflict sequence and provide a context where the 
alignment between all part ies is more favourable. In the following 
discussion I will consider how the therapists’ interventions over the three 
sequences have contributed to this alignment.   
 
Summary and Discussion of Therapy 2  
Negotiating goals 
In Part 1 of this Chapter I  argued that Mandy and Kevin seem to have 
different ideas about what they want to achieve in therapy. Mandy wants 
to talk about the arguments between them and specifically wants Kevin to 
account for his behaviour. Kevin actively, although not explicit ly, resists 
Mandy’s goal. In effect, his goal in this session appears to be to deny or 
minimise the arguments and avoid talking about anything contentious. I  
have shown that T1’s interactional project init ially aligns with Mandy’s. She 
encourages Kevin to talk, arguably because in any form of talking therapy 
a basic requirement is that part icipants talk, at least a lit t le. Furthermore 
the talk needs to be relevant to the inst itut ional agenda of family therapy, 
typically about relat ional difficult ies. However, as Kevin minimises the 
problems in response to T1s enquiries, so Mandy upgrades her complaints 
against Kevin. The consequence of T1 aligning with Mandy in pursuing talk 
about the problem of arguments and the reasons for those arguments, is 
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the construct ion of a context which makes relevant Mandy’s  blaming of 
Kevin. 
 
T1 ut ilises the identity posit ions of patient and carer to absolve both of 
responsibility for their arguments, laying the blame on the stress of illness. 
The consequence of her formulat ion is that it  resolves the immediate 
conflict at  t he expense of furt her explorat ion of t he problem . The 
sequence shows the negotiat ion, and part icularly T1’s influence upon the 
negotiat ion, not only of what kinds of problems are relevant to talk about 
but also what  kinds of t alking are accept able.  
Responses to blame and self-blame 
T1 responds to blame by selecting from Mandy’s complaints to highlight a 
circular pattern of interaction between Mandy and Kevin. Thus she locates 
the blame not in Mandy or in Kevin but in the interaction, a SIK 
fundamental to the systemic project. When this fails to interrupt an 
emergent pattern of blame and denial between Mandy and Kevin, T1 
intervenes to change the topic to ‘talking about talking’.  This interrupts the 
pattern of blame and denial and Mandy responds by changing her stance 
to one of self-blame. She posits a potential explanation for Kevin’s 
behaviour that it  is her fault  because she is ill. Where T1 has repeatedly 
intervened to divert or reframe blame talk, she receives self-blame talk (or 
confession) with invitat ions to expand, thus displaying a preference for 
confession over blame. Mandy’s confession invites co-operation from Kevin 
with a reciprocal confession that yes he does get stressed but as he wants 
to care for Mandy he doesn’t  mind. T1 chooses to emphasise the veracity 
of his account by drawing on material from their first  meeting as evidence 
and the conflict is ostensibly resolved. The findings of CA, that in mundane 
talk accusation projects denial and confession projects mit igation, are 
reflected in T1s actions. I  suggest the systemic SIK that therapists should 
interrupt blame talk and invite responsibility talk are located in an implicit  
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understanding of these interactional processes that are grounded in 
practical knowledge.   
Explaining or arguing 
In Part 2 of this chapter I  argue that Mandy reintroduces her goal, but in 
another guise, one that fits the emergent local rules of what kind of talking 
is reasonable here. She does this by fit t ing it  to the context of the 
immediately preceding conversat ion, the effect of childhood abuse and 
mental illness on her current behaviour. She introduces t he topic again 
from the posit ion of confession, thus linking it  with the closing of the 
sequence described in Part 1. In this case I show that T1 and Mandy 
become misaligned in their interactional projects. The dist inct ion between 
‘explaining’ and ‘explaining oneself’ is part icularly pert inent to the 
meaning of the subsequent interaction.  I  show that where Mandy can be 
understood to be reintroducing the topic of Kevin’s failure to sufficient ly 
account for his actions, T1 is interpret ing Mandy’s account as an 
explanation for how things are. T1 uses a range of systemic techniques, 
circular quest ioning, reframing and strategic quest ions, to mit igate 
Mandy’s self-blame by re-describing her claims as t he consequence of 
illness and abuse. However, as a result  she also places Mandy in the 
posit ion of an unreliable witness, unable to fully different iate bad 
behaviour from abuse. The more T1 mit igates Mandy’s claims, the more 
Mandy upgrades her culpability. T1 is misaligned with Mandy and seems to 
be replicating the posit ion which Mandy complains Kevin repeatedly 
takes. T1 fails to hold Mandy to account for her actions, and, for a 
moment, Kevin has the opportunity to watch this interaction unfold before 
him. 
Team work 
The other part icipant in this interaction, largely silent throughout these 
selections, T2, is also watching. Her observation is an important one that 
helps to create a relevant context for Mandy’s outcry a few turns on.  Her 
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formulat ion, that Mandy is seeking a reaction from Kevin, is validated by 
Mandy’s st rong agreement, but t he nat ure of that agreement, that she 
wants Kevin to beat her, presents the therapists with a further dilemma, do 
they accept this claim, invest igate it , ignore it , divert it  or challenge it? 
Failure to challenge such a claim might be heard as a tacit  acceptance 
of it . T1 chooses to challenge it . As a result , T2’s project of highlight ing the 
interactional process issues between Mandy and Kevin is diverted and the 
misalignment between Mandy and T1 continues. However, T2’s 
observation perhaps provides the context for Mandy’s subsequent 
interruption, ‘I  wish he would speak’ which, bot h puts her goal explicit ly 
back on the table and serves to mark T1’s interactional project as 
irrelevant.  The ensuing accusation/denial pattern between Mandy and 
Kevin is again interrupted by T1 with ‘talking about talking’. It  is following 
this that Kevin shares his dilemma; he does agree with Mandy that her 
behaviour feels abusive, he does lose his temper with her, but how can he 
just ify his complaints against her when she has had such a brutal 
childhood? This account seems sufficient to Mandy, T1 and T2 and 
interrupts the redundant pattern of pursuit  and withdrawal. 
The therapeutic dance 
I f we were to dist il the interaction st ill further, a step by step pattern seems 
to emerge, a movement between part ies of alignment and misalignment 
as different interactional projects are pursued and responded to. T1 first  
aligns with Mandy and sustains explorat ion of the problem against 
resistance from Kevin. Problem explorat ion invites blame. T1 quickly 
intervenes with a range of mit igating and exonerating practices. If these 
fail and conflict seems immanent she evokes her authority as a therapist  by 
explicit ly, if delicately, sett ing rules about ‘how we should talk’ that 
proscribes blame and conflict.  Mit igation seems to align closer with Kevin’s 
interactional project, of avoiding problem talk, but also leads to premature 
resolut ion of the problem.  
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When Mandy re-introduces the topic, the alignment displayed between 
Mandy and T1 as they co-construct a blameless identity for Mandy 
diverges as their different interactional projects develop. Where T1 is 
orient ing to explanation, Mandy orients to claim backing and an argument 
ensues between T1 and Mandy. The more T1 mit igates, the more Mandy 
upgrades her culpability. Kevin becomes a witness to this argument, which 
mirrors that between Mandy and him. T2’s observation of the process 
temporarily interrupts the escalat ing pattern and aligns with Mandy. 
However she concedes the floor back to T1 to challenge a further 
upgrade of Mandy’s argument. Finally Mandy’s outcry, ‘I  wish he would 
speak’ t ies back to T2’s observation of the process, releases T1 and Mandy 
from a redundant argument and returns Kevin to the field.  The established 
pattern of accusation and denial resumes and T1 again interrupts by 
‘talking about talking’. This finally creates a context for Kevin to concede 
and offer a resolut ion.  
 
I  suggest that it  is these step-by-step moves, explorat ion leading to 
heightened emotion, followed by mit igation and softening of emotion, 
followed by further explorat ion and so on, that enables Mandy and Kevin 
to interrupt their usual pattern sufficient ly to move to a different solut ion 
(albeit , like most solut ions, temporary). Furthermore, it  is the ability of the 
therapist  to take a different stance, to misalign with at least one party, 
which enables explorat ion of different versions of events to occur, and the 
ability to repair that misalignment, repair the therapeutic alliance, get  
back in step, that enables the conversat ion to continue.  What all the 
above sequences demonstrate is the complexity of the practices involved 
in such an endeavour. 
 
Essentially, if the therapist  didn’t  mit igate, the conflict might become so 
intense no resolut ion could be reached. If the therapist  didn’t  pursue 
explorat ion of the problems despit e resistance, the part icipants would 
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remain stuck in redundant patterns. It  is in the careful management of the 
tension between the two that resolut ion occurs. 
 
In the following Chapter I  will draw together the threads from the analysis 
of both therapies to consider their implications for practice. 
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Chapter 6 
Introduction  
This final chapter is concerned with the implications of the analysis for 
clinical practice and future research. My purpose in bringing together the 
disciplines of CA and Family Therapy has been to see how CA can help 
therapists to better understand the practical management of blame in 
family therapy. In the two preceding chapters I  have described an analysis 
of two explicit  blaming events in two family therapy sessions. I  t raced the 
history of the interactional t rouble for which each explicit  blaming event 
became an attempted solut ion in order to describe in detail the 
conversat ional st rategies which informed and drove the production of the 
blame. The main thrust of the analysis has been to examine how the 
therapists put their skills in the management of blame into practice and the 
consequences of those practices for the on-going interaction.  Blaming 
implications are demonstrably present in the talk of both the therapists and 
the family members. I  argue that implications of blame are not just an 
indication of interactional problems, but are also ut ilised as solut ions to 
interactional problems. In Therapy 2 for instance I have argued that the 
therapist ’s mit igation of blame led the conversat ion away from the 
problem Mandy was pursuing and Mandy’s explicit  blame of Kevin 
became a way of Mandy staking her claim for her agenda to be followed, 
with great success. In Therapy 1 a redundant interactional pattern was 
ended when the legit imacy of Janet ’s account  of the problem was 
challenged by the therapist ’s explicit  blame. Of course there are many 
and varied solut ions to such an impasse and this solut ion may not be one 
that you, or I , or indeed the therapist  himself believes is the best.  
 
The aim of the research has been to invest igate the following quest ions: 
 How do family therapists do ‘non-blaming’ in their rout ine practice?  
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 How do family therapists manage blame in the context of families 
affected by psychosis?  
 How do therapists manage the competing inst itut ional tasks of 
decreasing blame and increasing agency in their rout ine practice?  
 How do family therapists manage the tensions of negotiat ing 
conflict ing versions of events without allocating blame? 
 
The chapter is divided into three parts. In Part 1 the findings are discussed in 
4 sections, each section relat ing to one of the quest ions above. In Part 2 
the clinical implications of the study are considered. Part 3 concludes with 
a discussion of the study’s st rengths and limitat ions and recommendations 
for future research.   
 
Part 1 – A summary of the findings 
How do family therapists do ‘non-blaming’ in their routine 
practice?  
I  have suggested that unlike more formal inst itut ional sett ings, such as a GP 
consultat ion or a court room, in therapy there are no explicit  social norms 
for part icipants to know how they are expected to behave. Part icipants 
locally and collaboratively avoid certain forms of interaction and choose 
others within the bounds of cultural and inst itut ional expectations. For 
therapy to be more than just having a conversat ion, the conversat ion 
needs to achieve certain inst itut ional goals, minimally, some form of 
change that helps people to move on in their lives. Different types of 
therapy will have different theoret ical and practical knowledge which 
shapes those inst itut ional goals. For therapists the norms and practices 
described in textbooks and taught in their therapy training make up their 
Stocks of Interactional Knowledge (Peräkylä and Vehviläinen, 2003) which 
form the background to what kinds of conversat ions are deemed relevant. 
We understand what we are doing in terms of our theories. Other cultural 
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norms inform how families understand therapy and how therapists 
understand families. So although part icipants locally and collaboratively 
avoid certain forms of interaction and choose others, this is not done within 
a vacuum, inst itut ional and cultural expectations form the boundaries of 
what is possible. A common expectation would be that therapists make 
judgements according to professional expert ise rather than personal 
values. Within Family Therapy there exist  st rong inst itut ional norms that 
proscribe blame and these resonate with general cult ural expectations 
about the proper behaviour of therapists. I  have argued that a tension 
exists between the task of negotiat ing what a legit imate problem is (and 
by implication the legit imate goals of therapy) and the stance of 
impart iality, or being non-blaming. This is because in the process of 
agreeing a legit imate problem, certain causal explanations will be implied 
or inferred and these causal explanations will have implications for who is 
to blame and what needs to change. Change carries with it  both a 
potential implication of fault  and expectation of remedial action, what 
Hoffman (1995) calls the blame and change mind set. In both Therapy 1 
and 2 I have shown how part icipants negotiate these tensions in pursuit  of 
agreement about what problems are relevant to talk about, what 
explanations are deemed reasonable and how talk about these problems 
should be conducted. In pursuit  of these goals the following conversat ional 
practices emerge as recurrent patterns of interaction. 
The co-construction of a non- blaming therapy - therapists 
Constructing good intent 
The therapists display assumptions of good intent. In Therapy 1 for instance, 
T1 and T2 construct Janet ’s reasons for not going back as due to a 
misunderstanding about her needs. She is not to blame but others have 
given her the wrong task. In Therapy 2 T1 reconstructs Mandy’s descript ion 
of Kevin treating the children unfairly as due to stress, not to ill intent. This 
bias towards health rather than pathology, solut ion rather than problem, 
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could be seen as a CBA associated with family therapy within the broad 
systemic field. 
Treating blame as a delicate matter 
The therapists are highly attuned to the possibility of being seen as 
blaming. They predominantly show caution in making implications that can 
be heard as blaming. Utterances which contain t he pot ent ial for blame to 
be heard are overwhelmingly marked as dispreferred, thus displaying that 
blame is a ‘delicate matter’ (Silverman 1997). For instance T1 inoculates 
himself against Mandy inferring blame with this hesitant conversat ional 
move ( I-I dont  want  us t -t o kind of (.) I dont  want  you t o feel we’re t rying 
t o > get  at  you) (Therapy 1 line 139).  
Avoiding further exploration of contentious topics. 
When topics are raised which are potentially blaming the therapists 
frequently intervene to refocus the topic to a less contentious area. For 
example, in Therapy 1, when Steven discloses that Janet chose the work 
she is complaining about, T1 does not explore why she kept this information 
to herself, but instead shifts tack to explore what kind of work she would like 
to do. One possible reason for this might be that if he did follow this line of 
enquiry it  would highlight fault  on her part and possibly be received as 
blaming. However, by avoiding the topic of her agency, the quest ion 
remains unresolved.  
Reformulating linear explanations into circular ones. 
Therapy 2 in part icular shows the ut ilisat ion of a number of practices to 
reformulate linear, blaming explanations into explanations that privilege 
mutual influence and responsibility. This includes: 
 circular quest ions - ( is t here any kind of pat t ern t o how (1) frequent  
t hings can build up) Therapy 2 line 261  
 formulat ions - (SO HOW KEVin react s can t hen lead t o you t o react  in 
a part icular kind of way t oo ) Therapy 2 line 279  
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 reinterpretations - (but  what you’re expect ing from Kevin is almost  t o 
respo:nd back wit h physical abuse t o make you kind of bet t er (.) but  
act ually it  would be part  of what  would have been happening bef ore (1) 
of what  you’d expect  from people) Therapy 2 line 776.  
Interrupting and implicitly proscribing blaming interactions 
When the above practices fail to avert a pattern of accusation and denial 
between family members in Therapy 2, T1 explicit ly interrupts and redirects 
the topic to ‘talking about talking’. So explicit  blame prompts the therapist  
to init iate a conversat ion about what kind of talking is acceptable, with 
the implication that blame talk is not (Example 2 line 288 below) 
Suggestions disguised as questions 
In both therapies, therapists produce a stance of neutrality through the use 
of quest ions containing embedded suggest ions. For example, in Therapy 1 
T1’s embedded suggest ion that adjust ing one’s life is part of the process of 
gett ing better achieves the action of highlight ing Janet ’s responsibility to 
do something in the guise of an impart ial quest ion.  In Therapy 2 T1 sets up 
a contrast between Mandy’s experience of childhood abuse and her 
descript ion of her behaviour towards Kevin as abuse, with the clear 
implication that one does not equate with the other. T1 then asks Kevin if 
he experiences Mandy’s behaviour as abuse. Designing quest ions in this 
way greatly limits the range of relevant answers and thus enables the 
pursuit  of a part icular argument while preserving the appearance of 
neutrality for the quest ioner.  
The co-construction of a non-blaming therapy - Family members 
Blame between family members 
Therapists cannot construct a non-blaming therapy alone. Family members 
must display their hearing of an utterance as non-blaming for it  to be 
established as such. This analysis shows that how family members manage 
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blame differs according to whether they are responding to each other or 
to the therapists.  
Treating blame as a delicate matter 
Both families, init ially, also display a preference not to blame. For instance 
in Family 1 Steven delays his disclosure that Janet chose the task of 
cleaning. Steven thus offers several opportunit ies for Janet to take up the 
less culpable option of self-repair prior to his disclosure of the trouble 
source. Similarly in Therapy 2, Mandy init ially introduces Kevin’s st ress as the 
trouble she wishes to address, a trouble far less culpable than her later 
complaint that he treats the children unfairly. Family members in these 
sessions therefore also display that blame is a delicate matter. 
Building a case for blame 
In both therapies, family members appear to build their case for blame 
over several turns and sequences. In Therapy 2 I have argued that Mandy 
builds her case against Kevin step by step, beginning with self-blame (he is 
st ressed because of her behaviour), then blaming Kevin for not gett ing 
help (however he is reneging on his responsibility to manage his st ress), 
then sharing blame for the arguments that  ensue and finally blaming Kevin 
alone for t reating the children unfairly. It  is when Kevin repeatedly fails to 
take up her invitat ions for him to discuss with her the nature and cause of 
the problem, that the delicacy with which she displays blame diminishes. 
Similarly, in Therapy 1, Steven continues to offer possible mit igating 
explanations for Janet ’s decision not to go back to the charity shop. It  is 
when Janet repeatedly resists discussing these possible explanations that 
he blames her (Yes (1) she t ries it  once (.) if it ’s no good (.) never go back 
(2) […] But  I t hink it ’s a bit  more det erminat ion I t hink you need on your 
part ) (Therapy 1 line 533). Thus family members show a preference to avoid 
explicit  blame by their delay in using it  as a conversat ional procedure. The 
subtle implication of blame, in the guise of simply report ing facts, posit ions 
the blamer as a neutral reporter, with no stake or interest (Edwards and 
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Potter 1992). Building a case in this way then constructs explicit  blame as 
the just ifiable last resort of a reasonable person.  
Family member’s responses to blaming implications  
Displaying conflict 
The most common responses to implications of blame between family 
members are claims of irrelevance, denial and withdrawal.  
 
Example 1  -  Irrelevance, (Therapy 1) 
153 S =>to be fair Janet< we were in town last week weren’t we (.) we went into this  
154  foundation shop dint we (.) where you worked  n we see the woman behind  
155  the desk (.) and Janet she put her application form in and Jan said like  
156  she’ll come up and have a little taster day and she said y’know what d’you  
157  wanna in the shop, you can work the tills, do what you like n Jan said I’ll  
158  do a bit a cleaning she said [indecipherable] 
159 J  [well yeah, they give me a choice yeah but I found it boring [basically 
160 S           [theres  
161  other jobs to do there Janet in the shop besides cleaning 
162  J well I was bored, I do that every day [of the week 
 
Example 2  - Denial, (Therapy 2) 
283 M                       [cos sometimes like he’s like inappropriate in what 
284  he says (1) he can be really nasty to Alfie and he just wont accept it when I 
285  tell him 
286 K no it [indecipherable ] 
287 M          [its like the girls have a lot of leeway 
288 T1 .hhhh I’ve got a suggestion is that we ↑don’t try to get into too much detail (1) 
 
Example 3  - Withdrawal, (Therapy 1) 
504 T1 =I wonder what they would’ve given you= 
505 S =yeah= 
506 T1 =and I wonder what you’d be saying now. 
507 S That’s what I said (.) in a way John coming up in the car this afternoon (1) 
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508 T1 mmhm 
509 S didn’t I? 
510   (1)  
511 S in a way 
 
Where irrelevancy claims and denial occurs further accusation most 
frequently follows. In Example 1, following Janet ’s irrelevancy claim (line 
159) Steven upgrades his accusation (line 160).  In Example 2, Kevin’s 
denial (line 286) is followed by a further complaint by Mandy (line 287). In 
Example 3, the sequential implication of Steven’s rhetorical quest ion (line 
507) is that Janet has no right to complain about  a job she has chosen. 
Janet ’s silence (line 510) is a withdrawal from the topic which marks t rouble 
in how to move on in the conversat ion. 
 
All three forms of response display that the previous turn has been heard as 
blaming and that the recipient is either engaging in, or withdrawing from a 
disagreement. Thus part icipants display a stance of conflict. Where conflict 
occurs, therapists are generally prompted to action (Example 2, line 288) 
Displaying co-operation 
In contrast, responses to t herapist s’ utterances that contain implications of 
fault  are more varied. In Example 4, explicit  blame from T1 is received by 
Janet with marked agreement.  
 
Example 4  -  Agreement, (Therapy 1) 
519 T1 [and you have no one to blame but yourself really 
520 J                      [no, no, that’s ri↑ght.  
 
 I  have argued that this agreement, due to its sequential placement in a 
conflict sequence, presages opposit ion, but that opposit ion becomes 
manifest only in response to Steven’s turn (see below). While denial and 
disagreement occurs it  is more likely to be marked as dispreferred, and 
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withdrawal is less common. So even when therapists utterances can be 
heard as implying blame, family members are less likely to respond to them 
as an accusation. Therapists’ utterances then are most often responded to 
as if they are neutral observations regardless of implications of fault . 
 
Example 5  -  Disagreement, (Therapy 1 ) 
523 S bu- but ↑say you worked tomorrow >for a couple of days< and there  
524  was two women (.) there aswell (.) you’d feel more comfortable wouldn’t  
525  you 
526 T2 mmm, mm 
527 J But I’m not going back there really so that’s that (.) theres no good  
528  going on about ↑ i(h)t 
 
Example 6  - Irrelevance, (Therapy 2) 
788 T1 But its interesting what Jan was asking before isn’t it that you are expecting a  
789  different response from Kevin. 
790 M I ↑wish he would speak like I’m re(h)ally frustrated now cos he just  
791  wont speak .hh 
792 K      [indecipherable] 
793 M      [and I just really want him to speak I really .hh I don’t want him to  
794  spare my feelings I [want him to sit there and say right] 
795 K    [I’m not I’m not] I don’t like it at ↑all 
796 M .hhh this is this and that is that and I- I get cross with her cos of this or 
 
In each therapy I suggest that where there is a conflict between a family 
member’s version of events and the therapists’ version of events, the 
conflict with the therapists is expressed indirectly through conflict with the 
family member. In Example 5 line 527, Janet ’s complaint is said in direct 
response to Steven, although it  could be read as equally directed to T1 
and T2. Similarly, in Example 6 line 790, Mandy’s complaint is directed to 
Kevin, but its sequential placement serves to mark T1’s interactional project 
as irrelevant. I  suggest that one of the reasons for this is linked to Member 
Categories. In their selection of accounts members draw on shared 
 183 
understandings about the way a competent person should behave under 
given circumstances. Beyond the part icular inst itut ional norms of systemic 
therapy in prescribing impart iality, we also have wider cultural norms that 
inform how we interpret actions. The Member Category ‘therapist ’ brings 
with it  Category Bound Activit ies of neutrality which inform family members 
interpretat ion of the meaning of the therapists response. Of course, within 
that CBA are different versions of therapist , good or bad, part ial or 
impart ial, and therapists actions will be interpreted accordingly. However 
to imply that a therapist  is part ial would have far more serious social 
implications than to accuse a partner of part iality. Families co-operate in 
the construct ion of a non-blaming therapy by responding to therapists as if 
t hey hold a neut ral st ance even when their talk can be inferred as 
blaming. I  have argued that therapists display assumptions of good intent 
in family members. Here we can see family members displaying 
assumptions of good intent in therapists. This does not mean that the 
part ies believe the good intent displayed.  However I am claiming that co-
operation between the therapists and family members in the display of 
good intent enables the conversat ion to continue. 
The social function of treating blame as a delicate matter. 
CA shows that blame, of self or other, upsets the usual preference structure 
and disagreement is preferred. Once the preference structure is re-
organised in this way, disagreement becomes expected. Thus the 
sequence of blame and denial takes part icular effort  to disengage from. 
Concessions need to be marked as dispreferred for them to be understood 
as such (Antaki 1994). One explanation for this is that if someone has been 
maintaining a part icular argument, then to suddenly accede has 
implications for their moral standing. Inferences might be made regarding 
their character, such as being fickle or deliberately provocative. It  is 
expected that people will display hesitancy in making concessions in 
arguments to protect their moral standing as competent social actors. If in 
everyday conversat ion blame projects denial and conflict, displaying a 
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cautious approach to blame makes sense if arguments are to be avoided. 
If we assume that these families have agreed to therapy because they 
want to resolve difficult ies, then showing caution in apport ioning blame 
displays good will, and potentially ameliorates conflict.   
 
Another mundane concern in everyday conversat ion is what Potters and 
Edwards (1992) call managing stake. If we are seen to have an interest in 
the matter discussed then our portrayal of the facts will be more open to 
quest ion. Presenting facts as if one is impart ial is a conversat ional st rategy 
used to validate claims (Pomerantz, 1984). The inst itut ion of therapy carries 
with it  addit ional expectations of professional neutrality. Heritage (2002, p. 
1430), discussing the news interview, demonstrates how “interviewees 
collude in a fict ion that quest ioning is object ive”, despite the quest ions 
being slanted in different ways. Due to the ‘ideology of neutrality’ Heritage 
argues that part icipants are highly attuned to whether the quest ion is 
hearably neutral or assert ing a point of view. Thus, although news 
interviewers inevitably slant quest ions in different ways, they do so with 
displayed caution which rarely invites challenge from the interviewee. 
Where the norm is for news interviewers to promote arguments, the 
expectation is for therapists to resolve them. What part icipants in both 
contexts share is an interest in presenting ‘the facts’ as neutrally as possible 
in order to present as competent social actors. In both these therapies, 
part icipants display an orientat ion towards neutrality and avoidance of 
blame. Ambiguity serves to delicately test reactions to potentially blaming 
construct ions and avoid the conflict that explicit  blame usually projects. 
However, the more delicate the implication, the more ambiguous the 
meaning and misunderstanding can easily occur. Explicit  blame becomes 
relevant only where more implicit  st rategies have failed.  The posit ive 
aspect to ambiguity is the more ambiguous the recipient design, the less 
constrained are possible responses. The ‘not knowing’ approach of 
dialogical practice, prescribed as tentat ive in tone and manner (Anderson 
1997) therefore shows a sophist icated grasp of the interactional 
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opportunit ies doing ‘not knowing’ opens up.  It  enables the conversat ion to 
continue in a way not dominated by the speaker. Ambiguity does not 
mean an absence of moral implication, but those implications will be more 
subtle and open to interpretat ion and less likely to project opposit ion.  
How do family therapists manage blame in the context of families 
affected by psychosis?  
A further recurrent  feature of the management of blame in these sessions is 
the practical use of the Member Categories of Patient and Carer and 
associated Category Bound Activit ies. 
 
In Therapy 1, T1’s quest ion at the beginning of the transcript embeds a 
suggest ion that gett ing better involves an adjustment of what you do 
during the day. Janet ’s response essentially offers an account for why she 
hasn’t  made such an adjustment. The shared assumption that work is an 
activity that promotes recovery is bound to the category of patient and 
social knowledge regarding good patients (who try to get better) and bad 
patients (who don’t). T1 and T2’s interpretat ion of Janet ’s complaint as a 
request for help to return to work rests on normative assumptions that work 
is a means to recovery. Imagine for instance if Janet had said that she had 
decided to adjust her life by consult ing a local witch who had invited her 
to attend a magical healing ceremony daily, but Janet had decided she 
was worth more than that and she wasn’t  going back. How likely is it  that 
the therapists would have pursued this as a legit imate problem to solve 
without explorat ion of Janet ’s beliefs about magical ceremonies? Thus the 
analysis shows how wider inst itut ional norms about how patients achieve 
recovery permeate the session through the absence of quest ioning work 
as a legit imate means to recovery. In this case, not returning to work has 
implications of fault  because of Janet ’s category membership of patient. 
She can be just ified in not going back if the work does not meet the 
appropriate condit ions for recovery, and T1, T2 and Steven all work hard to 
find these condit ions, offering numerous alternative just ifiable reasons for 
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not going back. Thus they all show a preference to avoid blame. However, 
because Janet chose the work that she later rejects as unworthy of her, 
and she fails to co-operate with providing an explanation deemed 
sufficient to meet her obligations as a patient, she becomes culpable.  
 
Therapy 2 reveals the complexity of member categories in use t o achieve 
different actions at different t imes. T1 frequently ut ilises the member 
category of patient to absolve Mandy of culpability for unreasonable 
behaviour. Similarly she ut ilises the member category of carer to absolve 
Kevin of culpability for not standing up to Mandy’s unreasonable 
behaviour. However, by exonerating Mandy’s behaviour due to illness, she 
also undermines Mandy’s argument that Kevin should respond to her as a 
responsible adult . The crux of the argument between Kevin and Mandy 
rests on the complementary but competing obligations between husband 
and wife and patient and carer. Example 7 illustrates the complexity with 
which these competing categories are used to pursue part icular 
arguments at part icular t imes. 
 
Example 7 -  Member Categories in use (Therapy 2) 
721 M             [yeah] I’ll ↑be honest with you (.) I I really  
722  punish Kevin I do. yknow I’m absolutely sur↑prised he’s still with me to  
723  be honest with you.  I mean I-I suppose I abuse ↑Kevin. I’ve severely  
724  abused him. 
725 T1 mm 
726 M He’s always there to take the brunt of it when my schizo↑phrenias bad  
727  y’know? he’s the one who takes the brunt of it. 
728  (2)  
729 M sh- He (h) don(h)’t ↑say anything he always says I don’t care, I don’t care. 
730  (2) 
731 K [indecipherable] 
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Mandy’s incumbency of the category membership wife is implied in lines 
721 to 724 and t ied to her turn in 729 to imply Kevin’s culpability for not  
holding her to account for her abuse. However, she also exonerates herself 
from blame by evoking the member category ‘schizophrenic’ in line 726, 
thus implying her behaviour is outside her control. These disjunctive 
categories are put to flexible use to both blame and exonerate turn by 
turn.  Although T1 is drawing on the member category patient in order to 
mit igate blame, in this case, the category undermines rather than supports 
Mandy’s agency. T1’s reading of abuse as a CBA connected with the 
category patient, rather than wife, may have been influenced by cultural 
norms regarding gender. Had Kevin said he abuses Mandy, I  wonder if T1 
would have been less likely to move towards mit igating his claim rather 
than invest igating what he meant? In western cultures domest ic violence is 
more commonly seen to be the preserve of husbands towards wives.  
How do family therapists manage the competing institutional 
tasks of decreasing blame and increasing agency?   
Both therapists and families can be seen to draw on different member 
categories at different t imes to negotiate reasonable blame and 
reasonable agency. The rights and obligations associated with different 
categories are brought into play in pursuit  of part icular actions. These 
therapists overwhelmingly attribute posit ive events to the actions of the 
individuals concerned, and negative events to circumstances beyond the 
individual’s control. The member category patient is frequently used to 
imply such circumstances. The therapists then seem to privilege agency 
talk when talking about posit ive events in the past and present and when 
talking about a hypothetical future. The exception to this is when t he 
int eract ional rules wit hin t he session it self are cont est ed. So part ies are 
generally held responsible for the way they talk in the session. 
 
For example in Therapy 1 the therapists init ially attempt to exonerate Janet 
from potential blame through the assumption that circumstances beyond 
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her control are preventing her from returning to work. When Steven 
discloses Janet ’s responsibility for choosing the task she complains of, the 
therapists introduce a different topic, what job she would choose instead. 
Thus the therapists choose not to pursue the topic of her responsibility for 
this negative event. They do however highlight her personal agency in a 
hypothetical future by topicalising the type of job she would choose 
instead.  Her responsibility for failing to represent the world accurately is 
implicit ly marked, but not topicalised. It  is Janet ’s repet it ion of her 
complaint, implying that someone else was to blame for what was in effect 
her choice,  that prompts T1’s response ([…]you have no one t o blame but  
yourself really) line 519. Thus her dut ies and obligations as a competent 
and reliable conversat ionalist  are made relevant. 
 
In Therapy 2, T1 exonerates Mandy of blame for her behaviour by 
explaining it  as the consequence of her childhood abuse and mental 
illness, circumstances beyond her control.  Similarly she exonerates Kevin 
for his behaviour by locating it  in circumstances beyond his control, st ress 
due to Mandy’s illness. Agency is highlighted with regard to Kevin’s choice 
to care for Mandy and Mandy’s choice to cope different ly with the effects 
of her illness on her relat ionships. However, the consequence of posit ioning 
Mandy as ill and therefore not responsible for her actions is to call into 
quest ion Mandy’s capacity to represent the world accurately. For instance 
rather than being curious about why Mandy describes her behaviour 
towards Kevin as abuse, T1 implies that the descript ion itself is inaccurate. 
The cost of exoneration in this case is to undermine Mandy’s right as a wife 
to call her husband’s lack of response to account. I  have shown that an 
unintended consequence of this mit igation of blame through a denial of 
agency is that Mandy escalates the negative descript ions of her 
behaviour. The more T1 tries to persuade Mandy that she is not responsible, 
the more responsibility M claims. The result ing descript ions then are not 
simply a representation of Mandy’s view of the world but are designed to 
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persuade T1 t o her posit ion. It  is when Mandy blames Kevin explicit ly, that 
T1 brings Mandy to account for the way she is speaking in the session.  
Resistance as an expression of agency 
I  show that in both these sessions the therapists align init ially with Steven 
and Mandy, both of whom pursue problem topics. By their take up of these 
topics the therapists demonstrate them to be appropriate to the inst itut ion 
of therapy, and Kevin and Janet ’s minimal responses as wanting. Kevin 
and Janet are treated as passive part icipants that the therapists are 
actively attempting to engage. However if we were to view both Kevin 
and Janet ’s resistance to the topic as an expression of agency it  might 
make alternative strategies more relevant.  For example, in Therapy 1 
Janet ’s agency is expressed by,  
1) not going back.  
2) resistance to the quest ioning of her account  for not going back.  
 
However, she obscures her own agency by failing to disclose that the 
choice not to go back was hers, and subsequently failing to just ify that 
choice. An interest ing quest ion to ask is why it  made sense t o Janet  t o 
obscure her agency in t his case. I  suggest that the absence of quest ioning 
about the merits of work reveals a powerful social norm regarding its value. 
Janet ’s choice to not go back contravenes this norm, making ambiguity 
and closing the topic a solut ion to avoid censure. As soon as the therapists 
become aware of Janet ’s agency in this matter, they too close the topic, 
asking instead about what she would choose in the future. I  argue that one 
of the functions of this move is to avoid highlight ing her agency in relat ion 
t o a negat ive event  and instead highlight her agency in relat ion to a 
hypothetical posit ive outcome.  That it  is a negative event is not 
quest ioned, and as a result  the reasons for Janet ’s choice remain 
unquest ioned. Janet later says (I want  t o really do somet hin t hat ’s gonna 
(2) t hat I want to do) lines 725-726, which perhaps throws light on her act  of 
resist ance as the first  step in adjust ing her life as part of a process of gett ing 
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better. She has not yet formed an account of what she wants to do, but 
she knows what she doesn’t  want to do.  If the norm of employment 
becomes open to examination then the repertoire of possible 
interpretat ions of not going back becomes greater and a different 
t rajectory for the conversat ion is opened up. 
Differentiating explanation from argument 
In both therapies I suggest that Janet and Mandy are presenting their 
accounts from the stance of explanat ion as claim backing and the 
therapists respond as if they speaking from a stance of explanat ion as 
answer. The key difference depends on “t he assumed agreement  on, or 
quarrel about , t he st at e of affairs being explained” (Antaki and Leudar, 
1992, p.186, italics in original).  In each case explicit  blame seems to occur 
where the therapists and part icipants are misaligned in this respect over a 
series of t urns. In Mandy’s case, T1’s mit igation of Mandy’s self-blame invites 
Mandy to elaborate her descript ions of being abusive in order to further 
her argument. In Janet ’s case, the therapists problem solving stance leads 
to Janet ’s withdrawal, and the more they problem solve the more Janet 
withdraws. The therapists, whether intent ionally or not, became embroiled 
in an argument each of which are ended following a blaming event.  
How do family therapists manage the tensions of negotiating 
conflicting versions of events without allocating blame?  
I  have shown that in these two sessions, family members have init ially 
presented conflict ing versions of events delicately, displaying a preference 
to avoid blame. However, as disagreement continues then the complaints 
are upgraded and blame is implied. I  have argued that family members 
display two main responses to blame, denial or withdrawal. Both create 
problems with how to go on.  Denial is one way to co-operate with an on-
going interaction, but the structural propert ies of conflict lead to 
redundant patterns of accusation and denial militat ing against problem 
resolut ion. Withdrawal from the argument avoids the often heated and 
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emotional exchange associated with conflict but is equally ineffective in 
promoting change and resolut ion of the problem.  
 
In each therapy, the therapists have ut ilised a range of conversat ional 
practices (described in the sections above) in order to pursue their goals. 
However, the consequences of their actions are unpredictable. Their 
problem is how to manage the tension of keeping the conversat ion going. 
The pursuit  of problem resolut ion risks being heard as blaming while the 
interruption of blaming talk risks premature resolut ion of the problem and 
the maintenance of the status quo. 
The co-construction of legitimate problems and goals 
In each therapy I have shown that family members present different 
versions of events and these different versions influence, and are 
influenced by their goals. By ‘goal’ I  am not merely referring to the 
intent ions a person may bring with them into the session.  Part icipants may 
come to therapy hoping for a part icular outcome. For instance, in Therapy 
1, in response to T1’s quest ion about their hopes for therapy, Steven clearly 
states that a good outcome for him would be if Janet returned to work in 
the charity shop. While Steven’s goal is to get Janet to return to work, 
Janet ’s goal appears to be t he resist ance of his project. 
 
In Therapy 2, Mandy’s stated goal is to talk about relat ional problems. 
Kevin’s goal appears to be the resistance of Mandy’s project. Both sets of 
therapists are faced with a similar dilemma; Kevin and Janet wish to 
terminate a topic while Mandy and Steven wish to pursue it . In each case 
the therapists must make a judgement about whether the topic in quest ion 
is relevant to their goals as therapists and how to manage the diverging 
goals of each couple.  
 
There are also more implicit  goals that shift  and change in relat ionship to 
one another as the conversat ion unfolds. These are linked to the design of 
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part icular utterances and sequences of utterances that pursue a part icular 
action. For instance, in Therapy 1 I suggest that Janet ’s goal in presenting 
her story about the shop in response to T1’s quest ion is to persuade the 
therapists, and Steven, that she has good reason not to return there. I  show 
that her account was forged part ly in response to T1’s quest ion but also in 
response to an argument between Janet and Steven that preceded the 
therapy session. So while T1’s interactional project is to problem solve, 
Janet ’s interactional project is to persuade. Throughout Chapters Four and 
Five I have referred to these types of goals as ‘interactional projects’, 
following Schegloff (2006). The concept of stance (Du Bois, 2007; Du Bois 
and Karkkainen, 2012) adds another dimension to our understanding of 
how part icipants negotiate what it  is reasonable to talk about:   
 
Stance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically through 
overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, 
posit ioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects, 
with respect to any salient dimension of the sociocultural field. (Du 
Bois, 2007, p.163).  
 
An important element of the concept of stance is that of affect and 
emotion. In CA, people are seen to have a range of affective displays 
open to them from which they can draw to achieve interactional tasks. 
The term alignment is generally associated with the display of semantic 
convergence where affiliat ion is concerned with the display of affective or 
emotional concerns (Du Bois 2012). The concept of stance weaves the two 
together. Evaluations and affective displays go hand in hand. For example 
a smile as the wrapping paper falls away displays a different evaluation of 
the gift  revealed than that of a frown. Stance leads to a more dynamic 
understanding of alignment, not as a dichotomous ‘for or against ’, but as: 
 
…a subtly nuanced domain of social action, in which speakers 
negotiate along a continuous scale the precise nature of the relat ion 
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between their presently realised stance and a prior stance, whether 
overt ly expressed or left implicit  by another. (Du Bois, 2012, p. 440) 
 
In this data set, displays of heightened emotion are evident, especially 
where conflict sequences occur. It  is these sequences that most frequently 
prompt therapist  intervention.  Part icipants can be seen to negotiate 
legit imate goals through a process of evaluating their own posit ion in 
relat ion to their perception of the other’s stance towards them in an on-
going conversat ion.   
 
In both therapies the therapists take up the problematic topics and pursue 
them as relevant despite resistance. In each case then talking about a 
problem is privileged over the avoidance of problem topics. However, in 
both therapies the therapists display sensit ivity to the differing stances of 
the part icipants, sometimes aligning with one party, not ing resistance or 
heightened emotional affect from the other and recalibrat ing their stance 
in response. We can see the therapists offering, or attempting to elicit , 
alternative explanations for events in order to move part icipants away 
from more polarised posit ions. 
 
For example, in Therapy 1 T1’s quest ion (So have you adjust ed what  you 
d:o during t he da:y […]as part  of t his (.) process of get t ing bet t er?) (line 
111),  is designed with the goal of invit ing a descript ion of Janet ’s agency 
in her own recovery, a rout ine systemic practice. Janet ’s account for not 
going back to the shop is heard as a descript ion of t he world and Janet is 
posit ioned as a help seeker. Thus the therapist ’s init ial stance within the 
unfolding conversat ion is one of joining Janet in problem solving. The 
therapists overarching goal could be read as enhancing Janet ’s agency 
by helping her to think about ways to achieve her assumed goal of 
working in the shop. Janet ’s init ial stance however appears to be making 
an argument  for not going back and posit ioning the therapists as potential 
allies in her argument with Steven. Steven’s stance mirrors Janet ’s. He too is 
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making an argument and he does this by implying that Janet ’s account  is 
wanting. The therapists’ stance of problem solving and Steven’s stance of 
challenging Janet ’s account appear to be aligned. However they each 
quest ion her account from separate posit ions, each of which have 
different consequences for Janet ’s identity. In response, Janet shifts her 
stance towards the therapists. Rather than allies in her endeavour they 
appear to be more closely aligned with Steven in persuading her to return 
to the shop.  In response her next interactional project is to terminate the 
topic. By doing so she can be seen to be withdrawing from an argument 
with Steven and signalling that T1 and T2’s quest ions are irrelevant. T1 
notices this apparent misalignment and he remarks on it  ( I don’t  want  you 
t o feel we’re t rying t o >get  at  you or anyt hing like t hat ) (Therapy 1, line 
139). Thus, on a turn by turn basis, we can see T1 pursuing the resisted topic 
while displaying a sensit ivity to Janet ’s posit ion and the possibility of blame.  
 
Similarly, in Therapy 2, T1 pursues a topic introduced by Mandy which is 
resisted by Kevin. Rather than allow Kevin to avoid the topic of relat ional 
difficult ies T1 embeds non-blaming causal explanations for those difficult ies 
within her quest ions (Cos yknow I t hink you were t ouching on t here Kevin 
t hat  t hat  you y-you kinda like (.) want ing […] t o help Mandy) (Therapy 2, 
lines 323-326). Thus both therapists show that the discussion of problems is a 
legit imate goal of therapy, while the avoidance of talking about problems 
is not.  
The co-construction of legitimate talk. 
These therapists both show that problems are a legit imate topic of 
conversat ion. However, therapists also showed that how people talked 
about problems was a matter of concern. All part icipants show caution in 
apport ioning blame. More explicit  blaming explanations are displayed as 
dispreferred by therapists.  For example by reframing to a circular 
explanation (SO HOW KEVin react s can t hen lead t o you t o react  [..] in a 
part icular kind of way t oo Mandy) (Therapy 2,  line 279-282) or directly 
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commenting on how talk should be conducted ( I’ve got  a suggest ion is 
t hat  we ↑don’t  t ry t o get  int o t oo much det ail) (Therapy 2, line 288).  
 
Sometimes causal explanations for negative events are made relevant, for 
instance in response to Janet ’s ‘unhappy incident report ’ which prompts 
the therapists to locate the cause of the problem in order to solve it . When 
negative events in the past are talked about, responsibility talk is generally 
avoided, or mit igating explanations are preferred. For instance, in response 
to Janet ’s implication that the charity shop had been responsible for giving 
her a job unworthy of her T2 suggests (do you t hink it  was somet hing t o do 
with it  jus- t he first  day, t hat  t hey t hought  t hey’d kinda give you somet hing 
easy t o do t he first  day) Therapy 1 lines 129-130.  
 
The exception to this is when the interactional rules of the session itself are 
transgressed. I  have argued that T1’s utterance (and you have no one t o 
blame but  yourself really) (Therapy 1 line 519) was prompted by Janet ’s 
repetit ion of an explanation that had already been judged as irrelevant  t o 
t he t ask in hand in t his conversat ion. In this way he makes explicit  Janet ’s 
contravention of a mundane interactional rule, that she withheld 
information pert inent to the proper interpretat ion of events.  
 
In Therapy 2, T1 also holds Mandy responsible for the way she talks, but in a 
less explicit  manner than the example above.  She does this by interrupting 
Mandy when her blaming of Kevin becomes more extreme by making 
explicit  acceptable ways of talking. For instance ( I’ve got  a suggest ion is 
t hat we ↑don’t  t ry t o get  int o t oo much det ail) (line 288) and ([…] if we ↑all 
t alked at  t he same t ime (.) none of us would hear what  t he ot (h)her 
pe(h)rson was saying[…]) (lines 807-808).  Through sequential analysis I  have 
argued that the meaning of this in context is that T1 is proscribing 1) 
blaming details and 2) conflict talk.   
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In both therapies then, family members are held responsible for the way 
they talk in the session. 
Summary  
I  argue that the disciplines of CA and MCA reveal the strategies used by 
part icipants in both therapies to negotiate blame delicately, and to 
collaborate on the production of a non-blaming, impart ial therapy. 
Therapists can be seen to put mundane conversat ional practices into 
action in pursuit  of inst itut ional goals including:  
 Construct ing good intent  
 Treating blame as a delicate matter 
 Avoiding further explorat ion of contentious topics 
 Reformulat ing linear explanations into circular ones 
 Interrupting and implicit ly proscribing blaming interactions 
 Embedded suggest ions  
 
When negative events in the past are talked about, responsibility talk is 
generally avoided, or mit igating explanations are preferred. Personal 
agency is generally highlighted when talking about posit ive events or 
hypothetical future events. 
 
Family member’s responses to blaming implications differ depending on 
whether the implication is made by a family member or a therapist .  Family 
members blaming implications are generally t reated as part ial, therapists 
implications as impart ial. However, in both therapies, sequential analysis 
reveals implications of t herapist  part iality embedded within responses to 
family members. In other words, where the therapist  and family seem 
aligned in their interactional projects, resistance to that project is more 
explicit ly art iculated towards another family member rather than the 
therapist . However, because of the presumed alignment between the 
therapists and family member’s stance, the therapist  is also implicated.  
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Families and therapists t reat blame as a delicate matter. The case for 
blame is built  over t ime. It  is when the ambiguity with which delicacy is 
performed leads to a misalignment of interactional projects that explicit  
blame becomes a relevant solut ion. I  highlight the misalignment between 
the stance of explanation as claim backing and explanation as answer as 
an important factor in the production of explicit  blame. 
 
A further recurrent feature of the management of blame in these sessions is 
the practical use of the Member Categories of Patient and Carer and 
associated Category Bound Activit ies to mit igate blame. This may show 
the influence of Family Management theories on these therapists practice. 
Further research would be necessary to determine if this is common 
practice for systemic practit ioners who do not overt ly integrate FM theories 
into their practice.   
 
I  have shown that both sets of therapists prefer the discussion of problems 
over the avoidance of talking about problems. I  suggest that therapists 
select topics recognisable as the proper subject of family therapy to 
pursue, despite resistance. In both therapies I show that resistance to the 
topic signals a misalignment of interactional projects, and that therefore 
being alert  to markers of resistance is important to repair 
misunderstandings and misalignments.  
 
In Part 2 I  will elaborate the implications of these findings for systemic 
practice.  
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Part 2  
Implications for clinical practice  
Tolerating blame to increase understanding 
As a therapist  I  am left wondering what might drive those misalignments 
between therapist  and family members described above.  I  suggest that 
the broad injunction to be non-blaming may militate against therapists’ 
considerat ion of the many subtlet ies and functions of blame. If we think of 
blame as having an important social function then it  opens up the 
quest ion of what kinds of blame are deemed reasonable or not in any 
therapeutic encounter. By framing the quest ion in this way it  can help the 
therapist  to think about the moment to moment evaluations they are 
making, the stance they are taking and their power to shape clients 
narrat ives. An unintended consequence of the injunction to be non-
blaming might be the premature closing down of topics. Frosh (2013, p. 21) 
warns against “t rying to be too ameliorat ive, too helpful, even, perhaps, 
too t herapeut ic in one’s approach.” By this he means moving too quickly 
towards offering an ameliorat ing narrat ive at the expense of staying with 
the distress and pain one might see. He suggests there is a tension 
between the former, what he calls the therapeutic (and what I will call 
ameliorat ive) and the latter, the analyt ic, or deconstruct ive. In both the 
therapies in this data set, it  appears that essentially ameliorat ive aims lead 
to misalignment.  
 
In Therapy 1, the aim is to move towards the resolut ion of a problem. In 
Therapy 2 the aim is to soften the emotional consequences of blame, self 
or other. T1’s reaction to Mandy’s claim that she abuses Kevin was 
constructed in the context of Mandy’s descript ion of her own appalling 
childhood abuse, and her motive is to produce an ameliorat iv e narrat ive. 
However, the outcome is to miss Mandy’s point. Mandy is claiming 
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responsibility for her actions, for a reason. By doing so she claims her 
posit ion (for the moment) as a wife (albeit  an abusive wife) and not, as a 
patient. She is seeking Kevin’s response as a husband not as a carer. These 
identity posit ions are laden with negative emotions and moral implications, 
but ameliorat ion moves away from resolut ion. In some ways it  mirrors the 
very thing Mandy complains of in Kevin, responding to her as someone not 
responsible for their actions. In this sense it  moves away from a proper 
understanding of the problem.  
 
Stancombe and White (2005) and Stratton (2003a) call for therapists to be 
more explicit  about their moral posit ions in therapy.  This study poses the 
quest ion of whether injunctions to avoid blame may influence systemic 
therapists to privilege the ameliorat ive over the deconstruct ive posit ions, 
perhaps moving quickly to solve problems or avoid blame at the expense 
of understanding. This is not a simplist ic call in support of allowing blame to 
go unchecked. I have shown that we have a wealth of clinical research 
into the negative effect of crit ical and host ile atmospheres in families. CA 
also has a wealth of empirical evidence that upholds the pragmatic 
import of interrupting blaming sequences. When blame is allowed to 
continue unabated, disagreement is preferred and unproductive conflict 
or withdrawal is predictable. In Therapy 2, as will be revealed in the Coda, 
arguments have led to physical violence. It  is therefore important that 
families feel they can trust the therapist  to manage the sessions in a way 
that maintains emotional and physical safety. However, I  am interested in 
how systemic therapists find t he balance between the ameliorat ive and 
deconstruct ive. This data set shows how the move towards premature 
resolut ion of the problem invites more blame. Blame in this sense then acts 
as a check to the therapists’ ameliorat ive moves and invites them back 
towards the deconstruct ive. If we think of blame as co-constructed then it  
opens up the quest ion of the function of t his blaming statement now. In an 
attempt to ameliorate emotionally painful topics and avoid conflict, 
therapists might be driven towards solut ions too quickly.  Perhaps tolerat ing 
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a lit t le blame enables the therapist  to understand the family members 
experience more fully. 
Repair and the therapeutic relationship 
Increasing interest in the role of common factors in family therapy (Sprenkel 
and Blow, 2004; Sprenkle, Davis and Lebow, 2009) has st imulated research 
into the associat ion between therapeutic alliance and change within the 
field. Most of the research on therapeutic alliance is focussed on individual 
therapy sett ings drawing on Bordin’s (1979) concept of three key elements,  
 bonds – relat ing to qualit ies of t rust and attachment between client 
and therapist   
 goals – relat ing to shared goals 
 tasks – relat ing to compatibility regarding the major activit ies 
involved in therapy 
 
There is robust evidence that the quality of the therapeutic relat ionship 
predicts therapeutic change over a range of different therapy models 
(Horvarth and Bedi, 2002; Horvarth and Symonds, 1991). An important 
strand in the literature for this study is an interest in how therapists deal with 
ruptures in the therapeutic alliance. In individual psychotherapy, Safran 
and Muran (2006) describe a rupture as a negative shift  in the relat ionship 
which can vary from momentary miscommunications to major difficult ies 
and impasses that lead to drop out.  Ruptures in t he alliance are seen as a 
possible threat to good outcome if not attended to, but if attended to 
effectively, offer an opportunity for greater learning and change.  In a 
study of couple therapy for depression, Kuhlman et  al. (2013) found that a 
good therapeutic alliance rat ing in one session was correlated to 
increased client well-being in the following session. They suggest that a 
reciprocal relat ionship between alliance and well-being exists, with greater 
subjective well-being predict ing a good alliance and a good alliance 
predict ing greater subjective well-being in a virtuous circle. This suggests 
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that if therapists can notice and attend to ruptures in the alliance wit hin 
t he session, then better outcomes may be predicted. 
 
In family therapy the concept of the therapeutic alliance is complex. The 
therapist  has more than one person to make an alliance with, often with 
different levels of motivat ion and high levels of conflict. Furthermore, the 
nature of the alliance bet ween family members is also seen to affect 
outcome (Friedlander et  al., 2006, Horvarth and Symonds, 2004). Glebova 
et  al. (2011) found the greater the rift  in the family alliance prior to therapy, 
the greater the drop-out rate. Escudero et  al. (2008) found that both a 
shared sense of purpose within the family and a sense of safety regarding 
talking in the family were central to good outcome. This supports the 
importance of therapists’ attent ion to the negotiat ion of shared goals and 
to managing blame from the outset.   
 
I f we consider the tension between what Frosh terms the therapeutic 
(ameliorat ive) and the deconstruct ive posit ions in terms of rupture and 
repair of the therapeutic relat ionship, tolerat ing blame might enable a 
fuller understanding of the difficult ies but threaten a rupture in t he alliance, 
either in the therapy/family system or in the family system itself.  Similarly 
prematurely moving toward the ameliorat ive posit ion might threaten the 
negotiat ion of shared purpose or goals. In family therapy, with mult iple 
alliances to attend to, ruptures in alliances are inevitable. What is most 
important is how these ruptures are managed and repaired. CA provides 
us with an established corpus of data from which we can learn about the 
markers and mechanisms of misalignments. This can help us t o attend to 
ruptures in both the family alliances and the therapeutic alliance, to 
promote learning and change rather than impasse or drop out. 
The concepts of explaining versus arguing 
This study shows that blaming statements are not simply descript ions of 
events or value judgements, but can perform a range of actions, including 
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arguing a posit ion and interrupting a redundant interactional pattern. I  
have argued that an unacknowledged misalignment between 
part icipants has contributed to an increase of blame. In both examples 
therapists respond to an argument as if it  is an explanation, while their 
contribut ions are responded to as if they are arguing a posit ion. There are 
no easily definable rules for different iat ing between explaining and arguing 
in situ. The different iat ion depends on whether the explanation is heard as 
contentious or not. In therapy, it  is likely that differing interpretat ions of 
events have brought families to therapy in the first  place. However, even in 
the most disputatious of families, the assumed agreement, or not, about 
the state of affairs being explained will differ according topic.  A person 
describing an event from an explanatory stance may be more open to 
considering alternative versions of events (such as the mit igating and 
problem solving strategies followed by the therapists in this data set) than a 
person describing an event from a stance of argument. If this were the 
case therapists would be advised to pay close attent ion to feedback 
regarding the stance and interactional aims of the blamer and adjust their 
responses accordingly. Similarly, given that family members will more 
readily display conflict towards other family members while treat ing 
therapists turns as impart ial, therapists would do well to consider whether a 
rupture in the alliance between family members might also display a 
potential rupture in the alliance with the therapist . Where the therapist  
might be understood to be more closely aligned with the stance of a 
part icular family member then, a complaint directed to that family 
member may contain an embedded complaint against the therapist  
themselves. 
 
I  do not wish to imply that therapists can analyse every conversat ional 
move for their performative force whilst  at the same t ime responding 
spontaneously in the therapy session. In the to and fro of conversat ion 
these practices are the invisible machinery by which we make meaning 
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and not readily open to scrut iny. Neither do I wish to imply a simplist ic 
division between the acts of explaining versus arguing. However I do 
believe that the concept  of explaining versus arguing is a useful one for the 
therapist  to hold in mind. The concept of preference structures and how 
argument projects disagreement is also helpful to keep in mind when 
caught in a ‘yes but ’ conversat ion. By attuning our listening ear to moves 
of resistance for instance it  may help us to remember that language both 
const ruct s reality as well as describes it . I f we bring to the foreground of our 
minds some of the tacit  rules by which we signal resistance to the 
performative action of a turn in talk, we can ask ourselves ‘why that now?’ 
What argument have we become embroiled in, intent ionally or 
unintentionally? This might help us to check more frequently and 
transparently what different people are trying to achieve at different t imes 
and help us consider our own stance. Do we want to ‘repair’, or do we 
want to stay with this misalignment for a part icular purpose?   
Implications for teaching and supervision 
Contemporary interest in dialogical theory and posit ioning draws our 
attent ion to the micro-processes of therapy and the construct ion of realit y 
through dialogue. Seikkula (2011) for example emphasises the ordinary and 
everyday aspects of interaction as the foundation of psychotherapy and 
suggests that our theories may at t imes get in the way of therapeutic 
practice. Perhaps it  is when our theories prevent us from listening to 
feedback that misalignments may occur.  
 
Conversat ion Analysis is a difficult  discipline to master, requiring familiarity 
with a large body of work. It  would be unrealist ic to expect trainee 
therapists to become competent conversat ion analysts. However, I  believe 
that the contribut ion of Conversat ion Analysis to the understanding of how 
every-day and inst itut ional conversat ional practices work is of enormous 
relevance to systemic therapists. We share an interest in how we do things 
with language. Conversat ion Analysis offers an established discipline that 
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illuminates the way in which we both create and respond to context 
through talk. Systemic therapy is founded on the principle that by 
influencing the context of meaning we can help families to overcome 
impasses and move on in their lives. It  seems to me that the systemic 
discipline has largely overlooked a research methodology that could 
make a great contribut ion to our understanding of therapy process. For 
example, we have a part icularly rich body of literature on different types of 
quest ioning which are designed to do part icular types of things. Circular 
quest ions, solut ion focussed quest ions, and externalising quest ions to name 
but a few. In much of the literature case studies showing the use of these 
quest ions are glossed, with t idied up transcripts which are easier to read 
and understand, but also edit  out the richness and messiness of ordinary 
therapy talk.  In Therapy 1 I showed that the quest ion T1 poses is designed 
to elicit  an alternative, solut ion focussed narrat ive, but Janet responds with 
a different goal in mind. Her resistance is signalled in numerous small 
details, which would be edited from a glossed account.   Detailed 
examination of real talk, how our quest ions are designed and how family 
members respond to them, could be of enormous benefit  in raising 
therapists awareness of the nuances of different quest ion design. For 
instance McMart in (2008) shows how trainees repeatedly recycled 
optimist ic quest ions regardless of their clients’ rejection of them. Where CA 
complements and supports systemic theory is in focusing our attent ion on 
feedback.   
 
Our discipline has always valued the taping of therapy sessions to aid 
reflect ion on our work. The part icular insights of CA could enhance 
reflexivity by raising students awareness of features of talk which signal 
emerging misalignments. Stokoe (2011, 2013) has implemented a teaching 
programme for family mediators where she demonstrates common 
interactional t roubles that occur, based on findings from a large corpus of 
data of family mediat ion session. She has found that the provision of 
t ranscripts alongside audio tapes enhances students understanding of the 
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importance of small, seemingly inconsequential hesitancies, pauses and 
overlaps which otherwise may go overlooked.  I  believe a similar 
programme for systemic therapists would greatly enhance therapists’ 
awareness of the way their interactions inevitably constrain family 
members’ possible responses and to be alert  to how family members co-
operate with or resist  those constraints.   
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Part 3  
The Strengths and Limitations of the Study   
This final part of the thesis concerns a crit ical analysis of how well the study 
achieves what I set out to do. I  begin with a brief summary of the rat ionale 
for a close analysis of a small number of therapy sessions and what it  has 
been possible to achieve, before highlight ing its limitat ions. I  go on to 
consider implications for future research.  
Does the method fit the questions? 
I  have argued that any negative event and causal attribut ion is potentially 
blaming, but that there is a difference between the crit ical quality of 
attributions of responsibility and attribut ions of blame. It  is when some moral 
failing is implied or inferred that the potentiality of blame is manifested. 
Some scholars have tried to operationalize these differences for research 
purposes and for example, confined the definit ion of blame to explicit  
attribut ions of fault  of a disposit ional or intent ional nature. However, I  have 
followed a model where the potentiality of blame is included in the 
analysis and subtle implications of blame can be attended to. My rat ionale 
is that it  is impossible to know, outside the immediate context, whether an 
utterance implies blame or mere responsibility. Similarly it  is impossible to 
anticipate whether an implication of responsibility will be taken up as 
blame by the recipient. This study shows how moral failing can be subtly 
implied and subtly defended against in ways that more rigid definit ions 
may overlook. Thus it  is through the examination of the delicacy with which 
blame can be implied and the subtlety with which it  can be defended 
against that the richness and complexity of the work that goes into 
construct ing a non-blaming therapy is described. The purpose of the study 
is to enrich our understanding of how this potentiality is made manifest or 
ameliorated in situ, and to think about the intended and unintended 
 207 
consequences of different actions, rather than to verify or counter exist ing 
theories. 
 
I  demonstrate that implications of blame, mit igation and exoneration were 
subtly evoked as part of the process of negotiat ing a legit imate topic for 
therapy which held consequences for the moral identity of the 
part icipants. Different goals have different implications for what or who 
needs to change which has the potential to evoke what Hoffman (1998, p. 
145) calls “the blame and change mind set ”.  I  show that in relat ionships 
that extend over t ime, blamings that happen in the therapy session can be 
seen as the closing of a sequence that occurred before the family entered 
the therapy room.  I  therefore show how these therapists join a system and 
influence the trajectory of sequences of blame that have opened prior to 
the meeting. What I have been part icularly interested in discovering is 
what interactional problems these blaming events are designed to solve. 
Although the specific ways these unfold are unique to the part icular 
part icipants in these two sessions, nevertheless I  believe we can 
legit imately speculate about common problems they may be addressing. 
This is because the part icipants share a common context which brings with 
it  mult i-layered normative expectations, both cultural and inst itutional. They 
are all engaged in a service encounter, where the therapists are delivering 
systemically informed therapy to families affected by psychosis.  
The exaggerating effects of micro-analysis 
Analysis of this type has inherent exaggeration effects (Stancombe and 
White, 1997). The painstaking analysis of recipient design can be read as if 
part icipants are consciously and deliberately planning moves in the 
moment. For example the analysis of Mandy’s use of the member 
categories patient and wife to construct an argument could be read as 
part icularly Machiavellian and disrespectful of Mandy’s experience. It  is 
important to understand that CA does not suggest any motivation or intent 
in the conversat ional st rategies people use. Instead it  is the very invisibility 
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of the rules by which we make sense of the social world which gives CA its 
methodological potency. It  is the part icipants’ agreement about the horror 
of Mandy’s real life experience of abuse and mental illness that gives 
credibility to the member categories in use. Also, the selection of segments 
for analysis was inevitably driven by my research quest ion. This can give the 
impression that the therapy sessions represented were filled with blame, 
argument and incipient conflict. In fact, these segments form a small part 
of four sessions rich with a variety of themes.  
Strengths and limitations of the sample size 
This study does not claim to add to the CA corpus of general patterns of 
interaction. In a study of this size the focus must be on the construct ion of a 
local moral order, rather than trying to make broader comparisons. 
However single case analysis sits in a strong tradit ion within CA since Sacks 
original lectures, where a general case is made by appeal to one 
exemplar case. Elliott  et  al. (1999) argue that the value of any scient ific 
method is in its ability to provide useful answers to the quest ions that 
motivated the research in the first  place. I  am claiming that this level of 
inclusivity, and CA’s part icular method of identifying phenomena, next -
turn-proof, has offered a useful way to answer the quest ion of how families 
and therapists manage blame together. 
Limitations in the use of audio recording 
Talk-in-interaction is just  one part of how we communicate. Gestures, eye 
movements, facial expressions and other embodied expressions are 
important in construct ing social meaning together. In a study of blame, 
where emotional expression is an important resource for communicating 
moral judgement, video recordings would have enhanced the analysis. 
However, I  wanted the recordings to be as naturalist ic as possible and as 
therapists usually visited families in their homes audio recordings were 
opted for.  
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Limitations in the consideration of the social GRRAACCES6 
One of the great strengths of systemic theorising has been its considerat ion 
of the polit ics of therapy and the influence of inequalit ies of power on the 
families we see. We have a strong tradit ion of crit iquing discourses of 
power, known within the field by the acronym of the GRRAACCES. The 
more crit ical forms of discourse analysis fit  these interests well and may 
account for their popularity with systemic practit ioners as research 
methods. Discourse analysis allows for the search for analyt ic categories 
that interest us as a start ing point of the analysis. In CA the start ing point of 
analysis is in part icipant orientat ion, next -turn-proof. The discussion 
concerning the construct ion of power in Therapy 17  is an example of how 
this start ing point influenced the analysis.   In Therapy 1, T1 is male and T2 
female. It  is T1, a man, who speaks most and who takes up the right to hold 
Janet to account. This raised the quest ion about social expectations of 
men and women and how this might affect the delicacy with which male 
and female therapists approach blame. I became interested in whether 
gendered power could be discerned in the orientat ion of part icipants to 
speaking rights. I  wondered if this could be demonstrated both in terms of 
frequency of turns but also turn shape. Are women therapists more 
‘delicate’ in their responses to blame and if so, could this be accounted for 
by ‘doing’ gender? In Therapy 2, where both therapists are female, the 
qualified therapist  also dominated the therapy and held Mandy to 
account for her actions. Although she does not use explicit  blame as T1 
does in Therapy 1, she does frequently interrupt Mandy, especially in the 
first  session (not shown in data set). Thus, this data shows part icipants 
orient ing to professional seniority where the orientat ion to gendered power 
remains a quest ion. It  does not mean that it  is not there, but this data set 
does not give sufficient evidence to show that for t he part icipant s it  was a 
relevant matter. Kitzinger (2000) argues that it  is the very invisibility of 
                                                 
6  
GRRAACCES is an acronym for Gender, Race, Religion, Age, Abilities, Culture, Class, Ethnicity 
and Sexual orientation. Burnham (1993) 
 
7
 see Chapter 4 page 115 
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gendered power to part icipants themselves that shows its pervasiveness. 
However to demonstrate that gender influenced these part icipants 
responses to blame different ly, further studies would need to show 
generalised patterns, something that this study cannot claim to do.  
How has CA contributed to further understanding of systemic SIKs? 
CA has a crit ical t ask in point ing out the simplified or empirically 
unsustainable assumptions of the SIKs. However, it  also has a 
complement ary t ask in providing more detailed or concrete 
descript ions of known practices and in showing new practices or 
functions. (Peräkylä and Vehviläinen, 2003, p.747) 
 
Our theories are founded on a sophist icated grasp of the complexity of 
communication and the impossibility of cont rolling how others will 
understand and respond to our actions. However, we have a strong body 
of theory and practical techniques upon which to draw to influence how 
our therapeutic moves might be taken up. Exactly how therapy is 
achieved however depends on responses to feedback.  In this study, CA 
complement s systemic theory by detailing how therapists are influenced 
by both theory and feedback.   
 
The strength of this study is in showing the development  of a piece of social 
action. The analysis shows the reality of the cut and thrust of a therapy 
session in real t ime, with real people thinking on their feet, t rying to 
communicate, or not communicate what they are thinking and feeling, 
t rying to persuade, trying to understand, avoid an argument, start  an 
argument, t rying not to offend, realising they’ve been misunderstood, 
making false starts, t rying again and so forth. I t  is, like all therapy and 
indeed all human communication, messy and unpredictable and full of 
mistakes and misunderstandings. CA and MCA show us the remarkable 
sophist ication of those practices we use to make sense of the world 
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together and, as family therapists, how we hone those practices in 
part icular ways to achieve part icular therapeutic goals. 
 
Through the discipline of sequential analysis part icipants are shown to 
subtly imply blame, mit igate and exonerate as part of the production of 
the local moral order in therapy. We can see the contest over moral 
identity played out. I  have taken two instances where part icipants are 
explicit ly orient ing to a blaming event and have shown how the meaning 
of events cannot be fully understood within the context of t he prior turn 
only. As we trace the origins of these sequences I show that they are the 
culmination of sequences that emerged earlier in the session. The explicit  
blaming events therefore can be understood as the closings of sequences 
that opened many turns before. My approach to this analysis then has 
been akin to the archaeology of a blaming event. Rather than examining 
many blaming events and the ground immediately surrounding them to 
identify general features, I  have painstakingly dug down to uncover the 
specific structures of these two events and how the turns that constructed 
them fit  together. What it  shows is the practices by which part icipants in 
family therapy sessions co-construct the way in which a blaming event 
unfolds. 
 
This analysis shows that  the systemic SIK of being non-blaming is grounded 
in a sophist icated understanding of the threat blame poses to co-
operation and agreement. The therapists in this study demonstrate that 
blame is seen as a prompt to action. In both therapies, the delicacy with 
which blame is t reated serves to enable the conversat ion to continue 
without withdrawal.  
Implications for future research 
Stancombe and White (1997) analyse a segment of t ranscript where 
indirect and ambiguous blaming is negotiated in a family therapy session. 
They pose the quest ion that this may be an extreme case, 
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“unrepresentative of normal talk in family therapy sessions.” This study 
shows further evidence of such talk. Further studies of blame in family 
therapy in different sett ings are necessary in order to build a body of 
generalizable findings. 
 
Further studies on the relat ionship between blame and the therapeutic 
alliance and/or therapy outcome are necessary. A recent randomised 
controlled trial into the effectiveness of family therapy in the treatment of 
young people who self-harm (Boston et  al., unpublished manuscript) may 
make this more practically possible. Robust measures will enable 
researchers to different iate families according to both outcome and 
therapy alliance measures. For example, families could be selected on the 
basis of good and poor therapeutic alliance rat ings and the management 
of blame compared. A part icular focus could be on how the 
management of blame is associated with misalignment and how these 
misalignments are repaired or not. Further research is necessary on the 
incidence of blaming events over t ime in families with good and poor 
outcome to establish if the ameliorat ion of blame is correlated with 
outcome. 
 
I  have shown that when blame of self or other is ‘doing’ claim backing, 
mit igation seems to invite an upgrading of the blame in order to produce 
further evidence for the argument. This poses the quest ion, if blaming 
statements are presented primarily from the stance of explanation, would 
mit igation be received into a more favourable context? Would it  be 
received as a possible alternative version of events rather than as a 
counter argument? This variable may have some bearing on the 
conflict ing research findings discussed in Chapter 2. Some studies show 
therapist  interventions lead to more blaming in the session and others 
indicate therapist  interventions lead to less. If this were the case therapists 
would be advised to pay close attent ion to feedback regarding the 
stance and interactional aims of the blamer and adjust  their responses 
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accordingly. Further research into how therapists not ice and respond to 
the stance of the blamer would be useful. 
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Coda 
As an experienced systemic psychotherapist  it  is impossible for me to view 
these transcripts as a naïve researcher. For instance, I  can see in the 
construct ion of many of the quest ions uttered by the therapists the legacy 
of our shared training. This has both posit ive and negative consequences. I  
may have an insider’s understanding which helps me to see the 
inst itut ional influences on the design of the therapists’ utterances. On the 
other hand I may ‘find’ those inst itut ional influences in the data where 
none exist  or other influences are more relevant.  One experience that 
really helped me to hold this bias in mind was a follow up interview held 
with one of the part icipant families. The original aim was to interview all 
part icipating family members; however I only succeeded in interviewing 
Family 2.  The aim was to find out whether families’ narrat ives about  the 
cause and explanations for problems had changed, and if so, whether 
they thought therapy had influenced those changes. 
 
The family had disengaged after two sessions and I wondered what had 
gone wrong. I  imagined the therapy had failed to meet their expectations 
in some way. Compared to my own practice, T1 had a fairly directive style, 
especially in the first  session (not shown). In that session T1 had often 
interrupted Mandy, divert ing her from problem talk in order to take a family 
history. In the second session, this was less pronounced but nevertheless T1 
frequently reframed or diverted Mandy’s complaints. I  wondered if Mandy 
had felt  shut down in some way or that the problems she wished to discuss 
were avoided.  
 
I  selected a couple of extracts from the recording of session 2 to play to 
the family (excerpts from Chapter 5 Part 1 and Part 3). However, despite 
my search for anything negative in their experience of therapy, both 
Mandy and Kevin maintained that not only had the therapy helped at the 
t ime but one year later it  continued to have a profound impact. What they 
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thought had changed was their capacity to communicate without 
frequent arguments and physical violence from Mandy towards Kevin. 
They thought the therapy had helped them to listen and understand one 
another better, and, importantly for Mandy, that Kevin had ‘found a 
voice’. They told me that they found the second session difficult  
emotionally. However, despite the emotional content they found the 
therapists style calming which enabled them to say things without arguing. 
The moment in Part 3 of therapy two, when Mandy wishes Kevin would 
speak and he responds was remembered by them as a significant 
moment. It  was not that they had said new things, but that they said things 
different ly. The consequence was that they thought they did not blame 
themselves or each other so much. Their reason for not continuing with the 
therapy was because they had so many other appointments they had to 
attend at the t ime, appointments that Kevin for the first  t ime was 
contribut ing to. In other words they did not withdraw because they had 
not  got what they wanted; they withdrew because they had got  enough 
of what they wanted. 
 
This interview challenged my preconceptions and helped me to look at 
both therapies anew. For instance, when I first  examined the transcripts of 
Therapy1, I  had been surprised by T1’s phrase ‘You have no-one to blame 
but yourself’. It  seemed to break the golden rule of being non-blaming and 
I wondered if it  may have influenced the family’s withdrawal.  The family 
did not wish to engage in a follow up interview and so we will never know 
their view. However, because the subjective experience of Family 2 had 
confounded my pre-conceptions I realised that my assumptions about 
Therapy 1 were equally quest ionable. This helped me to different iate 
between the two posit ions of therapist  and researcher a lit t le more clearly. 
It  also helped me to value the CA mantra of ‘Why that now? as a guiding 
principle, both in terms of the ‘human interaction engine’ of conversat ion 
as well as t rying to understand the inst itut ional aims of the therapists. In this 
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case I think the therapists interrupted Mandy and Kevin enough to listen to 
each other different ly and pursued topics enough for more information to 
be heard. This seems to have enabled Mandy and Kevin to adjust their 
stance towards one another and create different meanings.  
 
Conclusion 
I  introduced this study with a story about my motivation to undertake it . My 
desire to understand how we, as members of a wider culture where blame 
permeates every sector of life manage the discourses of ‘no blame’ in our 
part icular sub-culture of systemic psychotherapy. I  wanted to understand 
more about how systemic therapists deal with the practical moral 
dilemmas they face in day to day practice. Essentially, I  wanted to 
become a better therapist . During the process of the research my 
relat ionship with blame has changed. I feel more confident in my clinical 
decisions when faced with blame, more able to reflect on the process and 
less liable to be reactive. I  am more alert  to the subtlet ies of blame and its 
interactional consequences. I  do not claim to be analysing and planning 
every move in the cut and thrust of the session. The conversat ional 
st rategies I am responding to or using in the moment to moment 
interaction of the therapy remain largely beyond my conscious 
comprehension. However, I  am quicker to notice when certain generic 
forms of conversat ional practice occur. I  am alert  to ‘unhappy incident 
reports’ and the projected search for a culprit . I  am aware of shifts in 
preference structure from agreement to disagreement and more 
conscious about my decision making processes when this happens. I  may 
allow an argument to continue in order to try to understand the moral 
posit ions people take up, or I  may interrupt it  in order to cool things down 
and help the conversat ion to continue. I  am more alert  to the impact of 
irrelevancy claims and characterological blaming and aware that these 
predict withdrawal. I  will use these as cues t o deconstruct the values that 
underpin peoples strongly held posit ions. I  am part icularly alert  to the 
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preference shape of responses to my contribut ions. The t iny pause and 
downward inflect ion of a ‘yes’ in response to my quest ion is more likely to 
make me pause and reconsider the quality of agreement. I  often reflect 
on the interactional process in the session. When working in a team, in an 
observing posit ion, I  believe I listen with a more acute ear to the social 
action performed by a conversat ional st rat egy and think about what 
problem this is solving for the person. When working alone, or in front of the 
screen I am of course most ly responding intuit ively to what has been said 
or done and the emotions in the room. However CA offers another 
perspective for reflect ing on what happened after the event, an 
addit ional part of the knowledge and practice base upon which intuit ion 
rests. The discipline of CA enhances self-reflexivity. 
 
I  hope that this research will offer other family therapists alternative ways of 
thinking about their relat ionship to blame and how they manage blame in 
their practice. 
 
 
 
 
 218 
References  
Andersen, T. (1987) ‘The reflect ing team: dialogue and metadialogue in 
clinical work’, Family Process, 26 (4), pp.415-428. 
 
Anderson, H. (1997) Conversat ion, Language and Possibilit ies. A 
Postmodern Approach to Therapy. New York: Basic Books. 
 
Anderson, H. (2001) ‘Postmodern collaborative and person-centred 
therapies: what would Carl Rogers say?’  Journal of Family Therapy, 23 (4), 
pp. 339-360. 
 
Anderson, H., and Goolishian, H. (1988) ‘A View Of Human Systems As 
Linguist ic Systems: Some Preliminary And Evolving Ideas About The 
Implications For Clinical Theory’, Family Process, 27 (4), pp. 371-393. 
 
Anderson, H., and Goolishian, H. (1990) ‘Beyond cybernetics: Comments on 
Atkinson and Heath's "Further thoughts on second-order family therapy”’, 
Family Process, 29 (2), pp. 157-163. 
 
Anderson, H., and Goolishian, H. (1992) ‘The client is the expert: A not 
knowing approach to therapy’, in McNamee, S. and Gergen, K. (eds.) 
Therapy as Social Const ruct ion. London: Sage pp. 25-39. 
 
Antaki, C. (1994) Explaining and Arguing: The social organisat ion of 
account s. London: Sage. 
 
Antaki, C. (2008) ‘Formulat ions in psychotherapy’, in Peräkylä, A., Antaki, 
C., Vehviläinen, S., and Leudar, I . (eds.) Conversat ion Analysis and 
Psychot herapy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26-42. 
 
 
 219 
Antaki, C., and Horowitz, A. (2000) ‘Using identity ascript ion to disqualify a 
rival version of events as 'interested'’, Research on Language and Social 
Int eract ion, 33 (2), pp.155-177. 
 
Antaki, C., and Leudar, I . (1992) ‘Explaining in conversat ion. Towards an 
argument model’, European Journal of Social Psychology, 22 (2), pp. 181-
194. 
 
Antaki, C., Barnes, R. and Leudar, I . (2004) ‘Trouble in agreeing on a client 's 
problem in a cognit ive-behavioural therapy session’, Rivist a di 
Psicolinguist ica Applicat a, 4,(2) pp. 127-138.  
 
Atkinson, J., M., and Drew, P. (1979) Order in court : t he organisat ion of 
verbal int eract ion in judicial set t ings. London: Macmillan. 
 
Avdi, E. (2005) ‘Negotiat ing a pathological identity in the clinical dialogue: 
discourse analysis of a family therapy’, Psychology and Psychot herapy, 78 
(4),  pp. 493-511. 
 
Barrowclough C., Haddock G., Lowens I., Connor A., Pidliswyj J. and Tracey 
N. (2001). ‘Staff Expressed Emotion and causal attribut ions for client 
problems on a low security unit : an exploratory study’, Schizophrenia 
Bullet in, 27 (3), pp. 517-526.  
 
Bartesaghi, M. (2009) ‘Conversat ion and psychotherapy: how quest ioning 
reveals inst itut ional answers’, Discourse St udies, 11 (2), pp.153-177. 
 
Bateson, G. (1980) Naven. 2nd edit ion. London: Wildwood House. 
 
Bateson, G., Jackson, D., Haley, J. and Weakland, J. (1956) ‘Toward a 
theory of schizophrenia’, Behavioural Science, 1 (4), pp. 251-264. 
 220 
Bebbington, P., and Kuipers, E. (1994) ‘The predict ive ut ility of expressed 
emotion in schizophrenia: an aggregate analysis’, Psychological Medicine, 
24 (3), pp. 707-718. 
 
Bentall, R. (2003) Madness Explained: Psychosis and t he Human Mind. 
London: Allen Lane. 
 
Bercelli, F., Rossano, F., and Viaro, M. (2008) ‘Clients responses to therapists’ 
reinterpretat ions’, in Peräkylä , A., Antaki, C., Vehviläinen, S. and Leudar, I . 
(eds.) Conversat ion Analysis and Psychot herapy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp 43-61. 
 
Bertrando, P. (2007) The dialogical therapist : dialogue in syst emic pract ice, 
London: Karnac. 
 
Bertrando P., Cecchin, G.,  Clerici, C.,  Beltz J.,   Milesi, A.,  and Cazzullof, C. 
(2006) ‘Expressed emotion and Milan systemic intervention: a pilot study on 
families of people with a diagnosis of Schizophrenia’, Journal of Family 
Therapy, 28 (1), pp. 81–102. 
 
Besharat, M., Eisler, I ., and Dare, C. (2001) ‘The self and other blame scale 
(SOBS) – The background and presentation of a new instrument for 
measuring blame in families’, Journal of Family Therapy, 23 (2), pp. 208–223. 
 
Billig, M. (1999) ‘Whose terms? Whose ordinariness? Rhetoric and ideology 
in conversat ion analysis’, Discourse and Societ y, 10 (4),  pp. 543-558. 
 
Billig, M. (2001), ‘Discursive, Rhetorical and Ideological Messages’, in 
Wetherell, M., Taylor, S. and Yates, S. J. (eds.) Discourse Theory and 
Pract ice: A Reader. London: Sage, pp. 210-221. 
 
 221 
Blow, A., Sprenkle, D. and Davis, S. (2007) ‘Is who delivers the treatment 
more important than the treatment itself? The role of the therapist  in 
common factors.’, Journal of Marit al and Family Therapy,  33 (3), pp. 298–
317. 
 
Bolden, G. (2009) ‘Implementing incipient actions: The discourse marker 
‘so’ in English conversat ion’, Journal of Pragmat ics, 41 (5), pp. 974–998. 
 
Bordin, E. S. (1979) ‘The generalizability of the psychoanalyt ic concept of 
the working alliance’, Psychot herapy: Theory, research and Pract ice, 16 
(3), pp. 252-260. 
 
Boston, P. Eisler, I . Cottrell, D. (N.D.) SHIFT – Leeds Syst emic Family Therapy 
Manual for Adolescent  Self Harm . Unpublished manuscript. Inst itute of 
Health Sciences. University of Leeds. Leeds, UK.  
 
Bowen, C., Madill, A., and Stratton, P. (2002) ‘Parental Accounts of Blaming 
Within the Family: A Dialectical Model for Understanding Blame in Syst emic 
Therapy’, Journal of Marit al and Family Therapy, 28 (2), pp. 129-144.  
 
Bowen, C., Stratton, P., and Madill, A. (2005) ‘Psychological functioning in 
families that blame: from blaming events to theory integrat ion’, Journal of 
Family Therapy, 27 (4), pp. 309-329.  
 
Brown, G. W., Monck, E. M., Carstairs, G. M., and Wing, J. K. (1962) ‘The 
influence of family life on the course of schizophrenic illness’, Brit ish Journal 
of Prevent at ive Social Medicine, 16 (1), pp. 55–68.  
 
Brown, G. W., and Rutter, M. (1966) ‘The measurement of family activit ies 
and relat ionships: methodological study’, Human Relat ions, 19 (3), pp. 241-
263. 
 222 
Burbach, F. and Stanbridge, R. (1998) ‘A family intervention in psychosis 
service integrat ing the systemic and family management approaches’, 
Journal of Family Therapy, 20 (3), pp. 325-334. 
 
Burbach, F. and Stanbridge, R. (2006) ‘Somerset’s family interventions in 
psychosis service: an update’, Journal of Family Therapy, 28 (1), pp. 39-57. 
 
Burck, C. (2005). ‘Comparing qualitat ive research methodologies for 
systemic research: The use of grounded theory, discourse analysis and 
narrat ive analysis’, Journal of Family Therapy, 27 (3), pp. 237–262. 
 
Burck, C., Frosh, S., Strickland-Clark, L., and Morgan, K. (1998) ‘The process 
of enabling change: a study of therapist  interventions in family therapy’, 
Journal of Family Therapy, 18 (2), pp. 141-162. 
 
Burnham, J. (1993) ‘Systemic supervision. The evolut ion of reflexivity in the 
context of the supervisory relat ionship’, Human Syst ems, 4, pp. 349-381. 
 
Burman, E., and Parker, I .  (1993) Discourse Analyt ic Research: Repert oires 
and Readings of Text s in Act ion. Routledge: London. 
 
Burr, V. (1995) An Int roduct ion To Social Const ruct ionism.  London: 
Routledge. 
 
Buttney, R. (1990) ‘Blame–account sequences in therapy: The negotiat ion 
of relat ional meanings’, Semiot ica, 78 (3/4), pp. 219-247. 
 
Byng-Hall, J. (1998) ‘Evolving ideas about narrat ive: re-edit ing the re-edit ing 
of family mythology’,  Journal of Family Therapy,  20 (2), 133–141. 
 
 223 
Calam, R., Bolton, C., and Roberts, J. (2002) ‘Maternal expressed emotion, 
attribut ions and depression and entry into therapy for children with 
behavioural problems’, Brit ish Journal of Clincal Psychology, 41 (2), pp. 213-
216. 
 
Campbell, D. (2003) ‘Fundamentals of Theory and Practice Revisited; The 
Mutiny and the Bounty: The Place of Milan Ideas Today’. Aust ralian and 
New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 24 (1), pp. 15–25.  
 
Cecchin, G. (1987) ‘Hypothesizing, circular ity, and neutrality revisited: An 
invitat ion to curiosity’, Family Process, 26 (1), pp. 405-413.  
 
Cecchin, G., Lane, G., and Ray, W.A. (1992) Irreverence: A St rat egy for 
Therapist ’s Survival. London: Karnac. 
 
Cecchin, G., Lane, G., and Ray, W.A. (1994) The Cybernet ics of Prejudice in 
t he Pract ice of Psychot herapy. London: Karnac. 
 
Clayman, S. E. (1988) ‘Displaying neutrality in television news interviews’, 
Social Problems, 35 (4), pp. 474-92. 
 
Clayman, S. E. (1992) ‘Footing in the achievement of neutrality: the case of 
the news interview discourse’, in Drew, P., and Heritage, J. (eds.), Talk at  
work: int eraction in inst itut ional sett ings.  Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 163-98. 
 
Corcaran, J. and Ivery, J. (2004) ‘Parent and Child Attribut ions for Child 
Behaviour: Dist inguishing Factors for Engagement and Outcome’. Families 
in Societ y, 85 (1), pp. 101-106. 
 
 224 
Corrigan, P., and Miller, F. (2004) ‘Shame, blame and contamination: A 
review of the impact of mental illness st igma on family members’. Journal 
of Ment al Healt h, 13 (6), pp. 437-548.  
 
Couture, S. J., and Strong, T. (2004). ‘Turning differences into possibilit ies: 
Using discourse analysis to invest igate change in therapy with adolescents 
and their families’. Counselling and Psychot herapy Research, 4 (1), pp. 90–
101. 
 
Cuff, E. C. (1993) Problems of versions in everyday sit uat ions. Washington 
DC: International Inst itute for Ethnomethodology and Conversat ion 
Analysis. University Press of America. 
 
Cullin, J. (2009) ‘Double Bind: much more than just a step toward a theory 
of schizophrenia’, Cont ext , 102, pp. 8 -14. 
 
Dallos, R., and Draper, R. (2005) An Int roduction to Family Therapy, syst emic 
t heory and pract ice. 2nd edn. Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University 
Press. 
 
Dersley, I . and Wootton, A. (2001) ‘In the heat of the sequence: 
Interactional features preceding walkouts from argumentative talk’. 
Language in Societ y, 30 (4), pp. 611-638. 
 
Diamond, G. S. and Liddle, H. A. (1999) ‘Transforming negative parent -
adolescent interactions in family therapy: from impasse to dialogue’. 
Family Process, 38 (1) pp. 5-27. 
 
Dillon, J. (2010) ‘The tale of an ordinary lit t le girl’, Psychosis:  Psychological, 
Social and Int egrat ive Approaches, 2 (1), pp. 79-83 
 
 225 
Douglas, M. (1992) Risk and Blame. Essays in Cult ural Theory.  London: 
Routledge. 
 
Drew, P. (1992) ‘Contested evidence in a courtroom cross-examination: 
The case of a trial for rape’, in Drew, P. and Heritage, J. (eds.), Talk at  work: 
Int eraction in inst itut ional set t ings. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pp. 470-520. 
 
Drew, P. and Holt , E. (1988) ‘Complainable Matters: The Use of Idiomatic 
Expressions in Making Complaints’, Social Problems, 35 (4), pp. 398–417. 
 
Du Bois, J. W. (2007) ‘The stance triangle’, in Englebretson, R. (ed.) 
St ancetaking in discourse: Subject ivity, evaluat ion, interaction, Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins,  pp. 317-340. 
 
Du Bois, J. W. and Kärkkäinen, E. (2012) ‘Taking a stance on emotion: 
affect, sequence, and intersubjectivity in dialogic interaction’, Text  and 
Talk, 32 (4), pp. 433-451. 
 
Edwards, D. (2005a) ‘Discursive Psychology’, in Fitch, K.L. and Sanders, R. L. 
(eds) Handbook of Language and Social Int eract ion. New Jersey: Erlbaum, 
pp. 257-273. 
 
Edwards, D. (2005b) ‘Moaning, whinging and laughing: the subjective side 
of complaints’, Discourse St udies, 7, (1), pp. 5-29. 
 
Edwards, D. and Potter, J. (1992) Discursive psychology. London: Sage. 
 
Elliot, R., Fischer, C.T., and Rennie, D.L. (1999) ‘Evolving Guidelines for 
Evaluation of Qualitat ive Research Studies in Psychology and Related 
Fields’, Brit ish Journal of Clinical Psychology, 38 (3), pp. 215 -229. 
 226 
Emmerson, R. and Messenger, S. (1977) ‘The Micro-polit ics of Trouble’, 
Social Problems, 25 (2) pp. 121–34. 
 
Escudero, V., Friedlander, M. R., Varela, N. and Abascal, A. (2008) 
‘Observing the therapeutic alliance in family therapy: associat ions with 
part icipants’ perceptions and therapeutic outcomes’, Journal of Family 
Therapy, 30 (2), pp. 194-214. 
 
Falloon, I . R., Fadden, G., Mueser, K., Gingerich, S., Rappaport, S. and 
McGill, C. (2006) Family Work Manual. Birmingham: Meriden-The Family 
Programme. 
 
Finerman, R. and Bennett, L.A. (1994) ‘Guilt  blame and shame: 
Responsibility in health and sickness’, Social Science and Medicine, 40 (1) 
pp. 1-3. 
 
Fitzgerald, R. (2012) ‘Membership categorizat ion analysis: Wild and 
promiscouous or simply the joy of Sacks?’ Discourse St udies, 14 (3), pp. 305-
312. 
 
Flaskas, C. (2005) ‘St icky situations, therapy mess: on impasse and the 
therapist’s posit ion’, in Flaskas, C. Mason, B. and Perlesz, A. (eds.) The 
Space Bet ween: Experience, Cont ext  and Process in t he Therapeut ic 
Relat ionship. London: Karnac, pp.111-126. 
 
Flaskas, C. ( 2011) ‘Frameworks for Practice in the Systemic Field: Part 2 — 
Contemporary Frameworks in Family Therapy’, Aust ralian and New Zealand 
Journal of Family Therapy, 32 (2), pp.  87–108. 
 
Freedman, J., and Combs, G. (1996). Narrat ive t herapy: The social 
const ruct ion of preferred realit ies. New York: W. W. Norton. 
 227 
Freidlander, M., Heatherington, L., Johnson, B., and Skowron, E. A. (1994) 
‘Sustaining engagement: A change event in family therapy’. Journal of 
Counselling Psychology, 41(4), pp. 438-448. 
 
Freidlander, M., Heatherington, L. and Marrs, A. (2000) ‘Responding to 
Blame in Family Therapy: A Construct ionist/Narrat ive Perspective’, The 
American Journal of Family Therapy, 28 (2), pp. 133-146. 
 
Friedlander, M. L., Escudero, V., Horvarth, A. O., Heatherington, L. Cabero, 
A. and Martens, M. P. (2006) ‘System for Observing Family Therapy 
Alliances: a tool for research and practice’, Journal of Counseling 
Psychology, 53 (2), 214-225. 
 
Frosh, S. (1997) ‘Postmodern Narrat ives: or Muddles in the Mind’, in 
Papadopoulos, R. and Byng-Hall, J. (eds.) Mult iple Voices, London: 
Duckworth, pp. 86-89. 
 
Frosh, S. (2013) ‘Keeping cool in thinking and psychotherapy’, in Burck, C., 
Barrat, S., and Kavner, E. (eds) Posit ions and Polarit ies in Cont emporary 
Syt emic Pract ice: The legacy of David Campbell. London: Karnac,  pp. 15-
26. 
 
Frosh, S.,  Burck, C., Strickland-Clark, L., and Morgan, K (1996) ‘Engaging 
with change, a process study of family therapy’, Journal of Family 
Therapy,18 (2), pp. 141-162. 
 
Furlong, M. and Young, J (1996) ‘Talking about blame’, Aust ralian and New 
Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 17 (1), pp. 191-200. 
 
Gale, J. E. (1991) Conversat ion Analysis of Therapeut ic Discourse: The 
Pursuit  of a Therapeut ic Agenda. Norwood, N. J.: Ablex. 
 228 
Garcia, A. (1991) ‘Dispute resolut ion without disputing: How the 
interactional organizat ion of mediat ion hearings minimizes argument’. 
American Sociological Review, 56 (6), pp. 818-35. 
 
Garfinkel, H. (1967). St udies in et hnomet hodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prent ice Hall. 
 
Glaser, D. (1991) ‘Neutrality and child abuse: A useful juxtaposit ion?’ 
Human Syst ems: The Journal of Syst emic Consult at ion and Management, 2, 
pp. 149-160. 
 
Glebova, T., Bart le-Haring, S., Gangamma, R., Knerr, M., Meyer, K., 
McDowell, T., Adkins, K. and Grafsy, E. (2011) ‘Therapeutic alliance and 
progress in couple therapy: mult iple perspectives’, Journal of Family 
Therapy, 33 (1), pp. 42-65. 
 
Goldner V. (1985a) ‘Feminism and family therapy’, Family Process, 24 (1), 
pp. 31-47.  
 
Goldner V. (1985b) ‘Warning: Family therapy may be hazardous to your 
health’, Family Therapy Net worker, 9 (6), pp. 18-23.   
 
Gonzales Torres, A., Oraa, R., Aristegui, M., Fenrnandez-Rivas, A. and 
Guimon, J. (2006) ‘St igma and discrimination towards people with 
schizophrenia and their family members. A qualitat ive study with focus 
groups’, Social Psychiat ry and Epidemiology, 42 (1), pp. 14-23. 
 
Gotlib, I . and Abramson, L. (1999) ‘Attribut ional theories of Emotion’, in 
Dalgleish, T. and Power, M. (eds.) Handbook of Cognit ion and Emot ion 
New York: Wiley, pp. 613-636. 
 
 229 
Greatbach, D. and Dingwall, R. (1997) ‘Argumentative talk in divorce 
mediat ion sessions’, American Sociological Review, 62 (1), pp. 151-170. 
 
Grice, H.P. (1975) ‘Logic and conversat ion’, in Cole, P. and Morgan, J. 
(eds.) Synt ax and Semant ics, Volume 3. New York: Academic Press. pp. 41-
58. 
 
Guba, E.G. and Lincoln,Y.S (1994) ‘Competing paradigms in qualitat ive 
research’, in Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (eds) Handbook of Qualit at ive 
Research. London: Sage, pp. 105-117. 
 
Guilfoyle , M. (2002) ‘Rhetorical processes in therapy: the bias for self-
containment’, Journal of Family Therapy, 24 (3) pp. 298-316. 
 
Guilfoyle , M. (2012) ‘Towards a grounding of the agentive subject in 
narrat ive therapy’. Theory and Psychology, 22 (5) pp. 626-642. 
 
Hare-Mustin, R. T. (1994) ‘Discourses in the mirrored room: a postmodern 
analysis of therapy’, Family Process, 33 (1), pp. 19–34. 
 
Heritage, J. (1997) ‘Conversat ion analysis and inst itut ional talk: analysing 
data’, in Silverman, D.  (ed), Qualit at ive research: t heory met hod and 
pract ice, 2nd edn. London: Sage, pp. 222-245. 
 
Heritage, J. (2002) ‘The limits of quest ioning: Negat ive interrogatives and 
host ile quest ion content’, Journal of Pragmat ics, 34 (10-11), pp. 1427-1446. 
 
Heritage, J. and Sefi, S. (1992) ‘Dilemmas of Advice: Aspects of the delivery 
and acceptance of advice in interactions between health visitors and first  
t ime mothers’, in Drew, P. and Heritage, J. (eds) Talk at  work: Int eract ion in 
inst it ut ional set t ings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  pp. 359-417. 
 230 
Heritage, J. and Maynard, D. W. (eds) (2006) Communicat ion in Medical 
Care. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Heritage, J. and Watson, R. (1979) ‘Formulat ions as conversat ional objects’, 
in Psathas, G. (ed.), Everyday Language. New York: Irvington Press, pp. 123-
162. 
 
Hoffman, L. (1995) ‘The case against power and control’, in Hoffman, L.  
(ed.), Exchanging Voices: A Collaborat ive Approach t o Family Therapy. 
London: Karnac, pp. 10-62. 
 
Hoffman, L. (1998) ‘Sett ing aside the model in family therapy’, Journal of 
Family Therapy, 24 (2), pp. 145-156. 
 
Hollway, W. and Jefferson, T (2000) Doing Qualit at ive Research Different ly: 
free associat ion, narrat ive and t he int erview met hod.  London: Sage. 
 
Holma, J., and Aaltonen, J. (1997) ‘The sense of agency and the search for 
a narrat ive in acute psychosis’, Cont emporary Family Therapy, 19 (4), pp. 
463-477. 
 
Holstein, J. and Gubrium, J. (2011) ‘The Construct ionist  Analyt ics of 
Interpret ive Practice’, in Denzin, N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.) The Sage 
Handbook of Qualit at ive Research, 4th edn. London: Sage, pp. 341-358. 
 
Hooley, J. and Teasdale, J. D. (1989) ‘Predictors of relapse in unipolar 
depressives: Expressed emotion, mart ial distress and perceived crit icism’, 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 98 (3), pp. 229-235. 
 
 231 
Horvarth, A. O. and Bedi, R. P. (2002) ‘The alliance’, in Norcross J. C. (ed.) 
Psychot herapy Relat ionships t hat  Work: Therapist  Cont ribut ions and 
Responsiveness t o Pat ient s.  New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-69. 
 
Horvarth, A. O. and Symonds, B. D. (1991) ‘Relat ion between the working 
alliance and outcome in psychotherapy: a meta-analysis’, Journal of 
Counseling Psychology, 38 (2), pp. 139-149. 
 
Hurley, D. (2006) ‘Internalized Other Interviewing of Children Exposed to 
Violence’, Journal of Syst emic Therapies 25 (2), pp. 50–63. 
 
Hutchby, I . and Wooffitt , R. (1998) Conversat ion analysis: principles, 
pract ices and applicat ions. Oxford: Polity Press. 
 
Jayussi, L. (1984) Cat egorizat ion and Moral Order.  London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul. 
 
Jefferson, G. (2004) ‘Glossary of t ranscript symbols with an introduction’, in  
Lerner, G. H. (ed.) Conversat ion analysis: st udies from t he first  generat ion. 
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins,  pp.43-59. 
 
Jefferson, G., Sacks, H., and Schegloff, E. A., (1987) ‘Notes on laughter in 
pursuit  of int imacy’, in Button, G., and Lee, J. (eds.) Talk and social 
Organisat ion. Clevedon: Mult ilingual Matters, pp.152-205. 
 
Jefferson, G. and Lee, J. R. (1981) ‘The rejection of advice: managing the 
problematic convergence of a “Troubles Telling” and a “Service 
Encounter”, Journal of Pragmat ics, 5 (5), pp. 399-422. 
 
 232 
Jenkins, A. (1990) Invitat ions to responsibility: t he t herapeut ic engagement  
of men who are violent  and abusive. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre 
Publications. 
 
Johnston, I ., Fine, S., Weiss, M., Weiss, J., Weiss, G. and Freeman, W. S. (2000) 
‘Effects of st imulant medication treatment on mothers and children’s 
attributions for the behaviour of children with attention deficit  hyperactivity 
disorder’, Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 28 (4), pp. 371-382. 
 
Johnstone, L. (2009) ‘Controversial issues in t rauma and psychosis’, 
Psychosis, 1 (2), pp. 185-190. 
 
Kim, E. Y., and Malkowitz, D. J. (2004) ‘Expressed emotion as a predictor of 
outcome among bi-polar patients undergoing family therapy’, Journal of 
Affect ive Disorders, 82 (3), pp. 343-352. 
 
Kitzinger, C. (2000) ‘Doing feminist  conversat ion analysis’, Feminism and 
Psychology, 10 (2), pp. 163-93. 
 
Klaushofer, K. (2007) ‘Honouring our great grandparents: towards a 
rhetorical analysis of family therapy’, Journal of Family Therapy, 29 (2), pp. 
131-146. 
 
Kogan, S. M. and Gale, J. E. (1997) ‘Decentering therapy: Textual analysis of 
a narrat ive therapy session’, Family Process, 36 (2), pp. 101–126. 
 
Kotoff, H. (1993) ‘Disagreement and concession in disputes: On the context 
sensit ivity of preference structures’, Language in Societ y, 22 (2), pp. 193-
216. 
 
 233 
Kraemer, S. (1997) ‘What Narrat ive?’ in Papadopoulos, R. and Byng-Hall, J. 
(eds.) Mult iple Voices, London: Duckworth, pp. 41-63. 
 
Krause, I . (1993) ‘Family therapy and anthropology: a case for emotions’, 
Journal of Family Therapy, 15 (1), pp. 35-56. 
 
Kuhlman, I., Tolvanen, A. and Seikkula, J. (2013) ‘Couple Therapy for 
Depression Within a Naturalist ic Sett ing in Finland: Factors Related to 
Change of the Patient and the Spouse’ Cont emporary Family Therapy, 35 
(4), pp. 656-672. 
 
Kuipers, E., Leff, J. and Lam, D. (2002) Family Work for Schizophrenia. 2nd  
edn. London: The Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
 
Kuipers, E., (2006) ‘Family interventions in sch izophrenia: evidence for 
efficacy and proposed mechanisms of change’, Journal of Family Therapy, 
28 (1), pp. 73–80. 
 
Kurri, K. and Whalstrom, J. (2005) ‘Placement of responsibility and moral 
reasoning in couple therapy’, Journal of Family Therapy, 27 (4), pp. 352-369. 
 
Labov, W. and Fanshell, D. (1977) Therapeut ic discourse: Psychot herapy as 
conversat ion. Orlando: Academic Press. 
 
Lepper, G. (2000) Cat egories in Text  and Talk. A pract ical int roduct ion t o 
cat egorisat ion analysis. London: Sage. 
 
Levinson, S., C. (1996) ‘On the Human Interaction Engine’, in Enfield, N.J. 
and Levinson, S. C. (eds.) Root s of Human Socialit y. Cult ure Cognit ion and 
Int eract ion. Oxford: Berg, pp. 39-69 
 
 234 
Lobban, F., Barrowclough, C. and Jones, S. (2005) ‘Does expressed emotion 
need to be understood within a more systemic framework?’ Social 
Psychiat ry and Psychiat ric Epidemiology, 41 (4), pp. 50-55. 
 
McFarlane, W. R., Dixon, L., Lukens, E. and Luckstead, A. (2002) ‘Severe 
Mental I llness’, in Sprenkle, D. (ed.) Effect iveness Research in Marriage and 
Family Therapy. Alexandria: American Associat ion for Marriage and Family 
Therapy, pp. 255-288. 
 
McFarlane, W. and Cook, W. (2007) ‘Family Expressed Emotion Prior to 
Onset of Psychosis’, Family Process, 46 (2), pp. 185-197. 
 
Mackinnon, L.K. and Miller, D. (1986) ‘The new epistemology and the Milan 
approach: Feminist  and socio-polit ical considerat ions’, Journal of Marit al 
and Family Therapy, 13 (2), pp. 139-155. 
 
McConoghy, J. S. and Cottone, R. (1998) ‘The Systemic View of Violence: 
An Ethical Perspective’, Family Process, 37 (1), pp. 51-63. 
 
MacMart in, C.  (2008) ‘Resist ing optimist ic quest ions in therapies’, in 
Peräkylä , A., Antaki, C., Vehviläinen, S. and Leudar, I . (eds.) Conversat ion 
Analysis and Psychot herapy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
26-42. 
 
McNab, S. and Kavner, E. (2001) ‘When it  all goes wrong – challenge to 
mother blame: forging connections between mother and daughter’, 
Journal of Family Therapy, 23 (2), pp.189-207. 
 
McNamee, S. and Gergen, K. (1999) Relat ional Responsibilit y Resources for 
Sust ainable Dialogue. London: Sage 
 
 235 
Madill, A. and Doherty, K. (1994) ‘So you did what you wanted then’: 
Discourse analysis, personal agency, and psychotherapy’, Journal of 
Communit y and Applied Social Psychology, 4 (4), pp. 261–273. 
 
Mason, B. (2005) ‘Relat ional risk taking and the therapeutic relat ionship’, in 
Flaskas, C., Mason, B., and Perlesz, A. (eds.) The Space Bet ween: 
Experience, Cont ext  and Process in t he Therapeut ic Relat ionship.  London: 
Karnac, pp.157-170. 
 
Maturana, H. R. (1988) ‘Reality: The Search for Objectivity of the Quest for 
Compelling Argument’, The Irish Journal of Psychology, 9 (1), pp. 25-82. 
 
Maybin, J. (2001) Language, Struggle and Voice: The Bakhtin/Volosinov 
Writ ings, in Wetherell, M. Taylor, S. and Yates, S.J. (eds) Discourse Theory 
and Pract ice. London: Sage. 
 
Maynard, D. W. (1991) ‘Interaction and Asymmetry in Clinical Discourse’, 
American Journal of Sociology, 97 (2), pp. 448-95. 
 
Maynard, D. and Heritage, J. (2005) ‘Conversat ion analysis, doctor-patient 
interaction and medical communication’, Medical Educat ion, 39(4), 
pp.428-435. 
 
Meddins, S., Gordon, I . and Owen, D. (2010) ‘Family and Systemic work’, in 
Cupitt , C. (ed) Reaching Out : The Psychology of Assert ive Out reach. 
London: Routledge, pp.163-185. 
 
Meldonis, G. G. and Bry, B. H. (1995) ‘Effects of therapist  exceptions 
quest ions on blaming and posit ive statements in families with adolescent 
behaviour problems’, Journal of Family Psychology, 9 (4), pp. 451-457. 
 
 236 
Meyerstein, I . (1994) ‘Reflect ions on ‘being there’ and ‘doing’ in family 
therapy: A story of chronic illness’, Family Syst ems Medicine, 12 (1), pp. 21-
29. 
 
Minuchin, S. (1974). Families and family t herapy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Minuchin, S. (1998) ‘Where is the Family in Narrat ive Family Therapy’, 
Journal of Marit al and Family Therapy, 24 (4), pp. 397-403. 
 
Morrissey-Kane, F. and Prinz, R. J. (1999) ‘Engagement in child and 
adolescent treatment: The role of parental cognit ions and attribut ions’, 
Clinical Child and Adolescent  Psychology Review,  2 (3), pp. 183-198. 
 
Muntigl, P. and Turnbull, W. (1998) ‘Conversat ional st ructure and facework 
in arguing’, Journal of Pragmat ics, 29 (3) pp. 225-256. 
 
Muntigl, P. and Tim Choi, K. (2010) ‘Not remembering as a practical 
epistemic resource in couples therapy’, Discourse St udies, 12 (3), pp. 331-
357. 
 
National Inst itute of Clinical Excellence (2009) Schizophrenia: Core 
Int ervent ions in t he Treat ment  and Management  of  Schizophrenia in 
Primary and Secondary Care. London: NICE. 
 
Newman, A., Burbach, F. and Reibstein, J. (2013) ‘How therapists discuss 
causality with families in an integrated family management and therapy 
service, a qualitat ive study with focus groups’, Cont emporary Family 
Therapy, 35 (3), pp. 437-451. 
 
Norrick, N. R. and Spitz, A. (2008) ‘Humour as a resource for mit igating 
conflict’, Journal of Pragmat ics, 40 (10), pp. 1661–1686. 
 237 
Obuchi K., Tamura, T., Quigley, B.M., Tedeschi, J.,  Madi, N., Bond, M., and 
Mummendey, A. (2004) ‘Anger, blame, and dimensions of perceived norm 
violat ions: culture, gender, and relat ionships’, Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 34 (8), pp. 1587-1603. 
 
Parker, I . (1992) Discourse Dynamics: Crit ical Analysis for Social and 
Individual Psychology. London: Routledge. 
 
Peräkylä, A. (1995) Aids Counselling: Inst it ut ional int eract ion and clinical 
pract ice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Peräkylä , A., Antaki, C., Vehviläinen, S. and Leudar, I . (2008) ‘Analysing 
psychotherapy in practice’, in Peräkylä, A., Antaki, C. , Vehviläinen, S., and 
Leudar, I . (eds.) Conversat ion Analysis and Psychot herapy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 5-25. 
 
Peräkylä , A. and Ruusuvuori, J. (2011) ‘Analysing Talk and Text’, in Denzin, 
N. and Lincoln, Y. (eds.) The Sage Handbook of Qualit at ive Research (4th  
edn.) London: Sage, pp. 529-544. 
 
Peräkylä , A. and Vehviläinen, S. (2003) ‘Conversat ion analysis and the 
professional stocks of interactional knowledge’, Discourse and Societ y, 14 
(6), pp. 727-750. 
 
Pomerantz, A. (1978) ‘Attribut ions of Responsibility: Blamings’, Sociology 12, 
pp. 115-121. 
 
Pomerantz, A. (1980) ‘Telling my side: “Limited access” as a “fishing” 
device’, Sociological Inquiry, 50 (3/4), pp. 186-198. 
 
 238 
Pomerantz, A. (1984) ‘Agreeing and disagreeing with assessments: some 
features of preferred/dispreferred turn shapes’, in Atkinson, J., and 
Heritage, J. C. (eds.) St ruct ures of Social Act ion: St udies on Conversat ion 
Analysis,  Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 57-101. 
 
Pomerantz, A. (1986) ‘Extreme Case Formulat ions: A way of legit imizing 
claims’, Human St udies, 9 (2/3), pp.  219-229. 
 
Potter, J. and Wetherell, M. (1994) ‘Analyzing discourse’, in Bryman, A. and 
Burgess, B. (eds.) Analyzing Qualitat ive Dat a. London: Routledge, pp. 47-66. 
 
Procter, I . and Padfield, M. (1998) ‘The effect of the interview on the 
interviewee’, Journal of Social Research Met hodology, 1(2), pp. 123-136. 
 
Read, J. (1997) ‘Child abuse and psychosis: A literature review and 
implications for professional practice’, Professional Psychology: Research 
and Pract ice, 28 (5), pp. 448-456. 
 
Read, J., Haslam, N., Sayce, L. and Davies, E. (2006) Prejudice and 
Schizophrenia: A review of the ‘mental illness is an illness like any other’ 
approach. Act a Psychiat ric Scandinavica, 114 (1), pp. 1-16. 
 
Rikonen, E. and Smith, G. M. (1997) Re-Imagining Therapy: Living 
Conversat ions and Relat ional Knowing. London: Sage.  
 
Rober, P. (1999) ‘The Therapists Inner Conversat ion in Family Therapy: Some 
Ideas About the Self of the Therapist , Therapeutic Impasse, and the Process 
of Reflect ion’, Family Process, 38 (2), pp.  209-228. 
 
Rober, P. (2002) ‘Construct ive hypothesizing, dialogic understanding and 
the therapist 's inner conversat ions: Some ideas about knowing arid not -
 239 
knowing in the family therapy session’, Journal of Marit al and Family 
Therapy, 28 (4), pp. 467-478. 
 
Rober, P. (2005a) ‘Family therapy as a dialogue of living persons: A 
perspective inspired by Bakhtin, Voloshinov and Shotter’, Journal of Marit al 
and Family Therapy, 31 (4), pp. 85-397.  
Rober, P. (2005b). ‘The therapist 's self in dialogical therapy: Some ideas 
about not-knowing and the therapist 's inner conversat ion’, Family Process, 
44 (4), pp. 461-475. 
 
Roy Chowdhury, S. (2006) ‘How is the therapeutic relat ionship talked into 
being?’, Journal of Family Therapy, 28 (2), pp. 153-174. 
 
Sacks, H. (1979) ‘Hotrodders: a revolut ionary category’, in Psathas, G. (ed.) 
Everyday Language: St udies in Et hnomet hodology.  Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 
pp. 7-14 
 
Sacks, H. (1995) Lect ures on Conversat ion. Volumes 1 and 2.  Blackwell: 
Oxford. 
 
Sacks, H. and Schegloff, E. A. (1979) ‘Two preferences in the organizat ion of 
reference to persons in conversat ion and their interaction’, in Psathas, G. 
(ed.) Everyday language: st udies in t he et hnomet hodology. New York: 
Irvington, pp.15-21. 
 
Sacks, H., Schegloff, E. A., and Jefferson, G. (1974) ‘A  simplest systematics 
for the organizat ion of turn-taking for conversat ion’, Language, 50 (4), pp. 
696–735. 
 
Safran, J. D. and Muran, J. C. (2006) ‘Has the concept of the therapeutic 
alliance outlived its usefulness?’ Psychot herapy, 43 (3), pp. 286-91. 
 240 
Schegloff, E. A. (1982) ‘Discourse as an interactional achievement: some 
uses of “uh huh” and other things that come between sentences’, in 
Tannen, D. (ed.) Analyzing discourse: t ext and t alk. (Georgetown University 
Roundtable on Languages and Linguist ics), Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, pp. 71-93 
 
Schegloff, E. A. (1984) ‘On Some Quest ions and Ambiguit ies in 
Conversat ion’, in Atkinson, J., Maxwell, J. and Heritage, J. (eds.) St ruct ures 
of Social Act ion: St udies on Conversat ion Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 28-52. 
 
Schegloff, E., A. (1987) ‘Analyzing single episodes of interaction: An exercise 
in conversat ion analysis’, Social Psychology Quart erly 50 (2), pp. 101-114 
 
Schegloff, E., A. (1988) “On an actual virtual servo-mechanism for guessing 
bad news: A single case conjecture”. Social Problems 35 (4), pp. 442-257. 
 
Schegloff, E., A. (1992) ‘In another context’, in Duranti, A. and Goodwin, C. 
(eds.) Ret hinking Cont ext : Language as an Int eract ive Phenomenon. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 193-227. 
 
Schegloff, E. A. (1997) ‘Whose text? Whose context?’, Discourse and 
Societ y, 8 (2), pp. 165-187.  
 
Schegloff, E. A. (1998) ‘Reply to Wetherell’, Discourse and Societ y, 9 (3), pp. 
413-416.  
 
Schegloff, E. A. (1999) 'Schegloff's texts' as 'Billig's data': a crit ical reply’, 
Discourse and Societ y, 8 (2), pp. 558-575.  
 
 241 
Schegloff, E. A. (2005) ‘On Complainability’, Social Problems, 52 (3), pp. 
449-476. 
 
Schegloff, E. A. (2006) ‘Interaction: the infrastructure for social inst itut ions, 
the natural ecological niche for language, and the arena in which culture 
is enacted’, in Enfield, N.J.  and Levinson, S. C. (eds.) Root s of Human 
Socialit y. Cult ure Cognit ion and Int eract ion. Oxford: Berg, pp. 70-96. 
 
Schegloff, E.A. (2007) ‘A tutorial on membership categorizat ion’, Journal of 
Pragmat ics,  39 (3), pp. 462-482. 
 
Seikkula, J. (1993) ‘The aim of the work is to generate dialogue: Bakhtin and 
Vygotsky in family session’, Human Syst ems, 4 (1) pp. 33-48. 
 
Seikkula, J. (2002) ‘Open dialogues with good and poor outcomes for 
psychotic crises: Examples from families with violence’, Journal of Marit al 
and Family Therapy, 28 (3), pp. 263- 274. 
 
Seikkula, J. (2008) ‘Inner and outer voices in the present moment of family 
and network therapy’, Journal of Family Therapy, 30 (4), pp. 478-491. 
 
Seikkula, J., and Arnkil, T.E. (2006) Dialogical meet ings in social net works. 
London: Karnac.  
 
Seikkula, J. and Trimble, D. (2005) ‘Healing Elements of Therapeutic 
Conversat ion: Dialogue as an Embodiment of Love’, Family Process 44 (4), 
pp. 461-475. 
 
Seikkula, J. (2011) ‘Becoming Dialogical: Psychotherapy of a Way of Life?’ 
The Aust ralian and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 32 (3), pp. 179-
193. 
 242 
Selvini Palazzoli, M., Boscolo, L., Cecchin, G., and Prata, G. (1980) 
‘Hypothesizing-circularity-neutrality: Three guidelines for the conductor of 
the session’, Family Process, 19 (1), pp. 3-12. 
 
Shapiro, D. (2006) ‘Self reproach and personal responsibility’, Psychiat ry, 69 
(1), pp. 21-25. 
 
Shotter, J. (1993) Conversat ional Realit ies. London: Sage. 
Shotter, J. (1993). Cult ural polit ics of everyday life: Social const ruct ionism, 
rhet oric, and knowing of t he t hird kind. Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press. 
 
Siegfried, J. (1995) Therapeut ic and everyday discourse as behaviour 
change. New Jersey: Ablex. 
 
Silverman, D. (1997) Discourses of counselling. HIV counselling as social 
int eract ion. London: Sage. 
 
Sinclair, S. L.  (2007)  ‘Back in the mirrored room: the enduring relevance of 
discursive practice’, Journal of Family Therapy 29 (2), pp. 147–168. 
 
Smith, G., Gregory, K., and Higgs, A. (2007) An int egrat ed approach t o 
family work for psychosis, a manual for family workers. London: Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers. 
 
Speed, B. (1996) ‘You Cannot Not Relate’, in Flaskas, C. and Perelesz, A. 
(eds.) The Therapeut ic Relat ionship In Syst emic Therapy.  London: Karnac.  
 
Sprenkle, D.H. and Blow, A.J. (2004) ‘Common factors and our sacred 
models’, Journal of Marit al and Family Therapy, 30(2), pp. 113-129. 
 
 243 
Sprenkle, D.H., Davis, S.D. and Lebow, J.L. (2009) Common fact ors in couple 
and family t herapy: The overlooked foundat ion for effective pract ice. New 
York: Guilford Press.  
 
Stancombe, J. (2002) Family therapy as narrat ive: the management of 
blame and responsibility. Doctoral Thesis. University of London: Birkbeck 
College. 
 
Stancombe, J. and White, S. (1997) ‘Notes on the tenacity of therapeutic 
pre-supposit ions in process research: Examining the artfulness of blamings in 
family therapy’, Journal of Family Therapy 19 (1), pp. 21-41. 
 
Stancombe, J. and White, S. (2005) ‘Cause and responsibility: towards an 
interactional understanding of blaming and ‘neutrality’ in family therapy’, 
Journal of Family Therapy 27 (4), pp.  330-351. 
 
St iles, W. B., and Shapiro, D. A. (1989) ‘Abuse of the drug metaphor in 
psychotherapy process outcome research’, Clinical Psychology Review, 9: 
(4), pp. 521 543. 
 
Stratton, P. (2003a) ‘Causal attribut ions during therapy 1: Responsibility and 
blame’, Journal of Family Therapy 25 (2), pp. 136-160. 
 
Stratton, P. (2003b) ‘Causal attribut ions during therapy I I : Reconst ituted 
families and parental blaming’, Journal of Family Therapy 25 (2), pp. 161-
180. 
 
Stokoe, E. (2000) ‘Toward a Conversat ion Analyt ic Approach to Gender 
and Discourse’, Feminism and Psychology 10 (4),  pp. 552-563. 
 
 244 
Stokoe, E. (2011) ‘Simulated interaction and communication skills’, in 
Antaki, C. (ed) Applied conversat ion analysis: Changing inst it ut ional 
pract ices. Basingstoke, England: Palgrave Macmillan,  pp.119-139. 
 
Stokoe, E. (2012) ‘Moving forward with membership categorizat ion analysis: 
Methods for systematic analyis’, Discourse St udies, 14 (3), pp. 277-305. 
 
Stokoe, E. (2013) ‘Overcoming barriers to Mediat ion in Intake Calls to 
Services: Research-based Strategies for Mediators’, Negot iat ion Journal, 29 
(3), pp. 289-314. 
 
St ivers, T. (2005) ‘Parent resistance to physicians treatment 
recommendations: One resource for init iat ing a negotiat ion of the 
t reatment decision’, Healt h Communicat ion, 181 (1), pp. 41-74. 
 
Sutherland, O. and Couture, S. J. (2007) ‘The discursive performance of the 
alliance in family therapy: A conversat ion analyt ic perspective’ Aust ralian 
and New Zealand Journal of Family Therapy, 28 (4), pp. 210–217. 
 
Tattan T. and Tarrier N. (2000) ‘The Expressed Emotion of case managers of 
the seriously mentally ill: the influence of EE and the quality of the 
relat ionship on clinical outcomes’, Psychological Medicine 30 (1), pp.195-
204. 
 
ten Have, P. (1999) Doing Conversat ion Analysis: A Pract ical Guide.  
London: Sage. 
 
Thompson, D. (ed) (1995) The Concise Oxford Dict ionary. 9th Edit ion. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 245 
Tomm K. (1987a) ‘Interventive Interviewing: Part I . Strategizing as a Fourth 
Guideline for the Therapist’, Family Process, 26 (1), pp. 3-13.  
 
Tomm K. (1987b) ‘Interventive Interviewing: Part I I . Reflex ive Quest ioning as 
a Means to Enable Self-Healing’, Family Process, 26 (2), pp. 167-183.  
 
Tomm K. (1988) ‘Interventive Interviewing: Part I I I . Intending to Ask Lineal, 
Circular, Strategic, or Reflexive Quest ions?’ Family Process, 27 (1), pp. 1-15. 
 
Tseliou, E. (2013) ‘A Crit ical Methodological Review of Discourse and 
Conversat ion Analysis Studies of Family Therapy’, Family Process, 52 (4), 
pp. 653–672. 
 
Watters, E. (2010) Crazy Like Us: The Globalizat ion of t he American Psyche. 
New York: Free press. 
 
Watzlawick, P., Weakland, J., and Fisch, R. (1974) Change: Principles of 
Problem Formulat ion and Resolut ion. New York: Norton. 
 
Wetherell, M. (1998) ‘Posit ioning and interpretat ive repertoires: 
Conversat ion analysis and post -structuralism in dialogue’, Discourse and 
Societ y, 9 (3), pp. 387-412. 
 
Wetherell, M. (2001) ‘Editors Introduction’,  in Wetherell, M. , Taylor S. and 
Yates, S. J. (eds.) Discourse Theory and Pract ice: A Reader. London: Sage, 
pp. 1-8. 
 
Wetherell, M. and Potter, J. (1992) Mapping t he language of racism: 
Discourse and t he legit imat ion of exploit at ion. London: Harvester 
Weatsheaf. 
 
 246 
White, C. and Barrowclough, C. (1998) ‘Depressed and non-depressed 
mothers with problematic pre-schoolers: Attribut ions for child behaviour’,  
Brit ish Journal of Clinical Psychology, 37 (4), pp. 385-398. 
 
White, M. (1989) Select ed papers. Adelaide: Dulwich Centre Publications. 
 
White, M. (2002) ‘Addressing Personal Failure’, The Int ernat ional Journal of 
Narrat ive Therapy and Communit y Work, 1 (3), pp. 33-76. 
 
White, M. (2004) Narrat ive practices and exot ic lives: resurrect ing diversity in 
everyday life. Adelaide, Australia: Dulwich Centre Publications. 
 
White, M. (2007) Maps of narrat ive pract ice. New York, NY: Norton. 
Whitehead, K. A. (2012) ‘Moving forward by doing analysis’, Discourse 
St udies, 14 (3), pp. 337-344. 
 
Wolpert, M. (2000) ‘Is anyone to blame? Whom families and their therapists 
blame for the presenting problem’, Clinical Child Psychology and 
Psychiat ry, 5(1), pp. 115-131. 
 
Zubin, J. and Spring, B (1977) ‘Vulnerability: A new view of schizophrenia’, 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 86 (2), pp. 103-126. 
  
 247 
Glossary 
 
 
Adjacency Pair A two part sequence in which the first pair part 
makes relevant the production of a second pair 
part such as question/answer, greeting/greeting 
Affiliation Displaying emotional understanding or support 
Alignment Displaying that the topic or interactional project is 
relevant 
Category Bound 
Activity (CBA) 
Any activity linked in situ to a category drawing on 
culturally shared inferences regarding the 
obligations and rights of each member and 
associated expected actions. 
Category Bound 
Predicate 
(CBP) 
The use of common understandings of different 
categories in order to negotiate what type of 
member one is, for example good or bad, 
competent or incompetent. 
Collection The situated rules by which member categories are 
heard to belong together, such as ‘family’ or 
‘patients’. 
Conflict In CA, conflict (or argument) is minimally defined 
as a three part sequence. If speaker A’s utterance 
is contested by speaker B, A can either make a 
concessionary move or counter oppose B. An 
argument remains latent until the third move 
constructs it as such. 
Consistency Rule In MCA if two or more categories are used next to 
each other and they belong to a standard 
collection such as ‘family’ then they are heard as 
coming from the same device. 
Conversation Analysis 
(CA) (Applied) 
The application of CA to particular contexts or 
practical interests. 
Conversation Analysis 
(CA) (Pure) 
The study of naturally occurring talk-in-interaction. 
Disjunctive Categories Asymmetric category pairings hierarchically 
arranged in different contexts to generate 
conflicting characterisations of the same person. 
Duplicative 
Organisation 
A collection of member categories treated as a 
unit or team, not as individuals. For example, when 
talking about a mother, father and child it will be 
expectable to think about them as coming from 
the same family. 
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Economy Rule While any person can be a member of 
innumerable categories, at the core of competent 
talk is the capacity to apply only those categories 
that are necessary to achieve the task at hand and 
to combine categories in recognisable ways. 
 
Extreme Case 
Formulation 
“So as to legitimize a complaint and portray the 
complainable situation as worthy of complaint, a 
speaker may portray the offense and /or the 
suffering with Extreme Case formulations”. 
(Pomerantz, 1986, p. 227-8) 
Formulation Formulations immediately follow a person’s turn 
and ostensibly give the gist of what that person has 
said by selecting elements of a person’s account, 
deleting others and presenting it as merely a 
summary of that person’s words. 
Interactional project The persistent effort to maintain a particular topic or 
direction of talk-in-interaction (Schegloff, 2006) 
Member Incumbent of a member category in use. 
Membership 
Categorisation Device 
(MCD) 
A “collection of categories for referring to persons, 
with some rules of application” (Sacks, 1995, Vol.1, 
p. 238) 
Preference 
Organisation 
In CA preference is used to denote two linked but 
slightly different meanings.  
1. findings that project empirically which 
alternative is most frequent and therefore 
expectable.  
2. structural properties of responses that mark 
actions as normatively positive (preferred) or 
negative (dispreferred). 
Recipient Design The shaping of an utterance in such a way as to be 
understandable by a particular  recipient in a 
specific context, given the pre-suppositions of the 
speaker regarding the kind of knowledge the 
recipient might have. 
Reinterpretation Therapist reinterpretations are similar to therapist 
formulations in that they both refer to personal 
events that clients have greater access to. 
However because reinterpretations explicitly 
propose views that are additional to or different 
from those that the client has said, client 
agreement or disagreement is sought. (Bercelli et 
al., 2008). 
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Repair In CA repair refers to those practices which enable 
any kind of trouble, (misunderstandings, 
mishearings, misalignments) to be dealt with. 
Practices of repair are found to occur immediately 
after a trouble source is identified. 
Sequence The beginning of a sequence in CA is marked by a 
turn in which one of the participants initiates an 
action which is taken up by recipients. Its end is 
marked by the place where participants are no 
longer responding to that action.  
Sequence 
Organisation 
In CA every utterance is produced in relation to 
what has gone before and projects or limits the 
possibilities of what can come after. Meaning is 
tied to the position of the utterance in unfolding 
talk, its ‘sequential implicitiveness’. 
Standard Relational 
Pair (SRP) 
In MCA common sense understandings of the 
category collection in use set up expectations of 
member categories in relation to each other, for 
example within the device ‘family’, SRPs such as 
husband/wife, mother/child occur which describe 
normative relationships. By invoking such pairs the 
speaker draws on culturally shared inferences 
about the obligations and rights of each member 
with associated expected actions, otherwise 
known as category bound activities. 
Stocks of Interactional 
Knowledge (SIK) 
The institutional norms and practices described in 
textbooks and taught in professional training which 
guide practitioners expectations regarding the 
range of interactional practices and types of 
conversation deemed relevant (Peräkylä and 
Vehviläinen, 2003) 
Transition Relevance 
Place (TRP) 
The end of any TCU (see below) is termed a 
Transition Relevance Place. At each TRP there are 
three main ways that the next turn is allocated. The 
present speaker can select the next, a speaker 
can self-select or the present speaker can 
continue. 
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Troubles Telling In mundane conversation the preferred response to 
troubles telling is emotional reciprocity. The 
identities of troubles teller and troubles hearer in 
this context are symmetrical, in that their roles are 
interchangeable. In a ‘service encounter’ the 
troubles teller and troubles hearer roles are 
asymmetric, with the expectations of troubles 
hearer (service provider) being help giving and the 
troubles teller as help seeking (Jefferson and Lee 
1992). 
Turn Taking Overwhelmingly in conversation only one person 
speaks at a time with minimal gap or overlap 
between different speakers. A number of 
organising practices allow for speakers turns to be 
changed smoothly. For example, speakers orient 
to a possible change of speaker at the end of a 
Turn Construction Unit. 
Turn Construction Unit 
(TCU) 
A TCU is marked by its adequacy to achieve an 
action. It might be a sentence, a single word or a 
nod of the head. 
Tying Rules The means by which one part of a conversation is 
linked to another. 
Unhappy Incident 
Report 
An ‘unhappy incident’ is reported in such a way 
that the event is not linked with an actor/agent but 
as something that just happened and most 
frequently, in an unelaborated way. It is frequently 
used as a device for allocating blame in that “By 
reporting an unhappy incident as an 
announcement, a speaker reserves accounts of 
the background, setting, circumstances etc. for 
subsequent turns. It is in these subsequent turns that 
the allocation of responsibility is routinely oriented 
to” (Pomerantz, 1978, p. 117) 
Utterance A unit of speech which fulfils an action, from a 
single word to a group of words or sentences. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
The history of the study 
The study was originally designed to invest igate therapy sessions of three 
families, each with a member where one had lived experience of 
psychosis, with three therapy teams, each containing a systemic 
psychotherapist .  I  intended to listen to tapes and identify sections where 
the negotiat ion of blame was evident, t ranscribe the relevant sections and 
subject them to a discourse analysis focussing on how blame, 
accountability, responsibility and exoneration for events were achieved.  
Following the end of therapy I planned to interview families and subject the 
ensuing transcripts to a narrat ive analysis. The focus was on whether, over 
t ime, the construct ion of blame became modified and whether families 
connected these changes to their experience of therapy. 
 
Finding a site where therapists and families agreed to the research and 
completed therapy proved difficult . More than two years after receipt of 
ethical approval for the study I had collected four therapy sessions in all 
and one follow up interview. During this t ime I t ranscribed the therapy 
sessions in full, using a ‘rough’ transcript ion (ie not including all the details a 
CA transcript would entail). I  identified blaming sequences, got excited 
that blame was evident from the outset, checked out my findings with my 
colleagues and impatient ly waited for more data. As I waited for the ‘real’ 
data to be collected I played around with the transcripts I  had and 
became interested in the Conversat ion Analyt ic end of the spectrum of 
discourse analyt ic methods. I  began to examine sections of the transcripts 
that I had dismissed as irrelevant. For instance I had dismissed one section 
as a pre-amble to the therapy proper, a rather rambling discussion 
concerning a missed appointment and the sett ing up of another. As I 
examined it  from a sequential, rather than a topical, perspective I began 
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to see a complex and delicate negotiat ion about who was to blame (the 
therapists for not attending to the families needs, the patient for her illness, 
the husband for forgett ing?) and what I will call identity work (a caring 
therapist , a neglectful husband, a responsible patient?) This led to a 
recalibrat ion of my work. I  looked at the transcripts through a different lens, 
shift ing focus from topic (a blaming event) to sequence (is this a complaint, 
how is it  being taken up) and identity ascript ion (what member category is 
being implied and what are the consequences?) When two of the three 
therapists recruited to the study told me they were leaving it  made more 
sense to me to follow this new interest and change the focus of the 
analysis. This made the one follow up interview I had recorded difficult  to 
include in a meaningful way. However, despite the interview not being 
used as originally intended, the family’s report of their subjective 
experience had an important influence on the research. I  have therefore 
included a coda to the thesis which offers another perspective through 
which to reflect on the findings.  
 
253 
 
Appendix B   
Participant Information Sheet (Family) 
Research Title: How do family therapists help families make sense of the 
difficulties of living with psychosis? 
Thank you for agreeing to take some t ime to find out more about this 
research. This information sheet will tell you:  
 Who is responsible for the research. 
 What the research is about.  
 How the research will be carried out. 
 Possible disadvantages of part icipating in the research. 
 How the research may be of benefit . 
 What will be required of you if you agree to part icipate. 
 What will happen to the information we collect about you. 
If you decide you would prefer not to take part in the research it will not 
affect your treatment in any way. 
Who is responsible for the research? 
My name is Sarah Amoss and I am a family therapist  who works in the NHS 
in London. Many of the families I  work with have been affected by 
psychosis and I have become interested in finding out more about what 
therapists do which families find helpful or unhelpful. I  am carrying out t his 
research as part of the Doctoral Programme within the Tavistock and 
Portman NHS Foundation Trust.  
 
What is the research about? 
In my experience, when families come to therapy they are often trying to 
make sense of a difficult  situation. They are frequently t rying to work out 
who or what is responsible for their difficult ies in order to help them to move 
on.  Sometimes, different family members have different explanations for 
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the cause of their problems and are hoping that the therapist  can help 
them to throw some light on the situation. This research is designed to help 
us to find out more about how therapists respond to different explanations, 
part icularly those that may appear crit ical, and the effects of different 
responses.  
How will the research be carried out? 
I  will be analysing recordings of the family sessions of three different families 
with three different therapy teams. I  will then interview the families about 
their experience.  
Part 1- The Family Sessions 
The first  part of the research will involve audio recording your family 
sessions. I  will then listen to those recordings and transcribe sections that 
are relevant. I  am interested in finding out how therapists respond to 
different sorts of explanations and for this reason the focus of the first  part 
of this research is mainly on the therapists.  
Part 2 – The Research Interview 
The second part of the research will involve a research interview. After 10 
family sessions, or following your final session, whichever is the sooner, I  will 
meet with you for about an hour and ask you some quest ions. I  am 
interested in how you experienced the family sessions and whether you 
think they have affected your explanations for things or not.   
What are the possible disadvantages of participating in the research? 
The research interview may lead you to think about issues that you might 
have found embarrassing or upsett ing either in your family sessions or in 
your life. As someone who works with families affected by psychosis I  am 
familiar with support ing families in talking about difficult  issues. You will be 
free to answer the quest ions or not as you wish. Also, if you find the 
interview difficult  you will be able to withdraw from it . The [name of service] 
will meet with you following the research interview if you would like to. 
How will the research be of benefit? 
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The [name of service] has agreed to take part in this research because it  is 
committed to providing the best service possible. The aim is to understand 
more about helpful and unhelpful ways of responding to families. I  hope 
that this research will help not just the [name of service] in [region] but 
other family workers and therapists to improve their practice. We would 
therefore be grateful for your help. However, we also know that people 
who take part in research often find it  interest ing to talk with an outsider 
who is really curious about their experiences and so we hope it  might also 
be something you might enjoy too. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, 
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study 
has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by [name] Research 
Ethics Committee.  
 
If you agree to take part in this research you will be agreeing to two things.  
1. You will be giving permission for me to listen to the recordings of your 
family sessions. I  will be transcribing parts from your sessions which are 
relevant to the research quest ion.  
2. After family sessions have ended, or after 10 sessions whichever is 
sooner, I  will arrange to meet with you as a family for a research 
interview last ing about an hour. In this meeting I will ask you some 
quest ions about your experience of therapy. I  will record our 
conversat ion and transcribe it . The findings from the research will 
then be written up and published in a doctoral thesis and possibly 
elsewhere. 
Confidentiality 
Part1 - The Family Sessions 
The research does not affect the usual rules of confidentiality that your 
therapist  will have explained to you as a user of the [name of service]. All 
audio recordings will be encrypted for addit ional security and kept 
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securely according to [name] NHS Foundation Trust policies.  A copy of the 
audio recording will be transferred to an encrypted memory st ick and sent 
securely to me at the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust where I 
will upload it  onto their equipment temporarily in order to transcribe it .  
When I have transcribed and anonymised the data the copy of the 
recording will be destroyed.  
Part 2 - The Research Interview 
The research interview will be different from your family sessions. What you 
say in the research interview will not be fed back directly to the [name of 
service] unless you ask me to do so. However, should you say something 
that makes me concerned that someone is at serious risk of harm I will need 
to inform the [name of service] or another member of your direct care 
team, whichever you prefer.  
When the audio recordings are transcribed, all names and anything that 
might identify you will be changed to ensure anonymity. However, the very 
detailed nature of this type of research means that even anonymised 
material may be recognisable to family or friends. For instance I might use 
a short section of the transcript to illustrate a point and even though all 
your personal details have been changed, your family or close friends 
might be familiar with the story you tell or a part icular way of speaking. At 
the end of the study audio recordings and transcripts will be kept securely 
and destroyed after two years. I  will be publishing the results of the 
research in a doctoral thesis and possibly elsewhere. I  will ensure that you 
will not be identifiable in any published material.  
You will be free to withdraw from the research at any time. 
If you would like to speak to me directly to discuss any aspects of the study 
please contact me. If you would prefer, your therapist will answer any 
questions you may have. 
Thank you,  
Sarah Amoss 
Systemic Psychotherapist  
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Contact Details 
If you have any questions about the research process please contact me 
directly: 
Sarah Amoss  
Tel: 07592404818 / 020 8521 3635 E-mail: sarahamoss@e17.waitrose.com 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research please contact 
the research supervisor: 
Bernadette Wren (Consultant Psychologist)  
Tel: 020 8938 2298  E-mail:BWren@tavi-port.nhs.uk 
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Participant Consent Form (Family) 
Research Title: How do family therapists help families make sense of the 
difficulties of living with psychosis? 
Name of Researcher: Sarah Amoss 
 
Please t ick the boxes to show you have read and understood the 
information and then sign.  
 I  confirm that I have read and understood the Part icipant Information 
Sheet (Family) dated 18/07/2010 (version 3). I  have had an opportunity 
to consider the information, ask quest ions and have had these 
quest ions answered sat isfactorily. 
 I  understand that my part icipation is voluntary, that I am free to 
withdraw from the research at any t ime, without giving any reason 
and that this would not affect my treatment in any way.  
 I  give consent for my family sessions to be audio recorded and for 
these recordings to be made available for the above research. 
 I  understand that data collected during the study, may be looked at 
by individuals from the Tavistock and Portman Centre (the academic 
inst itut ion overseeing the project), from regulatory authorit ies or from 
the NHS Trust, where it  is relevant to my taking part in this research. I  
give permission for these individuals to have access to this data.  
 I  understand that I will be contacted after 10 sessions, or following the 
end of family sessions, whichever is sooner for a research interview and 
that this interview will be audio recorded. 
 I  understand that information from the research interview will not be 
fed back to the [name of service] or other members of the care team 
unless I  wish it  to be. The exception to this would be if the researcher 
becomes concerned that someone is at serious risk of harm. In this 
case she will inform a member of the direct care team. 
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 I  understand that all recorded and transcribed material will be kept 
securely and following the end of the research will be destroyed after 
two years. 
 I  understand that personal details will be changed in order to protect 
my anonymity in all published material relat ing to this project. 
 
Name of Part icipant    Date    Signature  
 
 
 
 
Name of person     Date    Signature  
taking consent  
 
 
 
Posit ion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher site file; 1 (original) to be kept in 
patient file.  
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Participant Information Sheet (Therapist) 
Research Title: How do family therapists help families make sense of the 
difficulties of living with psychosis? 
Thank you for agreeing to take some t ime to find out more about this 
research. This information sheet will tell you:  
 Who is responsible for the research. 
 What the research is about.  
 How the research will be carried out. 
 Possible disadvantages of part icipating in the research. 
 How the research may be of benefit . 
 What will be required of you if you agree to part icipate. 
 What will happen to the information we collect about you and 
your clients. 
Who is responsible for the research? 
My name is Sarah Amoss and I am a family therapist  who works in the NHS 
in London. Many of the families I  work with have been affected by 
psychosis and I have become interested in finding out more about what 
exactly therapists do which families find helpful or unhelpful. I  am carrying 
out this research as part of the Doctoral Programme within the Tavistock 
and Portman NHS Foundation Trust.  
 
What is the research about? 
In my experience, when families come to therapy they are often trying to 
make sense of a difficult  situation. They are frequently t rying to work out 
who or what is responsible for their difficult ies in order to help them to move 
on.  Sometimes, different family members have different explanations for 
the cause of their problems and are hoping that the therapist  can help 
them to throw some light on the situation. This research is designed to help 
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us to find out more about how therapists respond to different explanations, 
part icularly those that may appear crit ical, and the effects of different 
responses.  
 
How will the research be carried out? 
I  will be analysing recordings of the family sessions of three different families 
with three different therapy teams. I  will then interview the families about 
their experience.  
Part 1- The Family Sessions 
The first  part of the research will involve audio recording your family 
sessions. I  will then listen to those recordings and transcribe sections that 
are relevant. I  am interested in finding out how therapists respond to 
different sorts of explanations and for this reason the focus of the first  part 
of this research is mainly on the therapists.  
Part 2 – The Research Interview 
The second part of the research will involve a research interview with the 
family. After 10 family sessions, or following the final session, whichever is the 
sooner, I  will meet with the family for about an hour and ask some 
quest ions. The interviews will focus on family members’ experiences of their 
family sessions and whether they have affected their beliefs about what 
has caused their difficult ies.  
 
What are the possible disadvantages of participating in the research? 
Therapist  part icipants 
In addit ion to your rout ine work with families you will be required to explain 
the research to families, tape the family sessions and ensure that the data is 
kept securely and uploaded to the Trust network.  You will also be required 
to offer a family session following the research interview if the family 
requests one. 
Family Part icipants 
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The research interview may elicit  issues that are embarrassing or upsett ing. 
As an experienced psychotherapist  I  have the skills to support people 
should they become upset during the interview. The family will be able to 
answer quest ions or not as they wish and will have the right to withdraw 
from the interview. Following the interview the family will be given the 
opportunity to be referred back to the therapy team if they wish.  
 
How will the research be of benefit? 
“Research is needed to identify the competencies required to deliver 
effective family intervention to people with schizophrenia and their 
carers.” (NICE 2009) 
Part of my motivation for this research is that I think that dealing with 
contested causal explanations is a part icularly challenging aspect of our 
work and one that is under theorised. I  hope that this research will help us 
to understand more about helpful and unhelpful ways of responding to 
families’ attribut ions of responsibility. 
I  hope that if you decide to part icipate you will benefit  from the 
opportunity to reflect on your clinical work that tapes and transcripts offer. 
Tape review was something that I found invaluable during my training but 
sadly have lit t le t ime for in my current work sett ing.  
I  hope that families will find it  useful to tell an interested outsider about their 
experience of therapy. The research interview will be confidential but I  will 
ask the family if they wish any of the material that emerges to be fed back 
directly to the therapy team. The family will be informed that should any 
information emerge that indicates a serious risk of harm the direct care 
team will be notified. 
 
Who will be included in the study? 
Part icipant Inclusion Criteria (Therapist) 
Each therapy team will comprise one qualified systemic psychotherapist  
and one colleague with an accredited training in family intervention. 
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Part icipant Inclusion Criteria (Family) 
The family must have been assessed as suitable for and have been offered 
family sessions rout inely.  
All family members must be over 18.  
The family must contain at least one member who has experienced a 
psychotic episode.  
The presenting issue must involve the family’s experience of living with 
psychosis in some way.  
All members of the family must give written consent to t apes of the sessions 
being used for research purposes and to being interviewed following their 
family sessions. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
All research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people, 
called a Research Ethics Committee, to protect your interests. This study 
has been reviewed and given favourable opinion by [name] Research 
Ethics Committee.  
If you agree to take part in this research you will consent to the following:  
3. To discuss the project with families who meet the inclusion criteria 
and ensure that they are aware that their agreement or refusal to 
take part will in no way affect their t reatment. If the family agrees, to 
give them the Part icipant Information Leaflet (Family) and inform 
them that I am available to discuss the research further and answer 
any quest ions they may have. If they prefer to talk with you, to ensure 
that the family understands what is required of them with part icular 
regard to issues of confidentiality and information security. 
4. To ensure that all family members involved in the therapy have given 
informed consent and signed a consent form. 
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5. To be responsible for the audio recording of sessions. If audio 
recording takes place in families’ homes it  may require some 
adjustment to usual seating patterns to ensure the recording is 
audible.  
6. To make a note following each session to indicate whether the 
session included “responsibility talk”.  
7. To ensure that all recordings are kept securely in accordance with 
[name] NHS Foundation Trust policies and that the recording is 
uploaded to the Trust Network for access by the researcher.   
8. After therapy has ended, or after 10 sessions, I  will be interviewing 
family members. The therapy team will need to make available a 
follow up session to any family member that requests one in order to 
process any issues or concerns that may emerge through the 
research interview.  
Confidentiality 
When the audio recordings are transcribed, all names and anything that 
might identify you will be changed to ensure anonymity. At the end of the 
study audio recordings and transcripts will be kept securely and destroyed 
after two years. I  will be publishing the results of the research in a doctoral 
thesis and possibly elsewhere. I  will ensure that you will not be identifiable in 
any published material.  
You will be free to withdraw from the research at any time. 
Contact Details 
If you have any questions about the research process please contact me 
directly: 
Sarah Amoss (Systemic Psychotherapist) 
Tel: 07592404818 / 020 8521 3635 E-mail: sarahamoss@e17.waitrose.com 
 
If you have any concerns or complaints about the research please contact 
the research supervisor: 
Bernadette Wren (Consultant Psychologist)  
Tel: 020 8938 2298  E-mail:BWren@tavi-port.nhs.uk 
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Participant Consent Form (Therapist) 
Research Title: How do family therapists help families make sense of the 
difficulties of living with psychosis? 
Name of Researcher: Sarah Amoss 
Please t ick the boxes to show you have read and understood the 
information and then sign.  
 I  confirm that I have read and understood the Part icipant 
Information Sheet (Therapist) dated 18/07/2010 (Version 3). I  have 
had an opportunity to consider the information, ask quest ions and 
have had these quest ions answered sat isfactorily. 
 I  understand that my part icipation is voluntary, that I am free to 
withdraw from the research at any t ime, without giving any 
reason and with no detriment to my employment.  
 I  give consent for the family sessions to be audio recorded and for 
these recordings to be made available for the above research.  
 I  understand that relevant sections of data collected during the 
study, may be looked at by individuals from the Tavistock and 
Portman Centre (the academic inst itut ion overseeing the project) 
from regulatory authorit ies or from the NHS Trust, where it  is 
relevant to my taking part in this research. I  give permission for 
these individuals to have access to this data.  
 I  understand that I will be responsible for the safe keeping and 
uploading of the audio recordings of the family sessions in 
accordance with the [name] NHS Trust Information Governance 
Policy, IM&T Security Policy and Bespoke Software Policy (pending 
approval). I  have been provided with an opportunity to read and 
discuss the relevant sections of these policies and understand my 
responsibilit ies. 
 I  understand that recordings and transcripts of my therapy 
sessions will be made available to me for clinical purposes. 
 I  understand that in order to use these recordings and transcripts 
for teaching or research purposes I will be required to seek further 
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permission from the families involved, and in the case of research, 
to seek approval from the Research Ethics Committee. 
 I  understand that all recorded and transcribed material will be 
kept securely and following the end of the research will be 
destroyed after two years. 
 I  have been informed that my personal details will be changed in 
order to protect my anonymity in all published material relat ing to 
this project. 
 
 
Name of Part icipant    Date    Signature  
 
 
 
 
Name of Person     Date    Signature  
taking consent  
 
 
 
Posit ion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When completed: 1 for participant; 1 for researcher site file; 1 (original) to be kept in 
patient file.  
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Appendix C: Transcripts Chapter 4 
Sequence 1 Therapy 1 
T1 So have you adjusted what you d:o during the da:y or how you live your life as part 111 
of this (.) process of getting better? 112 
J Well I did go voluntary today I done one day today I thought I’d go and see how I 113 
get on (.) and I was just basically walking around a furniture shop with a can of ha 114 
ha u(h)m (.) ↑cleaner (.)  n I thought this int me (.) I’m worth a bit more than this 115 
(.) so I’m not goin ↓back. 116 
S hhhhh well I said to Janet I said it’s a confidence builder 117 
T1 mm 118 
S I know she’s sayin its all men there at work obviously but there’s different days int 119 
[there 120 
J     [>yeah I ↑didn’t mean it like that< (.) what I’m sayin is it was all men 121 
when I went for a coffee (.) it’d be nice if there was a lady there but .hhh I felt like 122 
I’m worth more than this basically you know if you like ↓summin don’t you 123 
T2 mmmm  124 
T1 So you didn’t feel you fitted in there very well? 125 
J ↑Yeah I think I was all right but I- in myself I thought I think I’m worth a bit more 126 
than this hm hm 127 
T2 mhm do you think it was something to do with it jus- the first day, that they 128 
thought they’d kinda give you something easy to do the first day or d’you 129 
[ know 130 
J [>no I just thought it weren’t me< (.) what I was doin really 131 
S How would you feel if some of your mates came in n you were there cleanin (.)  132 
would you get embarrassed by that?  133 
(2)  134 
S Is that part of it? 135 
J ↑No I’m just saying I- I just feel it wasn’t for me. I don’t think I’d like to do that all 136 
the time. 137 
T1 I- I don’t want us t- to kind of (.) I don’t want you to feel we’re trying to >get at 138 
you or anything like that< but I’m feeling a- a bit the same as Steven and I guess a-139 
as you Mary I’m thinking I’m sure this isn’t your permanent (.) role in life its not 140 
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something you’re going to do f-for↑ever its like a stepping stone (.) its just 141 
something to get you back into the (.) ↑swing of things=  142 
J =I found it boring to be honest (.) it was just cleaning heh heh I thought I do 143 
enough of that at home basically (.) I thought here I go again 144 
T1 Ye:ah and there wasn’t a social side to it either= 145 
J =not really 146 
T1 The question is whether that’s (.) what they would expect you to do next time= 147 
J =mm 148 
T1 Did they say anything to you like next time we’ll show you how to do this 149 
J          [oh they were 150 
helpful they were helpful you know but I jus:t= 151 
S =>to be fair Janet< we were in town last week weren’t we (.) we went into this 152 
foundation shop dint we (.) where you worked  n we see the woman behind the 153 
desk (.) and Janet she put her application form in and Jan said like she’ll come up 154 
and have a little taster day and she said y’know what d’you wanna in the shop, you 155 
can work the tills, do what you like n Jan said I’ll do a bit a cleaning she said 156 
[indecipherable] 157 
J  [well yeah, they give me a choice yeah but I found it boring [basically 158 
S           [theres other 159 
jobs to do there Janet in the shop besides cleaning 160 
 J well I was bored, I do that every day of the week[of the week 161 
S       [frinstance 162 
T1 so you cho:se to do cleaning 163 
J ↑yeah yeah 164 
T1 it wasn’t that they expected you to do cleaning 165 
S No 166 
J No no no not at all but I just thought this int me 167 
T1 So what would be you  168 
(3) 169 
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Sequence 2 Therapy 1  
T2 yeah mmm (1) .hhh I suppose I was just (.) I was thinking in relation to the charit:y 481 
shop(1) was it a charity shop you volunteered in this morning? 482 
J yea:h. yeah 483 
T2 cos you don’t (1) you don’t see the people that you’re helping do you cos it is a 484 
really worthwhile job cos you are raising money for ↑charity and it’s a really good 485 
thing to do but you’re not actually 486 
S         [mmm  487 
T2      [in touch with the people you’re helping 488 
J ↑£I did meet an old lady today she asked if they had a reclining cha(h)ir in(h) the 489 
shop= 490 
T2 =Oh r(h)ight!= 491 
J =↑I says it’s my first day but as far as I’m a(h)ware there’s not£ 492 
T2 heh heh 493 
S She says there is one but I’m (h) sat in it 494 
[laughter]  495 
J          [ I explained I was cleaning and I think hang on I do that twenty four seven at 496 
home really 497 
T2 yeah↓ 498 
J clean, clean, clean 499 
T1 But ↑ if if you’d said something else when they asked you what would you like to 500 
do today (1) and you said give me ↑anything but cleaning cos I do enough of that at 501 
home= 502 
J =it was me that said cleaning= 503 
T1 =I wonder what they would’ve given you= 504 
S =yeah= 505 
T1 =and I wonder what you’d be saying now. 506 
S That’s what I said (.) in a way John coming up in the car this afternoon (1) 507 
T1 mmhm 508 
S didn’t I? 509 
 (1)  510 
S in a way 511 
T1 cos you don’t know what else they might have offered you 512 
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S mm 513 
T1 they might have said ↑would you like to do this or this (.) and you might have 514 
picked one of those (.) and come back and said >cor I’ve never done that before<or 515 
>that was quite interesting cos we did such and such and<(2) you picked the boring 516 
one didn’t you 517 
J  [I ↑did 518 
T1              [you and have no one to blame but yourself really 519 
J     [no, no, that’s ri↑ght.  520 
S I said on the way coming up is there any girls at all work in there,  521 
J ↑Its not the point its all men but I just felt (.) 522 
S bu- but ↑say you worked tomorrow >for a couple of days< and there was two 523 
women (.) there aswell (.) you’d feel more comfortable wouldn’t you 524 
T2 mmm, mm 525 
J But I’m not going back there really so that’s that (.) theres no good going on about 526 
↑ i(h)t 527 
T2 [ha ha ha] 528 
T1 is that right↓ 529 
J I’ve made me ↑mind up 530 
T1 Really (1)£ is this the Janet that you know Steven?£ 531 
S Yes (1) she tries it once (.) if it’s no good (.) never go back (2) 532 
T1 ri:ght 533 
S But I think it’s a bit more determination I think you need on your part 534 
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Sequence 3 Therapy 1  
T1 well if you work hard and have a little break that’s jus (1) hhh I was just thinking 703 
T2 um (.) we were going to ask you y’know (.) whether you’ve had further 704 
thoughts about (.) how best we can u:se these sessions (.) u:m (.) have you had (1) 705 
either your own thoughts about it or have you had any conversations about that (.) I 706 
know that you having had this set back and getting ill again (.) is yknow (.) 707 
probably got in the way of some of that but (.) have you given that some thought? 708 
(2) How we can best help you? 709 
 (3) 710 
S I think really the best thing I think is really t-to find a bit of work (.) for Janet an- 711 
give her a bit more confidence (.) that’s what I want to get out of this (.) as well as 712 
[undecipherable] (2) what do you think? 713 
 (2) 714 
J ↑ye↓a↑eh 715 
 (4) 716 
S cos you’re always tryin (.) putting yourself ↑down cos (.) 717 
J but I’ve always been a people pleaser as well haven’t I  718 
S mm 719 
J I always please other people so I want to really do somethin that’s gonna (2) that I 720 
want to do. 721 
T2 mm 722 
 J not that I sort of gotta (.) do this for the sake of doing it(.) that’s how  I look at 723 
  it 724 
 T2 that’s important isn’t it mm725 
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Appendix D: Transcripts Chapter 5 
Sequence 1 Therapy 2 
T1 so how are you feeling at present Kevin coming along today with all that going on 222 
and 223 
K ◦I don’t mind coming along◦ 224 
T1 rig(h)ht   225 
K  [not worried] 226 
T1   [o(h)k  u:m (1) an-and are you feeling Ok cos as as Mandy was 227 
saying she can be quite [ .hhh  228 
K      [yeah, yeah its hard 229 
T1             [hard on you] 230 
M      [You have] been stressed 231 
K yeah 232 
 (1) 233 
M He has been stressed (.) he he just wont he just wont say [he wont be honest 234 
K               [Yeah I have been its my 235 
brother’s birthday next week and that (.) an it was his anniversary last month 236 
T1 right 237 
K that’s not helped 238 
T1 is that a wedding anniversary? 239 
K no he died 240 
T1 the anniversary of his death 241 
K ◦ he died◦ (1) once it comes up always I think about him a bit more than normal so 242 
 (1) 243 
T1 and is that what you meant(.) Mandy when you said that Kevin was stressed? 244 
M we:ll Kevin Kevin is stressed with me (1) and right (1) he’s stressed with the 245 
ho:use and stuff but he just wont ↑say it and it makes me cross cos I I ↑know he i:s 246 
T1 mm 247 
M but he wont say and he wont get help and then (.) it all just builds up and then 248 
there’ll be a a massive like humungous outburst  249 
T1 ◦right◦ 250 
M to the point where like the kids are going up in their rooms or 251 
T1 wow 252 
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M putting something on really loud because they just cant ↑take it any more they just 253 
cant .hhh there’ve even been times when the  kids have actually cried cos theyre 254 
just so stressed with it all with us fi:ghting and (1) yknow its just (3) ◦and so yeah◦  255 
 (2) 256 
T1 is there any kind of pattern to how (1) frequent things can build up (.) due to kind 257 
of stress (.) on you Kevin? 258 
K no its just (1) I always forget to do things n’ that then it sort of goes from there al-259 
(.) always forget things and [forget 260 
T1          [so in in terms of frequency would that be kind of -261 
↑daily or 262 
K     [no, it’s not 263 
T  [or every other day or weekly or? 264 
K its the last two weeks have been the worst cos it seems to be (.) the house has been 265 
messed up and things (.) and that stresses me out as well so .hh 266 
M but its (.) its not that I think theres ↑other problems as ↑well because .hh like (1) I 267 
think he treats like Alfie different from the ↑girls and so (1) when like hes (1) 268 
having a go at Alfie  269 
T1 mmm 270 
M yknow I’ll I will  jump in and (.) and then tha- tha that’ll yknow that gets out of 271 
hand too 272 
T1 ◦right◦ 273 
M y’know cos sometimes [like 274 
T1     [SO HOW KEVin reacts can then lead to you to react 275 
M             [yeah 276 
T1                 [ in a 277 
particular kind of way too [Mandy 278 
M                      [cos sometimes like he’s like inappropriate in what he 279 
says (1)  he can be really nasty to Alfie and he just wont accept it when I tell him 280 
K no it [indecipherable ] 281 
M          [its like the girls have a lot of leeway 282 
T1 .hhhh I’ve got a suggestion is that we ↑don’t try to get into too much detail (1) 283 
K yeah 284 
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T1 beca:use what we would hope to do over yknow a series of appointments is that  285 
we can kind of look at the details of (.) yknow these kind of examples but in a kind 286 
of (1) y’know if that’s the kind of thing you want [to look at 287 
M                      [I just think stress is 288 
everything to do with me yknow I stress him out (.) right (.)  he has to do school 289 
run [and 290 
K       [oh I don’t [indecipherable] 291 
M   [and look after the kids and yknow I have panic attacks daily 292 
T1 mmm 293 
M right not just one neither (1) and they can be like (.) I can just be sitting there 294 
watching the telly and I’ll ju- it just comes on and so Kevin constantly like 295 
watching me to make sure I’m not self ha:rming [or er 296 
T1               [so we’re talking about a lot of 297 
stress aren’t we on a kind of daily basis [an 298 
K              [yeah I suppose yeah 299 
M yeah if I start self harming Kevin starts like safe proofing the house and everything  300 
T1 mm 301 
M and taking stuff away= 302 
T1 =the obvious things away (.) that you might hurt yourself with 303 
M yeah  304 
T1 yeah 305 
M so (.) I suppose .hh its like someone looking after a toddler isn’t it. 306 
K ◦no I don’t think its like that◦  307 
T1 mm 308 
 K I ↑wanna look after you I like it (1) its stressful yeah so ◦I like doing it◦ 309 
(2) 310 
T1 We talked (1) I don’t know ho:w how clearly you remember the conversations we 311 
had last time 312 
K not very much (.) I’m getting a really bad memory [actually I] forget 313 
T1        [ha ha] 314 
M We was talking about when we first met 315 
K >yeah, yeah, yeah that’s right yeah< 316 
T1 Cos yknow I think you were touching on there Kevin that that you y-you kinda like 317 
(.) wanting 318 
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K           [yeah yeah] 319 
T1   [to help Mandy (.) and that even if its stressful its something that yo-320 
you do 321 
K yeah 322 
T1 and you’re the(h)re 323 
K   [yeah] 324 
T1       [ you(h)re h(h)ere u:m but I think yknow that’s kind of what 325 
Mandy’s also saying .hh theres a lot of things which happen just on a daily ↑basis 326 
.hhh involving you, involving the children, involving how (.) you react or how 327 
Mandy’s reacting that either one of you will react to .hhh which actually can be a 328 
lot of stress  329 
K yeah it can be actually um 330 
T1 and you’ve talked a bit about a lot of your kinda role has been as a carer.hh 331 
K yeah= 332 
T1 =over the years you know to your mum an:d= 333 
K =yeah=  334 
T =and to Mandy when you got together and(.) yeah so its something which you’ve 335 
become used to doing  336 
K yeah 337 
T1 ha ha ha and in many ways you’ve elected to do you’ve chosen to do 338 
K yeah 339 
T1 haven’t you 340 
K yeah 341 
T and that’s important to not lose sight of. 342 
K ◦I like it◦ 343 
M its hard because I feel like I don’t show Kevin enough affection (1)344 
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Sequence 2 Therapy 2  
T1 .hh So coming back to th- the question Mandy how does (.)  those experiences 700 
affect you in the present in terms of (.) how you are trying to cope and deal with (1) 701 
events in your life and (.) how that fits in with your stress levels. How-how do you 702 
[make sense] of that. 703 
M    [U::m ] I’m doing a lots of work with Anne at the 704 
moment I’m trying to deal (.) cos I am an emotional personality disorder but that is 705 
because of how I’ve been brought up 706 
T1 mm 707 
M So I try and focus on my feelings a lot (.) to try and show Kevin some love an-(.) ◦ 708 
and some compassion and that◦. 709 
T1 So having those experiences (.) a lot of your growing up years (.) ha- makes you 710 
feel that you don’t show that kind of c-care  and (.) love to Kevin towards Kevin. 711 
M Sometimes I feel that with my mouth (.) sometimes I catch myself thinking God 712 
I’m turning into my mum? because she was- she was vicious with her mouth (.) 713 
and I hate myself for that 714 
T1 So you find yourself reacting in ways you don’t 715 
M ◦yeah◦ 716 
T1 that you’d kind of experienced yourself 717 
M ◦yeah◦ 718 
T1 others people other people being (.)[ yeah?] 719 
M             [yeah] I’ll ↑be honest with you (.) I I really 720 
punish Kevin I do. yknow I’m absolutely sur↑prised he’s still with me to be honest 721 
with you.  I mean I-I suppose I abuse ↑Kevin. I’ve severely abused him. 722 
T1 mm 723 
M He’s always there to take the brunt of it when my schizo↑phrenias bad y’know? 724 
he’s the one who takes the brunt of it. 725 
(2)  726 
M sh- He (h) don(h)’t ↑say anything he always says I don’t care, I don’t care. 727 
 (2) 728 
K [indecipherable] 729 
T1 I mean clearly (.) Kevin what Mandy has experienced is [absolutely horrific] 730 
K              [yeah yeah definitely] 731 
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T1 [isnt it] 732 
K [yeah ]↑yeah 733 
T1 a:nd um (1) I-I guess she’s usin:g (.) strong words isn’t she like 734 
K yeah 735 
T1 y’know  I guess I:: abuse Kevin is whats she saying 736 
K yeah 737 
T1 i-is that how you experience it?  738 
K .hh ◦no- not all the time I mean ↑sometimes its: its bad but (1) dunno? Its:◦ 739 
T1 You don’t kind of th-think of in those terms yourself 740 
K ◦no◦ 741 
T1 a-as abuse or 742 
K Dunno? I don’t think so  743 
T1 Ha, ha 744 
K ◦don’t know◦ 745 
T1 No (.) you don’t. 746 
 (1) 747 
T2 ↑I sort of get a sense you’re quite frus↑trated that Kevin doesn’t react to that. 748 
M yeah 749 
T2 I-I it feels ju- listening to you explain it Mandy it sounds like you’re really looking 750 
fo:r .hhh some sort of reaction for Kevin not to just keep taking 751 
M [yeah] 752 
T2 [the things] that you deliver. 753 
M .hhh sometimes I’ve wanted Kevin to beat me, I’ve wanted him to I think I n- I 754 
need him to .hh yknow= 755 
T2 =because? 756 
M because um praps I-it’ll make me a better person 757 
T1 ◦right◦ 758 
 (2)759 
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 Sequence 3 Therapy 2  
(2) 761 
T1  [and having Kevin (.) beat you (.) would that be: mo:re of the ↑old pattern 762 
or mo:re of something different happening in your own mind. 763 
 (2)  764 
M .hh no it would jus- I don’t know I ↑just- I just feel it would just make me a better 765 
person. 766 
T1 mmm 767 
M um 768 
T1 its interesting what you’re saying cos you’re looking for somethi:ng different to be 769 
happening like being a better person(.) I guess its an aspiration its something you 770 
strive for (.) yeah? 771 
M ◦yeah◦ 772 
T1 cos you’re saying you don’t feel you’re a very good person 773 
M ◦no◦ 774 
T1 how you think, or how you feel, or how you behave at times 775 
M yeah no I’m not a good person 776 
T1 but what your expecting from Kevin i:s (.) you said earlier that Kevin is the first 777 
person who hasn’t abused you 778 
M ◦yeah◦  779 
T1 but what you’re expecting from Kevin is almost to respo:nd back with physical 780 
abuse  781 
M ◦yeah◦ 782 
T1 to make you kind of better (.) but actually it would be part of what would have 783 
been happening before (1) of what you’d expect from people that people abuse 784 
you.   785 
M ◦yeah◦ 786 
T1 ◦yeah?◦ 787 
T1 But its interesting what Jan was asking before isn’t it that you are expecting a 788 
different response from Kevin. 789 
M I ↑wish he would speak like I’m re(h)ally frustrated now cos he just wont speak .hh 790 
K      [indecipherable] 791 
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M      [and I just really want him to speak I really .hh I don’t want him to spare 792 
my feelings I [want him to sit there and say right] 793 
K    [I’m not I’m not] I don’t like it at ↑all 794 
M .hhh this is this and that is that and I- I get cross with her cos of this or 795 
T mm 796 
M [I jus-] 797 
K [No I ↑don’t] like it obviously 798 
M it’s like I feel like I’m layin I’m layin all my stuff bare here 799 
T1 yes 800 
M and (.) he’s not givin- he’s not he’s not giving ↑anything and its just like .hhh I 801 
don’t ↑know how he feels I don’t ↑know w-what he thinks I cant (.) and that really 802 
inf- infuriates me because .hhh I just feel like I’m on m-my own in this group 803 
be↑cause hes not .hh hes not giving anything 804 
T1 .hhh Part of what’s going on he:re is that we’re actually (.) yknow meeting and 805 
we’re all being polite. Which is if we ↑all talked at the same time (.) none of us 806 
would hear what the ot(h)her pe(h)rson was saying and .hhh um it would be very 807 
hard to make ourselves heard .hh so theres a kind of social etiquette isn’t [there] 808 
K [yeah] 809 
T1  that we take turns [to .hh] 810 
M          [yeah]  811 
T1 either speak, ask questions, or actually say how it is fro:m each of our points of 812 
view .hhh so I guess as ↑you’re saying things its very hard for you Kevin to 813 
actually say something [or respond] 814 
K        [yeah] 815 
T1 but what we would ↑hope to do is gi:ve (.) both of you time to kind of think about 816 
what the other person (.) has said [um 817 
K          [yeah I ↑know its bad bu- when she says 818 
things then I will say things to ↑her (.) like horrible thin:gs an- 819 
T1 mm 820 
K ju- then after things have settled down I’ll feel really bad because (.) I’ve started s-821 
swearing at her and calling her horrible na:mes 822 
T1 mm 823 
K makes it a lot worse I think (.) cos I said it 824 
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T1 ◦right◦ so sometimes if you do react back to .hh Mandy an:d verbally you- you’re 825 
saying nasty things? 826 
K yeah 827 
M ve-very rare though (.) that probably happens like(.) twice a year?  828 
T1 [m↑hm] 829 
M [if that] 830 
K I feel bad because I don’t think I should be .hhh saying anything because of what 831 
shes been through 832 
T1 right (.) so in your own (.) for your own self Kevin actually that doesnt feel like an 833 
OK thing to do. 834 
K yeah, yeah 835 
T1 ◦yeah◦  836 
K sometimes you just can’t help an- it just happens so .hh h837 
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Appendix E: Transcription Symbols 
 
This set of symbols is based on Jefferson’s method as simplified by ten Have 
(1999). I  have further simplified the t iming of pauses to 1 second intervals. 
 
(1) A pause of 1 second 
(.)  A pause of less than 1 second  
=  Latching together of utterances, 
or continuation of a turn across 
lines  
[ ]  The onset and end of a section 
of overlapping talk  
.hh  Speaker in-breath  
hh  Speaker out-breath  
wo(h)rd  Breathiness (or laughter or crying) 
within a word  
wor-  Cut-off of the preceding word or 
sound  
::  Stretching of the preceding 
sound  
!  Animated intonation  
?  Rising intonation  
,  Falling and continuing intonation  
.  Stopping fall in tone  
£word£  Material delivered in a “smile” 
voice  
↑ ↓ Strong upward/downward 
intonation of following sound  
  
wo: rd  Weaker upward intonation 
before underlined colon  
word  Slight ly louder word or sound  
WORD  Significantly louder word or 
sound  
ºwordº  Significantly quieter word or 
sound  
>word<  Talk produced noticeably more 
quickly  
<word>  Talk produced noticeably more 
slowly  
( )  Unclear fragment of speech  
(word)  Transcriber‟s guess at an unclear 
fragment  
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Appendix F: Ethical Approval  
NHS Regional Ethics Committee Approval 1 
 
[Name] REC 
[address] 
 
 Telephone: […] 
Facsimile: […] 
23 July 2010 
 
Ms Sarah Amoss 
Vicarage Lane Health Centre 
10 Vicarage Lane 
Stratford 
London 
E15 4HD 
 
 
Dear Sarah  
 
Study Title: How family therapists help families make sense of the 
difficulties of living with psychosis. 
REC reference number: 10/H0107/47 
 
Thank you for your letter of 20 July 2010, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation as 
revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
Ethical review of research sites 
 
The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 
“Conditions of the favourable opinion” below). 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the start 
of the study at the site concerned. 
 
For NHS research sites only, management permission for research (“R&D approval”) 
should be obtained from the relevant care organisation(s) in accordance with NHS research  
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governance arrangements.  Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is 
available in the Integrated Research Application System or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk. 
 
Where the only involvement of the NHS organisation is as a Participant Identification 
Centre (PIC), management permission for research is not required but the R&D office 
should be notified of the study and agree to the organisation’s involvement. Guidance on 
procedures for PICs is available in IRAS. Further advice should be sought from the R&D 
office where necessary. 
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host organisations. 
 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied 
with before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as applicable). 
 
Approved documents 
 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
  
Document    Version    Date    
  
Investigator CV  1  10 June 2010    
Protocol  1  10 June 2010    
Supervisor CV  1  10 June 2010    
REC application         
Covering Letter    20 July 2010    
Interview Schedules/Topic Guides  1  10 June 2010    
Participant Information Sheet: Therapist  2  18 July 2010    
Response to Request for Further Information    20 July 2010    
Participant Information Sheet: Family  2  18 July 2010    
Participant Consent Form: Therapist  2  18 July 2010    
Participant Consent Form: Family  2  18 July 2010    
Referees or other scientific critique report    10 June 2010    
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
After ethical review 
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Now that you have completed the application process please visit the National Research Ethics 
Service website > After Review 
 
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National Research 
Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make your views known please use 
the feedback form available on the website. 
 
The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed guidance 
on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Adding new sites and investigators 
 Progress and safety reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of changes 
in reporting requirements or procedures. 
 
We would also like to inform you that we consult regularly with stakeholders to improve our 
service. If you would like to join our Reference Group please email 
referencegroup@nres.npsa.nhs.uk.  
 
10/H0107/47 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
Dr [Name] 
Chair 
 
Email: [identifiable email] 
 
Enclosures: “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” SL- AR2  
 
Copy to: Eilis Kennedy 
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NHS Regional Ethics Committee Approval 2 
NRES [name] 
[address] 
 
Tel: […] 
Fax: […] 
 
 
08 July 2011 
 
Ms Sarah Amoss 
Brent Adult and Family Psychotherapy Service 
103 Chestnut Avenue South 
Walthamstow 
London 
E17 9EJ 
 
Dear Ms Amoss 
 
Study title: How family therapists help families make sense of the 
difficulties of living with psychosis. 
REC reference: 10/H0107/47 
Amendment number: 2 
Amendment date: 04 July 2011 
 
Thank you for your letter of 04 July 2011, notifying the Committee of the above 
amendment. 
 
The amendment has been considered by the Chair. 
 
The Committee does not consider this to be a “substantial amendment“ as defined in the 
Standard Operating Procedures for Research Ethics Committees.  The amendment does not 
therefore require an ethical opinion from the Committee and may be implemented 
immediately, provided that it does not affect the approval for the research given by the 
R&D office for the relevant NHS care organisation. 
 
Documents received 
 
The new and amended documents received were as follows: 
 
 Document  Version  Date  
  
Participant Information Sheet: Family  3  04 July 2011    
Notification of a Minor Amendment  2  04 July 2011    
Covering Letter    04 July 2011    
  
Statement of compliance 
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The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for 
Research Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating 
Procedures for Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 
10/H0107/47: Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
[name] 
Committee Co-ordinator 
 
E-mail: […] 
 
Copy to: Dr Bernadette Wren, Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust 
Ms Eilis Kennedy, Tavistock and Portman NHS Trust 
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NHS Trust Site R&D Approval Letter 
 
[name] NHS Trust [logo] 
[address] 
Tel:[…] 
Fax: […] 
 
 
Our ref: […]058 
 
 
11th July 2011 
 
 
 
Ms Sarah Amoss 
Brent Adult and Family Therapy Service 
103 Chestnut Ave South 
Walthamstow 
E17 9EJ 
 
 
Dear Ms Amoss 
 
Study Title:  How family therapists help families make sense of 
living with psychosis 
REC Reference:  10/H0107/47 
Amendment number: 2 
Amendment date:  04 July 2011 
 
I am pleased to advise you that I have reviewed the amended documents (listed 
below) for the above study and I am happy for [name] NHS Foundation Trust to 
continue to be a site for this project. 
 
Document Name Version Number 
[name] REC Revision Letter July 2011 
Participant Information Sheet: Family 3 
 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
[name] 
 
 
Research and Development Lead 
 
 
[Trust Logo]   
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University Research Ethics Committee Approval  
Ms Sarah Amos  
103 Chestnut Avenue  
South  
Walthamstow  
London  
E17 9EJ  
 
27 February 2014  
 
 
Dear Miss Amos  
 
University of East London/The Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust: research 
ethics  
 
Study Title: The negotiation of blame in family therapy with families affected by 
psychosis  
 
I am writing to inform you that the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC) has 
received your site approval letter from NHS […] and your NHS letter stipulating the 
conditions of approval for the study that had to be met, which you submitted to the Chair of 
UREC, Professor Neville Punchard. Please take this letter as written confirmation that had you 
applied for ethical clearance from our UREC at the appropriate time; it is likely it would have 
been granted. However, this does not place you in exactly the same position you would have 
been in had clearance been obtained in advance. Therefore, when responding to any 
questioning regarding the ethical aspects of your research, you must of course make reference 
to and explain these developments in an open and transparent way.  
 
For the avoidance of any doubt, or misunderstanding, please note that the content of this letter 
extends only to those matters relating to the granting of ethical clearance. If there are any other 
outstanding procedural matters, which need to be attended to, they will be dealt with entirely 
separately as they fall entirely outside the remit of our University Research Ethics Committee.  
 
If you are in any doubt about whether, or not, there are any other outstanding matters you 
should contact Mr William Bannister at the Tavistock and Portman NHS Foundation Trust (e-
mail WBannister@tavi-port.nhs.uk).  
 
Yours sincerely  
 
 
 
pp: Catherine Fieulleteau  
Ethics Integrity Manager  
For and on behalf of  
Professor Neville Punchard  
Chair of the University Research Ethics Committee (UREC)  
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Foundation Trust  
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Portman NHS Foundation Trust  
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Professor Neville Punchard, Chair of the University of East London Research Ethics 
Committee  
Dr Alan White, Director of the Graduate School, University of East London  
Mr David G Woodhouse, Associate Head of Governance and Legal Services 
Sacks, H. (1995) Lect ures on Conversat ion. Volumes 1 and 2.  Blackwell: 
Oxford. 
 
